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*SOCIAL SCIENCES* (ISSN 0134-5486) is a quarterly publication of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). The articles selected by the Editorial Council are chosen from books and journals originally prepared in the Russian language by authors from 30 institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Statements of fact and opinion appearing in the journal are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the Editorial Council.

*Reprint permission:* Editorial Council. Address: 26, Maronovsky pereulok, Moscow, 119991 GSP-1, Russia.

*SOCIAL SCIENCES* (ISSN 0134-5486) is published quarterly by East View Information Services: 10601 Wayzata Blvd., Minneapolis, MN 55305, USA. Vol. 47, No. 1, 2016. Postmaster: Send address changes to East View Information Services: 10601 Wayzata Blvd., Minneapolis, MN 55305, USA.

*Orders* are accepted by East View Information Services. Phone: (952) 252-1201; Toll-free: (800) 477-1005; Fax: (952) 252-1201; E-mail: [periodicals@eastview.com](mailto:periodicals@eastview.com) as well as by all major subscription agencies.

*Subscriptions:* Individuals, \$61.00 per year; institutions, \$435.00 per year.

*Back issues:* Please send your inquiries to East View Information Services. *Electronic subscriptions:* individuals, \$61.00/year; institutions, \$435.00/year.

*SOCIAL SCIENCES* is indexed by *PAIS International Information Service*, *American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies (ABSEES)*, *International Bibliography of Periodical Literature*, *International Bibliography of the Social Sciences*, *Sociological Abstracts*, *Social Planning Policy & Development Abstracts*, *Linguistic & Language Behaviour Abstracts*, and *UnCover*. It is abstracted by the *Journal of Economic Literature*. It is listed in the *Ulrich's International Periodical Directory*.

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**FOUNDED IN 1970**

# SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME 47

NUMBER 1, 2016

## CONTENTS

*In This Issue* 1

### ECONOMICS

---

**Independent Economic Think Tanks in Russia:  
Evolution and Development Prospects** *A. Yakovlev,  
L. Freynkman,  
A. Zolotov* 3

### HISTORY

---

**The Interallied War in Summer 1913 as Seen  
by the Russian Public (Based on Russian press  
publications of that time)** *B. Kotov* 27

### PHILOLOGY

---

**How Gogol's Selected Passages  
from Correspondence with My Friends  
Reached the Reader** *I. Monakhova* 43

### PHILOSOPHY

---

**Locke's Razor** *A. Yakovlev* 52

### POLITICAL SCIENCE

---

**21st-Century Liberalism: Crisis or Revival?** *S. Peregodov* 65

### PSYCHOLOGY

---

**Liberals and Pseudoliberals: Psychological Profiles** *A. Yurevich* 75

### SOCIOLOGY

---

**Civic and Ethnic Identity and  
Image of Desirable Statehood in Russia** *L. Drobizheva,  
S. Ryzhova* 90

## BOOK REVIEWS

---

### I. Economics

---

- V. Tamovtsev. *Economics of Informal Institutions***     *A. Zaostrovtssev*     107
- O. Shkaratan, V. Leksin, G. Yastrebov (eds.).  
*Russia as a Civilization: Materials for Reflection***     *N. Zarubina*     111

### II. History

---

- I. Maksimychev. *Russia and Germany. War and Peace. From World Wars to European Security***     *N. Meden*     116
- Moscow during World War I. 1914-1917. Documents and Records***     *V. Polikarpov*     120

### III. Philology

---

- The Epoch of Napoleon as Seen from Russia. Book One***     *N. Podosokorsky*     125

### IV. Philosophy

---

- S. Lebedev. *Philosophy of Scientific Cognition: Basic Concepts***     *Yu. Granin*     129

### V. Political Science

---

- V. Pantin, V. Lapkin. *Historical Forecasting in the Twenty-first Century: the Kondratyev Cycles, Evolutionary Cycles and Prospects for World Development***     *I. Semenenko*     137

### V. Psychology

---

- V. Petrenko. *Psychosemantics of Art***     *Yu. Saurov,  
N. Nizovskikh*     143

### VII. Sociology

---

- I. Zabayev, Ye. Melkumyan, D. Oreshina et al. (Eds.).  
*The Invisible Church. Social Effects of the Parish Community in Russian Orthodoxy***     *Ye. Berdysheva*     147

## ACADEMIC LIFE

---

- Academic Journals**     154

**In This Issue:**

**A. Yakovlev, L. Freynkman, A. Zolotov:** “This paper includes a review of the main trends in the development of independent analytical centers (think tanks) in the area of economic policy in Russia. Let us emphasize that the focus of our attention is not the entire economic analysis market, but primarily *independent centers engaged mainly in ‘analytical’ research*, i.e., in the study of more fundamental and long-term problems of economic development at the national level and at the level of individual economic sectors.”

**B. Kotov:** “The Second Balkan War was an important turning-point in Russian attitudes to the Balkan Slavonic peoples. It buried the illusions that it was possible to merge all Orthodox Balkan peoples into a powerful coalition friendly to Russia and faced the Russian public and Russian diplomacy with the need to put a stake on one of the irreconcilable adversaries—Serbia or Bulgaria.”

**I. Monakhova:** “The current situation is reminiscent of the times of Gogol in that then, as now, the Church had a great—if not unlimited—influence on society. Some had a critical attitude toward it as society struggled to find new paths of development while at the same time seeking to reappraise the traditional path. Gogol’s visionary work was perhaps one of the most valiant attempts to do so. This may be why it is easier for us today to understand Gogol the preacher. The historical experience our country lived through during the past century, replete as it was with turbulence and upheavals, demonstrates how well justified were Gogol’s premonitions concerning his country’s destiny.”

**A. Yakovlev:** “John Locke’s *An Essay on Human Understanding* is an attempt to draw the boundaries, and to define the limits of knowledge by placing man in a chain of being, in a hierarchy of the intellectual world. There man occupies one of the lamentably low places and, besides the Revelation, bestowed on him out of pity, can only rely on a painful and weak channel, which is his experience. But such is the dispensation of God who deprived Adam and all his progeny of all the higher gifts he previously had, leaving him only with the ‘innate’ *tabula rasa*.”

**S. Peregudov:** “The main specific feature ... of liberalism is ... the very essence and ‘quality’ of the public relations it personifies. I would characterize this quality as the ‘human tint’ inherent to these relations ... liberalism in the early 21st century is gaining momentum and acquiring fundamentally new features rather than facing a crisis.”

**A. Yurevich:** “The confrontation between true and pseudoliberalism may in the coming years become a major arena of ideological struggles in Russia which

should involve not only the professional producers of ideologems, i.e., ideologists, politicians, etc., but also representatives of social and humanities sciences...”

**L. Drobizheva, S. Ryzhova:** “Research results demonstrate that there is a growing nationwide civic identity among a clear majority of Russians... It combines with ethnic identity and increasing ‘Russianness.’ The latter more clearly manifests itself among young people, who account for more supporters of preferential rights being given to the ethnic Russians; patriotic sentiments are more widespread among them.”

## **Independent Economic Think Tanks in Russia: Evolution and Development Prospects<sup>1</sup>**

**Andrey YAKOVLEV,**  
**Lev FREYNKMAN,**  
**Anton ZOLOTOV**

*Abstract.* This paper analyzes the current state of Russia's think tanks operating in the area of economic analysis. It examines the main stages of development of this sector and the key factors that shaped it. The paper shows that economic think tanks in Russia have reached a high degree of maturity; at the same time, the sector faces serious problems limiting its further development. The authors emphasize that in a situation of economic crisis there should be a larger role for independent expertise in the development of new economic policies and economic decision making. But the potential of Russian think tanks can be utilized effectively only if there is a change in the structure of demand for expertise driven by the emergence of new stakeholders interested in high-quality policy research. In order to maintain professional standards and promote high-quality expertise, collective action by the think tanks themselves is equally important. The paper is based on the results of two surveys of Russian think tanks conducted in 2012-2013 and 2015 and on interviews with their leaders.

*Keywords:* think tanks, business associations, collective action, independent expertise, model of economic development, economic policy analysis.

The events of the past year—from the confrontation with the West during the crisis in Ukraine to the fall in oil prices, the devaluation of the ruble and the assassination of Boris Nemtsov—have sharply increased the uncertainty of eco-

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conomic policy, and negative expectations have prevailed among economic agents making investment and business development decisions. Moreover, one gets the impression that the extremely contradictory actions of the authorities not only cannot change investor expectations, but actually lead to a disruption of the system of governance and ineffective use of accumulated reserves.

The fact that the country's leaders have no clear model of development or coherent economic policy is a characteristic feature of the current crisis, which makes it not only an economic, but also an ideological one, complicating the search for a way out of it. Standard prescriptions and copying of foreign experience (in Russia, this was the case for 20 years: at first, we followed the example of a generalized Western Europe, and then of South Korea as it was in the 1960s and 1970s) have failed to produce the desired results in Russian conditions. Today, the formulation of a new economic development model/ideology that could get the support of most of Russia's elite groups is back on the agenda. At the same time, the experience of developing countries (from South Korea to China) that have recently been able to make rapid progress in their development shows that such progress has always been based on institutional decisions that were unconventional for their time and took into account local peculiarities.

Russia's own experience of 1998-1999, when the country was able to emerge from a serious economic and political crisis relatively unscathed, shows that such adequate non-standard decisions can arise from close interaction and an effective dialogue between government and key economic agents. As the interests of the main "actors" are taken into account, such a dialogue increases the adequacy of the decisions being made and facilitates their practical implementation. An example of this kind is the successful implementation of the 2001-2002 tax reform, which was carried out before a full-fledged "power vertical" was put in place, when governors and oligarchs still had political influence and a real multi-party parliament existed in the country.

But for all the importance of including the main economic agents in the process of construction of a new economic development model, the question of expertise for this process and the quality of the expert community in the area of economic policy is equally important. As we see it, the success of a dialogue between elite groups and the prospects for the development of adequate pragmatic solutions promoting economic and social progress in Russia depend in large part on the current state of the country's expert infrastructure and its ability to ensure the interaction of these groups.

This paper includes a review of the main trends in the development of independent analytical centers (think tanks) in the area of economic policy in Russia. Let us emphasize that the focus of our attention is not the entire economic analysis market, but primarily *independent centers engaged mainly in "analytical" research*, i.e., in the study of more fundamental and long-term problems of economic development at the national level and at the level of individual economic sectors. That is why our analysis does not include consulting firms or government think tanks. The main emphasis is on centers using modern methods of economic analysis and thus comparable to similar foreign organizations. We

identify the main problems they face and show that demand for quality expertise from various interest groups (including not only the federal government, but also businesses and regional governments) is important for effective use of the potential of these centers. Another mechanism for the development of the Russian think tank sector is associated with greater self-regulation of this sector through the mechanisms of collective action. That is why special attention in this paper is paid to an analysis of the activity of the Association of Russian Economic Think Tanks (ARETT) as the key association in this sector.

In its empirical part, the paper is based on data from two surveys of the heads of Russian think tanks conducted jointly by HSE and ARETT. The first survey covered 46 think tanks (the sample included 38 ARETT participants and 8 other well-known centers) in late 2012 and early 2013. The second survey (with a smaller sample of 26 ARETT participants) was performed in early 2015. Twelve in-depth interviews with the heads of a number of think tanks and well-known experts were an important source of information.

### **Main Stages of Development of Independent Economic Think Tanks in Russia**

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which underwent a transition from socialism to a market economy in the late 20th century, have seen extremely rapid (explosive) growth in the number of new independent think tanks (TTs). According to Freedom House, in 1999, only 10 years after the start of market reforms, there were already 140 such organizations operating in the region [9]. The main reasons for such a rapid increase can be summarized as follows.

1. *The existence of a vacant institutional niche* in the area of economic policy advice in the period of market reforms: traditional research centers in the socialist countries were usually too academic and were out of touch with practical needs. In addition, they lacked sufficient knowledge about the functioning of the market economy and appropriate economic policy. At the same time, the new political leaders in many countries distrusted the traditional research units that used to be part of the communist establishment [7].
2. *The complexity of the tasks of the transition period*: market reforms naturally generated significant government demand for external expertise. This was particularly noticeable given the inadequate budget funding for expertise available at government entities [3]. This demand was met in large part by programs of international organizations providing for cooperation between Western and local experts. Such cooperation was institutionalized in the form of new national organizations, partly because cooperation with local experts had proved to be effective in situations requiring localization (adaptation to local conditions) of standard market recommendations.

3. *Changes in the financing structure*: the reduction in traditional budget funding at academic institutes and universities encouraged many leading researchers to move to new independent organizations that had begun to receive significant funding from external sources (joint programs with international organizations).
4. *Differentiation in line with the emerging political and ideological differences*: the formation of new interest groups and growing political competition in the first period of reforms led to new, more segmented demand for economic expertise associated with the need to explore alternative policy options according to the different preferences of various social groups.

The emergence of think tanks in Russia largely resembled the process of their formation in Eastern Europe because the main factors at work in Russia were the same. The central driver of this process was the objective need for adaptation and localization of the conclusions of modern economics for market reform purposes in specific local conditions. Effective support for the reforms was impossible without a deep understanding of the local realities. Hence the demand for local teams with a knowledge of modern economic theory and familiar with appropriate analytical methods. In the reform period, they began to appear in all post-communist countries [11]. Russia is no exception in this respect. Even in China one will find many elements of a similar process of emergence of a new analytics sector [1; 10]. Our analysis, based primarily on the materials of in-depth interviews with the heads of a number of leading domestic think tanks, has made it possible to portray a successful Russian think tank and identify the main factors of success in this specific market.

The analysis has confirmed that in all cases the emergence of successful Russian think tanks was associated with strong teams of experts. As a rule, they took shape in the process of implementation of specific analytical projects in the 1990s. Let us recall that the 1990s were a period of adaptation (both conceptual and organizational) of “Soviet-style” social sciences to the realities of our rapidly transforming economy and society. The existing research capacity was oriented to the solution of totally different problems. At the same time, considering the significant lag of Soviet social sciences behind their foreign counterparts, “traditional” research institutes could not, for the most part, meet the demand for high-quality research. In the early 1990s, the most active, advanced teams that used to be part of the traditional scientific community already began to stand out against that background: they were able to adapt to the new conditions earlier than others and to establish, among other things, long-term partnership relations with leading foreign researchers. Let us note that many of these self-formed teams were rooted in the previous experience of their members’ joint work in the best-known Soviet “brain trusts,” mainly represented by institutes of the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In terms of time, the formation of Russian think tanks can be tentatively divided into two periods or two generations of organizations. The first genera-

tion is represented by old centers that emerged back in the early 1990s (such as the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy or the International Center for Social and Economic Research—Leontief Center), and the second generation includes centers established in the early 2000s. An important specific feature of the formative period of think tanks in Russia was that due to a severe budget deficit most of the major analytical projects were implemented under international programs run by TACIS, the World Bank, USAID, etc. Initially, these projects were directed by foreign experts while Russian participants played a subordinate role. But by the end of the 1990s, due to participation in such joint projects, Russian experts had acquired the necessary skills and qualification and were prepared to run their own analytical projects. It is precisely such successful project teams (or, to be more exact, Russian groups in international project teams) that later on, at the turn of the century, provided the basis for a number of currently well-known think tanks: Economic Expert Group (EEG), Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF), Development Center, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), etc.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from a strong initial team of experts, most of the successful centers at the beginning of their activity typically had either a long-term grant or a major (key) customer. For example, at the time of its formation CEFIR received a five-year grant from the Swedish government with annual funding of about \$1 million, while the activities of the Development Center in the first few years were sponsored by a consortium of Russian banks. Significant and stable start-up funding enabled the new centers to get on their feet, find a place in the market, and gain customer acceptance no longer as a group of individual experts, but as a new organization.

However, a combination of these two factors (strong experts and start-up funding) was not necessarily a guarantee of success: the team that was given a “jump start” had yet to show its worth in a new capacity and prove its competence. This was not always the case. One example of relative failure is the Institute of Regional Policy (IRP), which was successfully launched in 2004 with the financial and political support of entities controlled by Aleksandr Khloponin but which later lost its position. One of the reasons for that was the initial lack of an obvious “core staff” and the instability of the IRP expert team.

The strategies for the further development of think tanks undoubtedly depended on the ambitions of their leaders. But in large part they were determined by the overall changes in the structure of demand and supply in the analytics market. In the 1990s, the entire TT sector in Russia was characterized by a severe lack of skills and competencies. At the same time, there was a lack of significant Russian funding for analytical research since there were virtually no competent government or business customers. Thus, the demand for economic policy analysis in that period was not only supported by international funding, but was also defined in large part by foreign experts.

By the beginning of the 2000s, the situation had changed. On the one hand, there were already a number of strong Russian teams capable of carrying out projects independently. On the other hand, “diversification of demand” was get-

ting underway. Foreign donors were still active in the market, but government contracts began to appear (in the format of increased R&D funding). The government declared that it was in need of serious analytical research that would take the utmost account of Russian specific features. Simultaneously, big business began to demonstrate demand for ideas and to finance analytical research. This applies not only to the projects of the Yukos Oil Company (Open Russia, School of Public Policy, Federation of Internet Education, etc.). In that period, an organization called Club 2015 supported the projects of INP Social Contract (since 2012, the Institute for National Projects); the structures of Oleg Deripaska initiated the establishment of the Institute for Complex Strategic Studies (ICSS); Andrey Vavilov founded the Institute for Financial Studies (IFS), and, as noted above, a consortium of Russian banks sponsored the activities of the Development Center.

Such a diversity of funding sources was associated with the continued uncertainty in the choice of an economic development path and with the independent role of business. Hence the “demand for ideas” from different interest groups involved in public policy. This situation objectively gave the emerging think tanks a lot of latitude and increased their independence. This multiplicity of potential customers and the new “competition for ideas” played an important role in the rise of the think tank sector in Russia in the early 2000s.

But from the mid-2000s, the trend in the economic expertise market was reversed, with a concentration of demand in the hands of a single customer: the federal government. The new trend was clearly connected with changes in the political situation, including the “Yukos Affair” and the integration of governors into the “power vertical” (with a redistribution of tax revenues in favor of the federal center and a transition to the appointment of governors, which significantly reduced the “demand for ideas” from the regional authorities). The scope for political competition contracted sharply, and the federal government became the major customer for analytical services.

Simultaneously, foreign programs were cut back, and not even because of some specifically Russian political factors. Due to economic growth in the 2000s, Russia very quickly moved into the category of middle-income countries, and international donors were obliged, in accordance with their own mandates, to scale down Russian grant programs. This reduction in funding by business and foreign organizations went hand in hand with a significant increase in R&D spending by federal agencies and departments. According to our estimates, total federal funding for these purposes increased, at current prices, at least eightfold from 2000 to 2007. As a result, by the second half of the 2000s the federal authorities became the main customer of think tanks.

The TT sector responded to such a concentration of demand by a trend towards the concentration of supply. That was also consistent with the aspirations and ambitions of the heads of several major think tanks seeking to become “leaders” in the national market for economic expertise and to capitalize on their historical competitive advantages. As subsequent events showed, two organizations actually aspired to this role: the Higher School of Economics (HSE) and

the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), which closely collaborated with the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy (IEP). Given their significant expert potential, they began to receive an increasing share of government contract awards. Simultaneously, the market leaders began to integrate well-known individual experts and entire teams into their own organizations.<sup>3</sup>

Due to the sheer scale of their activities, these two major centers actually acquired a new quality: in a number of areas, they became the dominant providers of expertise and analytics in the country. As a result, their “major customer” to a certain extent could not stop using their services. But from the perspective of the development of the sector as a whole, the concentration of demand and the emergence of two dominant centers in response to it objectively reduced the scope for competition.

For already existing strong teams that had previously established their own think tanks, these tendencies did not initially create any serious threats because up to 2008 the concentration of demand was accompanied by an overall increase in R&D funding at the federal level. But this rapid growth in federal demand occurred in the context of the operation of the formal procedures of the federal law on public procurement (No. 94-FZ), which rejected the use of criteria associated with qualification and previous experience. In the segment of think tanks without an established reputation, a combination of these factors against the background of a lack of public access to the results of the respective analytical projects led to serious distortions in the motivation of market participants and, in particular, to a significant spread of plagiarism and open corruption. One manifestation of this trend was the emergence of new “analytical organizations” that were actively engaged in R&D for certain government customers but did not release any public analytical reports.

More powerful think tanks that had already established a professional reputation, that were guided by high ethical standards and had access to “top” officials in federal agencies and departments could afford to rise above such “schemes.” We can identify two main strategies followed by such think tanks in that period:

- *continued orientation towards a key customer.* An example of such a strategy is the Economic Expert Group, which worked mainly with the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. This strategy is attractive in view of the low cost of liaison with the customer and an opportunity to focus on matters of content. The wide publicity of TT activities with regular presentation of analytical products to the public is a guarantee that think tanks pursuing this strategy are acting in good faith. However, this strategy is clearly associated with risk and may lead to problems in the event of significant personal or political changes on the side of the key customer;
- *entry into fundamentally new markets.* This strategy was implemented in different versions. CEFIR, for example, while carrying out projects for

Russian government agencies and private companies, began to participate in international tenders held by the World Bank, the European Commission, etc. INP Social Contract successfully branched out into other post-Soviet countries and implemented a number of projects in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The Leontief Center, the National Institute for System Studies of Entrepreneurship (NISSE) and a number of other think tanks stepped up their work under contracts with regional administrations.

The crisis of 2008-2009 led to tighter budget constraints for the federal government and thus to an absolute reduction in the amount of analytical R&D. In the post-crisis period, the total amount of federal contracts for such works decreased by almost two-thirds: from 2.15 billion rubles in 2007 to 0.8 billion rubles in 2010. It should be noted that the contraction in demand had a stronger impact on small think tanks.

In 2011, budgets somewhat increased, but this was largely due to allocations for the development of a new version of the Strategy for Socioeconomic Development of Russia Until 2020 (*Strategy 2020*), which were made through the HSE and RANEPa. This further strengthened their position as “market leaders.” The situation worsened with the enactment of the law on “foreign agents” (Law No. 121-FZ of July 20, 2012). As it is becoming clear today, this law has made it virtually impossible to attract foreign funding, which has affected, in varying degrees, all market participants. In this context, one can speak of the actual emergence of a new strategy of “integration with the leaders,” when a number of strong and previously independent think tanks have preferred to acquire the status of structural divisions of the HSE or RANEPa.

Overall, in our opinion, by the end of the 2000s the economic think tank sector in Russia had reached the stage of maturity. As the federal government turned into the major customer for economic policy analysis, a “three-tier” market structure emerged in this area. At the first tier, the HSE and RANEPa (in consortium with the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) acted as key think tanks providing the government, on a regular basis, with analytical expertise in a wide range of areas (including macroeconomics, social and industrial policy, public sector regulation, public administration, etc.). These organizations had a permanent staff of several hundred expert analysts, and dozens of them could be rightly referred to the category of key ones. At the second tier, there were about 15-20 major independent think tanks that had won a reputation in certain areas of economic analysis: Economic Expert Group (EEG), Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF), Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), Interdepartmental Analytical Center (IAC), Center for Fiscal Policy (CFP), Institute for Urban Economics (IUE), Leontief Center, INP Social Contract, National Institute for System Studies of Entrepreneurship (NISSE), and others. They usually had a staff of 20-30 experts, including 7-8 experts who could be regarded as key ones. All these centers were active ARETT participants, and their heads were members of the Association’s Board at different times. Finally, at the third tier there were several dozen smaller centers that occasionally carried out research studies for federal agencies or worked with regional administrations.

The role of the HSE, RANEPa and ARETT in the economic analysis market at the end of the 2000s was indirectly reflected in the preparation of a new version of *Strategy 2020* in 2011. Collective work on that document (with the active participation of hundreds of experts) can in a sense be seen as the “peak” in the development of think tanks in Russia. It was organized within the framework of 21 expert groups, each of which had two leaders (see [16]). These groups included 10 representatives each from the HSE and RANEPa/IEP, with 6 groups headed by experts who at various times were ARETT board members or presidents of the Association (Aleksandr Auzan and Evsey Gurvich). Although the new version of *Strategy 2020* was not approved as an official government document, objectively it remains a source of ideas for economic and social transformations.<sup>4</sup> Overall, the very organization and performance of such large-scale analytical work in a very short period is evidence of a high degree of maturity of the expert community in the area of economic policy.

The trends and conclusions formulated above are primarily based on an analysis of interviews with the heads of leading think tanks. In the next section, we will show how they correlate with the results of formal surveys of TT leaders using a sufficiently large (for this sector) and representative sample.

### **Development of Think Tanks After the 2008-2009 Crisis and Key Problems**

Along with qualitative interviews, we had an opportunity to conduct two surveys of the heads of think tanks operating in the area of socioeconomic analysis.

- The first of them covered 46 TTs, including 38 ARETT members and observers and 8 other well-known centers.<sup>5</sup> The main part of the survey was carried out by MarketUp Consulting Group LLC in October and November 2012 using the personal interview method, with some of the questionnaires administered in early 2013. The pollsters used a detailed toolkit developed by ARETT with the participation of the HSE Institute for Industrial and Market Studies (IIMS), which included about 100 questions and focused on trends in the development of think tanks in 2011-2012. (The main results of this survey are available at [17].)
- The second survey was conducted by ARETT in February 2015 using a shorter questionnaire that included, with slight modifications, the most essential questions used in 2012. This survey covered only ARETT think tanks and resulted in a total of 26 filled-in questionnaires.

Since in 2015 we did not survey any think tanks that were not members of ARETT, we will henceforth operate only with data obtained from ARETT members. At the same time, let us note that all key think tanks in the area of applied economic analysis are now members of ARETT and that the surveys we conducted in 2012-2013 and 2015 covered, respectively, about 70% and over 50% of all ARETT think tanks. This is why we believe that the data given below adequately describe the state and dynamics of the applied economic analysis sector.

Before turning to an analysis of the obtained data, let us emphasize that ARETT includes both large and small think tanks. At the same time, the share of large centers within ARETT is objectively higher than in the sector as a whole (such a situation is typical of industry associations, where large and medium-sized firms are usually more active). Given such a bias, below we mainly consider and compare survey data separately for large and small TTs. As a criterion for dividing centers by size, we used an indicator called “number of key experts.” This choice was dictated by the fact that key experts are the main intellectual resource of think tanks and determine the scope, complexity and diversity of works that a think tank can offer to perform as a contractor. For its part, the amount of orders or the total number of staff, in our opinion, are a derivative of the expert potential of the organization. Think tanks with five or fewer key experts on their staff we classified as “small,” and those with six or more key experts, as “large.” In the 2012-2013 survey, 22 of the 38 centers belonged to the category of large ones, and in the 2015 survey there were 16 large centers out of a total of 26.

Most ARETT think tanks (about 70%) were founded before 2001. In subsequent years, entry into this sector decreased significantly: for example, only 4 of the 38 centers taking part in the 2012-2013 survey were established after 2006. But there are some differences between large and small TTs: whereas the first group consists mainly of organizations established in the late 1990s, the majority of small centers are either “veterans” operating since the beginning of the 1990s or “newcomers” that entered this sector on the wave of rising demand for economic analysis in the early 2000s.

Since the demand for economic analysis today mainly comes from the federal authorities, think tanks are largely concentrated in the capital. The geography of the 2012-2013 survey includes the following cities: Moscow and Moscow Oblast (28 TTs), St. Petersburg (2 TTs), Perm (2 TTs), and Barnaul, Vladivostok, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Petrozavodsk and Tambov (1 TT each).

To characterize the scale of TT activities and how it has changed over time, it is important to know their financial status. In both surveys, we asked a number of questions on this topic; for example, we asked respondents to place their organization in one of four groups depending on the size of its annual budget. We also questioned the respondents about changes in the financial status of their organization in the previous two years and asked them to assess the adequacy of available funding for its development.

As is evident from Table 1, a number of respondents refused to answer the first question (there were more of them in the first, broader survey). Nevertheless, in both cases about half of the large centers pointed to an annual budget of more than 20 million rubles and somewhat less frequently spoke of a budget of 10-20 million rubles. Small TTs in 2012 were present mainly in the first two groups with the smallest budget, and in 2014, in the second and third groups. But since the number of respondents in the 2015 survey decreased, it can be assumed that some small centers did not take part in the survey because they had ceased their activities.

Table 1

Approximate Annual Budget of ARETT Think Tanks (*units*)

Indicator	At year-end 2012		At year-end 2014	
	small TTs	large TTs	small TTs	large TTs
Under 1m rubles	5	1	1	1
From 1m to 10m rubles	3	4	4	3
From 10m to 20m rubles	2	5	3	3
Over 20m rubles	2	8	1	8
I don't know	4	4	1	1
<i>Number of respondents</i>	16	22	10	16
<i>Source:</i> HSE and ARETT surveys of think tanks carried out in late 2012-early 2013 and in early 2015.				

The differences in the position of large and small think tanks are also evident from the responses to the question about changes in their financial status in the previous two years. Whereas in the group of large TTs there are more positive than negative answers, respondents from small centers are deeply skeptical (Table 2).

Table 2

Changes in the Financial Status of Think Tanks in the Previous Two Years (*units*)

Period	In the past two years, the financial status of your TT has:	Small TTs	Large TTs
2011-2012	Improved	1	5
	Not changed significantly	9	14
	Worsened	6	2
	I don't know	—	1
	<i>Number of respondents</i>	16	22
2013-2014	Improved	1	6
	Not changed significantly	4	6
	Worsened	5	3
	I don't know	—	1
	<i>Number of respondents</i>	10	16
<i>Source:</i> See Table 1.			

These trends can also be observed in the responses to the question about changes in the scale of TT activities in various areas (Table 3). Whereas large

think tanks in both surveys noted an increase in their activities in all areas (except publishing), the responses of small ones were purely negative: for example, the figures for the total number of projects in this group were -19% in 2011-2012 and -30% in 2013-2014.

But despite the increase in the scale of activities, there is also growing skepticism among the representatives of large think tanks. In the first survey, for example, 10 of the 22 respondents in this group said that available funding was adequate not only for their day-to-day activities, but also for development, whereas in 2015 there were only 4 such respondents out of a total of 16.

Table 3

**Balance of Opinion on Changes in the Scale of Think Tank Activities (%)**

	2011-2012		2013-2014	
	small TTs	large TTs	small TTs	large TTs
<i>Change in scale of:</i>				
consulting activities	-25	+33	-10	+44
research and analytical activities	-18	+50	-20	+25
data collection and monitoring activities	-40	+38	-10	+31
educational activities	-11	+12	-10	+19
publishing activities	-33	0	+10	0
<i>Change in number of:</i>				
public events (conferences, forums, seminars)	-6	+14	-10	+13
all projects	-19	+18	-30	+50
international projects	—	—	-10	-25
<i>Source:</i> See Table 1. The balance of opinion was calculated as the difference between the percentage of respondents reporting an increase in the respective indicator in the period under review and the percentage of respondents reporting a decrease.				

Skepticism is also evident in changes in the assessment of the actual need for think tank products (Table 4). Whereas in 2012 half of the large TTs noted that their conclusions and recommendations were taken into account by customers to a significant extent, in 2015 the proportion of such responses decreased significantly. The dominant response was “our recommendations are taken into account to an insignificant extent.” Let us also note that whereas in the 2012 survey half of all respondents said that representatives of the federal authorities consulted with them either constantly or on a regular basis, in 2015 the proportion of such

responses fell to one-third, and five TTs said the federal authorities did not consult with them at all.

Table 4

**Assessment of the Need for Think Tank Products**  
(distribution of responses to the question:  
“To what extent are the conclusions and recommendations of your think tank taken into account by government authorities?”, units)

	2012-2013		2015	
	small TTs	large TTs	small TTs	large TTs
To a significant extent	4	11	2	6
To an insignificant extent	10	8	6	9
Are practically not taken into account	2	2	1	1
Are not taken into account in principle	—	—	1	—
I don't know	—	1	—	—
<i>Number of respondents</i>	16	22	10	16
<i>S o u r c e:</i> See Table 1.				

In characterizing the major problems faced by think tanks (Table 5), we can identify three main problems (whose importance has changed little over time) for large think tanks: inadequate funding for serious analytical work, difficulties in communicating the results of their analysis to decision makers, and a shortage of qualified staff. At first glance, the complaints of large ARETT think tanks about difficulties with access to “policy makers” are unexpected because these are the very same think tanks that took an active part in developing *Strategy 2020* in the mode of intensive dialogue with key members of government. In our opinion, their responses in this case were probably influenced by their dissatisfaction with the inconsistent and unsystematic implementation of their proposals in practice.

As regards changes, let us emphasize the increase in the significance of the shortage of qualified staff (including in the group of small think tanks). Complaints about government over-regulation (especially on the part of small TTs) have also increased. At the same time, some progress has been made regarding unfair competition: whereas three years ago this problem was reported by 8 TTs (including 5 large ones), in 2015 it was mentioned by only 1 large and 3 small centers.

Among the significant changes that took place in the three years between the surveys, let us note the declining international cooperation of Russian think tanks. In 2013-2014, the balance of opinion on the number of international projects being implemented was negative in both groups of think tanks.

Table 5

**Difficulties Currently Encountered by Think Tanks (% of respondents)**

	Survey of 2012-2013		Survey of 2015	
	small TTs	large TTs	small TTs	large TTs
Inadequate funding for serious analytical work	81	43	60	50
Difficulties in communicating the results of analysis to decision makers	25	43	10	38
Shortage of qualified staff	19	38	40	44
High staff turnover	19	0	10	6
Excessive government regulation (reporting, audits, approvals)	13	24	40	25
Unfair competition	19	24	30	6
Lack of transparency in funding mechanisms	—	—	10	6
<i>Number of respondents, units</i>	16	21	10	16
<i>Source:</i> See Table 1.				

At the time of the 2015 survey, half of the small TTs and almost a third of the large ones did not have a single international project. The reduction in international contacts is, in our opinion, a very negative indicator because such contacts are extremely important for raising the expert level of any analytical organization. They are doubly important for Russian think tanks, which are often relatively young in institutional terms and many of whose employees have no basic economic education meeting current international standards. We do not attribute the reduction in international projects to a lack of demand for such cooperation in the think tank sector, but explain it by the emergence in the country in recent years of political barriers in the field of international cooperation, which limit the opportunities for sustainable development of the think tank sector and for improving the quality of expertise.

All in all, based on data from the two surveys, we can conclude that the trends for large and small think tanks are opposite. Whereas large TTs are quite confident about their expanding activities, the prospects for the development of small TTs are generally perceived as unfavorable. In our opinion, these trends reflect the continued consolidation of the sector with an increase in the average size of its participants.

At the same time, for large TTs the current situation is not unclouded either. As the scale of their activities increases, most of them have just enough resources for their day-to-day operations. Another point is that compared to 2012-2013 the influence of large think tanks on decision making in the area of economic poli-

cy has decreased: in the opinion of respondents, their conclusions and recommendations are usually taken into account by the authorities only to an insignificant extent.

Another important conclusion relates to the structural heterogeneity of the think tank sector in geographical terms. Historically, the main demand for new ideas and analytics was generated in Moscow, and combined with the human capital inherited from Soviet “brain trusts” this circumstance resulted in the concentration of most TTs (primarily large ones) in the capital. This is where—in the capital—one can speak of the sufficient maturity of the think tank sector. But the problem is that the need for skilled expertise is objectively far from being met, especially at the regional level. For example, in recent years the focus of efforts to implement reforms and create conditions for economic development (including matters of investment climate, production of public goods, budget balance, proper incentives in the state apparatus and the public sector, etc.) has increasingly shifted to the regions.

Large think tanks have responded to this demand: in 2015, three of them received requests for expertise from the regional authorities constantly or regularly (2-3 times a month), and another five reported the receipt of such requests from time to time (3-5 times a year). But most of the small TTs (7 out of 10 in the 2015 survey), which are mainly located outside Moscow, reported extremely rare requests from the local and regional authorities (1-2 a year) or their total absence. In our opinion, this reflects the structural imbalance in the development of the sector: even where the regional authorities have a demand for new policy research, local experts often lack the skills for analytical work, while sought-after “metropolitan” experts are not always ready to collaborate with the regions.

As we see it, the problems faced by think tanks in recent years (including the spread of unfair practices, the declining influence of TTs on decision-making processes in the area of economic policy, and difficulties in reproducing the staff potential) can be effectively resolved only through concerted collective action by its participants. The experience of ARETT is important in this respect, and we will consider it in the next section.

### **Association of Russian Economic Think Tanks: An Emerging Tool for Collective Action<sup>6</sup>**

The Association of Russian Economic Think Tanks (ARETT) was founded in October 2002 by 15 analytical centers. Its key objective is to promote the country’s social and economic development and improve social welfare by establishing the institution of independent economic think tanks and developing the professional community. ARETT’s main tasks include setting and promoting standards for the activities of independent think tanks, ensuring public access to the research products of ARETT’s member organizations, and developing dialogue between analysts and society.

A significant role in ARETT's formation and development was played by the Program of Support for Independent Economic Think Tanks, launched in 1999 by the Moscow Public Science Foundation (MPSF). Its main element was an annual competition to award grants for applied economic research. MPSF grants could be awarded to independent think tanks operating in the area of economic analysis or to groups (teams) of experts planning to establish their own center. Of course, MPSF grants could not solve the financial problems of think tanks (their average amount was 0.8-1 million rubles). But the analytics market in that period was characterized by current projects with very short deadlines (usually up to 5-6 months). Against that background, MPSF annual grants were seen as "long-term" financing and enabled centers without a large initial grant to operate stably. Let us also note that, in contrast to orders placed by government agencies or contracts with international organizations, MPSF grants were provided for projects selected by the centers themselves within the framework of the Foundation's overall thematic priorities.<sup>7</sup> Due to this approach, TTs were able to develop their expert potential and lay the groundwork for the future.

A specific feature of the MPSF Program format was its orientation towards the institutionalization of think tanks. Teams of experts were eligible for start-up support, but one of the conditions of the MPSF grant was the establishment of an independent legal entity during the implementation of the respective project. Far from all of the organizations established in this way subsequently proved to be viable. Nevertheless, for a number of strong groups (including, for example, the CMASF team, initially formed at the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences) the establishment of their own independent center was a qualitatively new stage in their activity and opened up new prospects for their development.

Another important element of the MPSF Program, which helped to strengthen horizontal relations between Russian think tanks and to improve the quality of their research, was the establishment of contacts with foreign think tanks. In particular, the MPSF held several conferences in Russia and abroad, and in 2002 it initiated a special program to support cooperation between Russian and East European think tanks.

ARETT was founded by the Institute of National Project "Social Contract," the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, CMASF, the Development Center, the Economic Expert Group, the Leontief Center, the Independent Institute for Social Policy, the Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), and other leading think tanks. One can say that the founding members of the Association were grant recipients under the MPSF Program. In fact, the activity of the Program's Board showed the opportunities and benefits of cooperation between think tanks, and the Program itself in large part covered the start-up costs of such cooperation by providing an initial "institutional grant" to ARETT.

In the first few years, ARETT's activity was aimed at developing the basic "support" infrastructure for its members: purchase of statistical and analytical information, organization of joint press conferences, and publication of almanacs; it also worked to consolidate and increase the membership of the Association. In 2003-

2005, its membership increased significantly with the accession of 14 new members and 23 observers. Such a substantial influx of new members and observers was due to the public activity of ARETT's first president, Leonid Grigoryev, as well as by the very low level of membership fees (10 thousand rubles a year).

Apart from full members, ARETT's Charter allowed the Association to grant observer status to think tanks other than NGOs or those that were structural divisions of other legal entities. Such a format helped to strengthen ties with universities due to the participation of university research centers in the Association as observers.

From 2006, the number of ARETT think tanks stabilized at around 50-54 organizations, while the proportion between members and observers remained roughly the same.<sup>8</sup> This was due to the fact that all key think tanks concerned had already joined the Association and to the gradual increase in membership fees (in order to achieve financial self-sufficiency for ARETT). In 2011, by analogy with some business associations, ARETT introduced differential fees for think tanks depending on the scale of their activities: from 10 thousand to 50 thousand rubles a year.

The style of management at ARETT changed in time. Initially, during the presidency of Leonid Grigoryev, there was a more centralized model. When Aleksandr Auzan became president of ARETT, the role of its Board increased.<sup>9</sup> It now included representatives not only of ARETT members, but also of observers. This wider involvement of TT representatives in the day-to-day affairs of the Association helped it to branch out into new areas of activity.

For example, in the spring of 2006, Evsey Gurvich and Aleksandr Auzan initiated the establishment of a debate club called "Nodes of Economic Policy" (see [18]), which has since then held monthly meetings at the Faculty of Economics of Lomonosov Moscow State University. The Debate Club plays an important role as a public forum for professional discussions open to a wide audience. Annual conferences held by ARETT in the early fall are another professional forum where its participants present their vision of the key problems in the country's economic development.

The ARETT University Project (see [19]), launched in 2007 with the financial support of the Oxford Russia Fund, was the Association's signature project. Under this project, students from leading economics universities had an opportunity to do an internship at the Association's research centers. The project was aimed at reducing the gap between basic economic education in Russia and the demands on analytical research made in practice.

The University Project can be seen as a response to the analytical community's unmet demand for qualified staff and as an instrument to reduce the costs of fostering new staff for think tanks. The point is that the appearance of any young employee at a think tank is not only time-consuming for its senior experts who help the newcomer to "learn the trade," but also implies the need to pay him/her a salary. ARETT scholarships reduced TTs' expenditures for these purposes, thus increasing their opportunities to recruit new staff. Such an arrangement (with temporary employment under a specific project) was also a kind of filter

enabling TTs to select better qualified and motivated young analysts among the interns, who could eventually be offered a permanent job at the think tank.

In the period from 2007 to 2013, about 70-90 students annually participated in the project, with internships at think tanks lasting from 4 to 7 months. In recent years, the number of students wishing to take part in the project was about twice as large as the actual number of placements provided by think tanks.

Among the other areas of ARETT's activity, let us note its interaction with various media platforms in order to spread the views of independent experts. For example, ARETT experts wrote regular columns for the newspaper *Moskovskiyе novosti* and for the Forbes.ru website. In 2011, ARETT instituted a Medal of Merit in Economic Analysis and a New Generation Prize, whose purpose was to increase public recognition of the personal contribution of individual Russian economists to the development of economic analysis in Russia and to encourage research by young experts.

Table 6 shows the attitude of think tanks to different areas of ARETT activity in 2012-2013 and 2015. As we see, in both cases the four most important activities are annual conferences, the University Project, the Debate Club, and dissemination of information on think tank activities. The University Project was more important for large centers.

Table 6

**Assessment of the Importance of ARETT Projects by Members of the Association**  
(percentage of respondents for whom the respective project was important for  
the development of their centers)

Project	Survey of 2012 -2013		Survey of 2015	
	small TTs	large TTs	small TTs	large TTs
Annual conferences	75	59	40	44
University Project	38	77	30	50
Debate Club	50	64	60	31
Developing standards of activity, fighting plagiarism and other unfair practices	44	50	20	19
Participating in the organizing committee of the National Prize in Applied Economics	6	27	30	19
Disseminating information on think tank activities, including through website or bulletin	75	50	50	56
Series of publications in <i>Moskovskiyе novosti</i> and on Forbes.ru	19	23	30	6
Protecting the corporate interests of think tanks (taxation, registration, etc.)	50	45	30	38
<i>Number of respondents, units</i>	16	22	10	16
<i>S o u r c e:</i> See Table 1.				

By the end of the 2000s, ARETT had reached a certain degree of maturity as expressed in a generally higher level of trust between its members and better coordination of their activities. Due to this, collective action to protect the interests of the analytical community has become possible on the basis of the Association. ARETT's work to develop and promote professional standards of analytical activity and to combat plagiarism is characteristic in this respect. In 2011, seeking to prevent unfair competition in the area of economic research, ARETT developed and adopted the Principles of Conducting Analytical Work and Presenting Its Results and the Criteria for Scientific Recognition of the Results of Applied Economic Research (see [20; 21]), which provided the basis for the work of the ARETT Committee on Professional Ethics. The Committee has reviewed a number of complaints of wrongful appropriation and outright plagiarism, thus helping to protect the copyright of experts working at ARETT think tanks. Given the public nature of this activity, one can assume that it has helped to change the practice of acceptance of R&D reports. For example, in recent years most federal agencies and departments have introduced procedures for checking submitted reports through the *Antiplagiat* (AntiPlagiarism) system. For its part, this may account for the gradual progress in dealing with problems related to unfair competition noted by respondents in our 2015 survey. Important manifestations of ARETT's public collective action included a statement by economics researchers, signed by 55 leading experts in May 2013, in connection with inspections of NGOs for compliance with the "foreign agents" law (see [22]) and a collective article, "Expert Community: Strange Agents," published in the newspaper *Vedomosti* at the same time [15].

When viewing the development of ARETT in a broader comparative context, one will find that the self-organization processes in the economic think tank sector in Russia have largely resembled the formation of sectoral business associations. As shown in a number of studies, the establishment of business associations is often initiated by successful medium-sized firms [13; 14]. The point is that the market leaders find it easier to solve their problems (primarily those related to the nature of government regulation) through direct interaction with the state. Medium-sized and small market participants usually have no such political resources. At the same time, medium-sized actors have some advantages over small organizations in terms of opportunities to coordinate their actions. First, it is easier for them to agree among themselves (they are less numerous). And second, due to the relative stability achieved by these organizations, their leaders can spend a part of their time on "public affairs" in the form of involvement in the work of an association. Thus, medium-sized organizations potentially have relatively more incentives for collective action.

But realizing this potential requires a number of conditions. For example, in analyzing the activities of successful business associations in developing countries, Richard F. Doner and Ben Ross Schneider noted that associations capable of performing socially useful functions (and not simply using their lobbying strength) usually faced stronger competitive pressure, which pushed sectoral actors towards strategic collective action [4].

In addition, effective associations should have sufficient “institutional strength,” which is based on a large membership in the sector (high member density), adequate representation of the interests of their members, and a qualified and competent staff. But the “institutional strength” of business associations depends to a large extent on whether individual firms have “selective incentives” to participate in their work: as a rule, associations can provide such incentives to their members due to certain powers delegated to them by the state. “Selective incentives” enhance the status of an association, help to broaden and diversify its membership base,<sup>10</sup> and encourage the association’s members to take an active part in its work. Such “selective incentives” can include members’ access (through the association) to participation in international trade negotiations; an opportunity to influence the regulatory framework in the sector and take part in setting industry standards; the use of certain associations as a platform for the allocation of government contracts; access to employee development programs, etc.

Drawing an analogy with the development of the economic analysis market, we can say that in the 2000s ARETT’s think tanks were faced with both stronger competitive pressure from the market leaders (HSE and RANEP) and competition (in terms of price and quality) from small actors. This process became particularly evident against the background of tightening budget constraints after the crisis of 2008-2009. In a sense, the programs of the Moscow Public Science Foundation and the Oxford Russia Fund can be seen as a mechanism for providing “selective incentives” according to the logic of Doner and Schneider.

The political changes of the past two years have placed constraints on ARETT activities. Many ARETT think tanks registered as NGOs and the Association itself have been investigated by prosecutors under the “foreign agents” law. This has led, in particular, to a suspension of the University Project and a relative reduction in ARETT activities in other areas.<sup>11</sup> As a result, ARETT’s further work and the institutional development of Russian economic think tanks that is closely associated with it depend in large part on whether the necessary resources can be found in Russia.

\* \* \*

The current economic crisis in Russia is further evidence that the economic model established after the 1998 default does not work anymore. Its inadequacy became clear during the crisis of 2008-2009. After that, there were at least two attempts to propose a new approach to stimulating economic growth:

- (a) the liberal model in the updated version of *Strategy 2020*, and
- (b) the mobilization economy model in the context of the current foreign policy conflict associated with the events in Ukraine. In our opinion, consensus between the key elite groups was not achieved in either case, and the country remains at a crossroads with regard to the choice of an economic development model.

In these conditions, the role of the national sector of independent analytics capable of providing an objective analysis of the economic decisions being made objectively increases. Compared to other transition economy countries, Russia has its own specific features. In Eastern Europe, the accession of the respective countries to the European Union has objectively reduced the scope for independent economic policy at the national level, and the interests of local actors have shifted significantly towards a better understanding of the policy being made in Brussels and the ways to influence it. The economy of the new EU members is currently dominated by foreign investors, which also reduces demand for the services and products of local think tanks. In Russia, the factors behind the maintenance and development of a strong national think tank sector include the existence of a powerful sector of large national companies, whose management seek to play an active role in economic policy making, and the “restoration of the state” (in the 2000s), which requires day-to-day analytical support for its activities. Uncertainty in the choice of a long-term strategy and a model for the country’s development also serves to maintain unmet demand for analytics and expertise.

Overall, Russian experience clearly shows that the existence of a strong analytics sector in the country is a public good that enables potential consumers (government, business and society) to get professional expertise in the field of economic policy. And, conversely, the absence of a professional analytical community in the country leads to additional risks and costs of reform (as in the final period of the USSR’s existence). But the level and quality of analytics depend not only on the efforts of individual think tanks, but also on the state of the sectoral infrastructure: professional standards, personnel training system, the existence of an adequate information environment and forums for qualified discussion, etc.

In recent years, ARETT has addressed precisely these problems, and the relatively successful development of independent economic think tanks in Russia, in our opinion, is due in large part to its activities. It should be noted that most of the initiatives for developing this sector came from members of the think tank community itself. At the same time, it appears that its further development will increasingly depend not only on the actions of the expert community, but also on the position and activity of stakeholders in the sector. Who are these stakeholders?

On the one hand, they certainly include the federal government (in recent years, it was the main customer of think tanks). But under the existing model, the federal authorities increasingly confine themselves to work with the “market leaders.” Moreover, given that the Russian government has no real economic development strategy or consistent economic policy, the federal authorities can hardly be expected to take purposeful action in support of the think tank sector.

That is why attention should be paid to the potential of other existing and possible stakeholders. In our opinion, they include:

- regional administrations, which need competent expertise for their decisions and are interested in establishing and developing their own think tanks. In this context, one may consider launching a kind of regional ver-

sion of the initial MPSF program with competitive grants to support partnership projects between metropolitan and regional think tanks;

- universities, which are interested in improving the quality of education for students (as future analysts for government and business) and in developing their own analytical competencies. In particular, it makes sense to develop regional think tanks precisely on the basis of strong regional universities;
- businesses (primarily business associations), which are interested in getting a better understanding of the economic situation, as well as in making sound economic policy decisions with effective expert support for their implementation.

At the same time, the initiative of ARETT itself and its key think tanks also remains a significant factor in the development of the sector. In our opinion, the first thing to talk about here is that the sector could offer new public analytical products of importance to a wide range of stakeholders. In a situation where the “leaders of the analytics market” are too closely associated with government and cannot distance themselves from government actions, one of such important products could be a professional and pragmatic discussion of economic development scenarios at ARETT forums with the participation of the key stakeholders in order to propose a new development model consistent with the current economic and political realities of Russia.

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#### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The paper is based on the results of research conducted with the support of the HSE Basic Research Program in 2012-2015. The authors are grateful to V. Golikova and I. Mer-

- siyanova for participation in the development of the survey toolkit and for assistance in conducting the 2012-2013 survey; to A. Zudin for participation in the analysis of qualitative interviews; to M. Dobrovsky for information on the activities of think tanks in Eastern Europe, and to D. Ivanov for calculating the amount of analytical R&D. A discussion of the previous version of the paper with L. Yakobson, L. Polishchuk, E. Gurvich, A. Auzan, V. Benevolensky, L. Grigoryev and N. Kosareva was very useful for the authors.
- 2 A similar process was observed somewhat earlier in the countries of Eastern Europe, where a typical form of the emergence of new think tanks was the institutionalization of local groups supporting Western experts hired by donors in the early years of reform [11].
  - 3 A similar consolidation process was also observed in that period in other sectors of Russian analytics such as political analysis [12]. Let us also note that the Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation, which aspires to being a “market leader,” follows a similar strategy in recruiting experts.
  - 4 One example is the package of measures to improve the business climate formulated with the participation of members of the business community. The measures initially proposed within the framework of *Strategy 2020* (see [23; 24]) and implemented in 2012-2013 included the establishment of the post of business ombudsman, an amnesty for entrepreneurs convicted of economic crimes, and changes in the mechanisms for assessing the activities of governors taking into account the dynamics of the business climate in the region.
  - 5 Let us emphasize that some of these centers engaged not only in economic analysis, but also in political consulting and sociological research, and in this sense they are not entirely comparable with ARETT think tanks. Such centers were included in the 2012-2013 survey in order to understand how the leading think tanks engaged in economic analysis compare with similar organizations in related areas.
  - 6 In preparing this section, we used the papers of ARETT’s first and second presidents, L. Grigoryev [5; 6] and A. Auzan [2].
  - 7 Along with the main competition, the MPSF Program also provided, in the interests of the Ministry of Economic Development, so-called “quick grants” on a competitive basis, usually focused on current economic problems. These competitions were important as an element of long-term strategy aimed at strengthening the interaction between the analytical community and government.
  - 8 During the existence of ARETT, a total of 24 think tanks have left the Association. About two-thirds of them have done so because of the actual suspension of their activities or closure. The rest of them have left ARETT because they could not satisfy their needs through ARETT membership.
  - 9 The Board is elected annually and has nine members, including the president of ARETT.
  - 10 W. Pyle and L. Solanko emphasize the importance for an association to have a diverse membership base so as to be able to develop a balanced strategy (and not simply to lobby for narrow group interests) taking into account the differing interests of various groups of enterprises [8].
  - 11 This trend is also manifested in the data of Table 6. Whereas in the 2012-2013 survey respondents identified an average of 4 important areas of ARETT activity, in 2015 the figure fell below 3 (2.9 for small centers and 2.6 for large ones).

*Translated by Yevgeniya Lipinskaya*

## **The Interallied War in Summer 1913 as Seen by the Russian Public (Based on Russian press publications of that time)**

**Boris KOTOV**

*Abstract.* This article considers the attitudes of Russian society to the dramatic events in the Balkans in summer 1913, analyzing what the most influential Russian newspapers and journals were saying about the Macedonian question, the Interallied War, and the Bucharest Peace Treaty.

*Keywords:* Interallied War 1913, Bucharest Peace Treaty, *Novoye vremya*, *Russkoye slovo*, *Golos Moskv*y, *Rech*.

The war that the Balkan League started against the Ottoman Empire in October 1912 attracted much attention in Russia. Turkey's defeats at the hands of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro were perceived by the Russian public as the consummation of Russia's own half-accomplished Balkan liberation mission that it addressed in the course of several Russo-Turkish wars in the 18th and 19th centuries. Russia hoped that a provisional coalition of four Balkan states would mature into a firm Balkan federation, a natural ally to Russia and other Entente powers in their military and political confrontation with the Austro-German bloc.

A prominent Russian early 20th-century political writer, Mikhail Menshikov, wrote in the influential *Novoye vremya* newspaper in November 1912: "The whole world is used to thinking that the Balkan peoples are at each other's throat in dog-eat-dog fashion and that at least some reconciliation between them is hardly possible. But the current war against Turkey has proved that there are miraculous slogans capable of turning rivalry into solidarity." [13] Yet, the first

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rumors about a surge of antagonisms between the winners over the sharing of conquered territories began trickling into the Russian press; the rivalry between Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs was still there: it was temporarily pushed into the background by the desire to settle scores with the Ottoman Empire. As soon as the Turks were defeated and their European possessions fell into the hands of the winners, their antagonisms flared up with a renewed force.

By the end of 1912, *Novoye vremya* reported serious frictions in the allied camp. Foreseeing a war that was to break out six months later, the newspaper, which was always characterized by ardent Slavophile sympathies, wrote uneasily that “the ancient shadow of a fratricidal strife is rising again between the allies. They are debating how to divide the skin of the yet living bear. And they’ll be sharing it until the wounded animal breaks the spines of the unreasonable disputants.” [14] *Utro Rossiya*, yet another important newspaper of neo-Slavophile tendency, which reflected the views of the party of progressists, emphasized that the allies would be able to sign a lucrative peace with Turkey and be successful in opposing the Austrian expansion, only if they remained united: “Vienna is hoping for the League’s dissolution. Attempts are being made to set the Bulgarians against the Serbs and the Greeks... The Balkan states are strong as long as they are united. In this case, Vienna is not much of a scare.” [15] Another newspaper, *Golos Moskvy*, the mouthpiece of the influential Union of October 17 (The Octyabrists), warned that the allies, if they finally fell out with each other, “would not share Turkey but would be shared by the predators that surround them on all sides as a greedy crowd.” [16]

But all the Russian press warnings proved of no avail. The next few months saw a rise in tensions between the winners. Failing to get an access to the Adriatic Sea, Serbia sought territorial compensations in Macedonia, where its interests clashed with those of Bulgaria that regarded practically the whole of Macedonia up to Lake Ohrid as its historical property. On occupying, as they waged the war, most of this area with some big cities like Skopje, Monastir and Dibre, the Serbs declared the March 13 (February 29), 1912 treaty with Bulgaria on Macedonian demarcation obsolete and urged its revision. Displeased with the London Conference’s decision to transfer northern Epirus with a mixed Albanian-Greek population to Albania, Greece sought to expand its territory through the inclusion of Southern Macedonian and Thracian lands that were also claimed by Bulgaria. [5] As early as the First Balkan War, the Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians practiced ethnic cleansing in territories under their occupation. By the time the London Peace Treaty was signed, the Bulgarian press, on the one hand, and the Greek and Serbian press, on the other, were engaged in a bitter information war, with both sides seeking to belittle each other’s military contribution to the victory over the Ottoman Empire. Both sides were accusing each other of atrocities committed in areas captured from Turkey, of failing to comply with allied commitments, etc.

It was highly painful for Russia to see the quarrel between the Balkan allies. Their brilliant victories over Turkey threatened to degenerate into the collapse of the Balkan League established with an active support from the Russian diplo-

macy. To preclude this, Emperor Nicholas II addressed a personal message, on June 8 (May 26), 1913, to the heads of the states that were tottering on the brink of war. In identical letters sent to Bulgarian Tsar Ferdinand I and Serbian King Peter, he stated that a Bulgarian-Serbian war over Macedonia would be a crime against the Slavonic peoples and an ugly culmination of the war of liberation against Turkey. The Emperor suggested that the disputants make recourse to Russian arbitration. [4, p. 341]

This peace initiative was welcomed by the Russian public hopeful that the Balkan governments would not dare to disobey an appeal for concord coming from the Russian monarch. The *Russkoye slovo* pathetically exclaimed: "Russia's firm and resolute voice sounded for the first time in the Balkans. Just as the brothers were about to cross their swords, the supreme force stopped them, reminding them of their duty of honor and conscience." [17] The *Novoye vremya* stressed that the state "which will think it permissible for itself to evade the Russian monarch's unbiased decision, will thereby disown the Slavonic peoples and cast in its lot with the barbarian peoples and long-standing enemies of the Slav freedom and independence." [18] The *Golos Moskvy* warned that renouncing the Russian arbitration would highly negatively reflect on Russian attitudes towards the Balkan peoples: "The Russian public will revise its sympathies for the Balkan Slavs ... They have been already subsiding in a horrifying progression... Do they in the Balkans think to gain much if this upsurge of indignant feelings is not restricted at once?" [19] The *Moskovskiye vedomosti* was hoping that "reason will prevail and that things will not go as far as a fratricidal war that will only devastate the Balkan peoples still more to the delight and for the benefit of the enemies of the Slavonic peoples, stripping them for long of any influence in world affairs." [20]

But Bulgaria's and Serbia's replies to Nicolas II's appeal were evasive. [9, p. 190] Both Sofia and Belgrade had more hope for their military than the power of ethnographic and historical arguments. The former allies and now irreconcilable enemies were very bellicose and unwilling to make concessions. No wonder that two days after the signing of the London Peace with the Turks on June 1 (May 19), 1913, the governments led by Nikola Pašić and Eleftherios Venizelos signed a strictly secret Serbian-Greek allied agreement directed against Bulgaria.

It was hard for the Russian public to decide, who was in the right in that conflict and who should be considered a traitor to the "Slav cause." The extreme right-wing *Russkoye znamya* and the liberal *Russkoye slovo* were leaning to the Serbian side. They denounced the Bulgarian chauvinism and condemned excessive, from their point of view, Bulgarian claims. These newspapers believed that the brilliant victories over the Turks made the Bulgarians extremely haughty and unwilling to reckon with the most important interests of their allies. The *Russkoye znamya*, a mouthpiece of the extreme right-wing (Black Hundreds) Union of the Russian People, though declaring at the start that it would not take sides but just wanted to be objective in reporting to its readers about the causes of the conflict between the allies, later clearly condemned Bulgaria's hegemonic aspirations and sympathized with Serbia. The newspaper indicated that the

Bulgarians, while insisting on a strict compliance with the ethnic principle during the partition of Macedonia, were disregarding it in the occupied Thrace populated mostly by ethnic Greeks and Turks. [21]

The *Russkoye slovo*, Russia's most widely circulated and popular newspaper before World War I and frequently acted as an official mouthpiece of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held an identical point of view. In March 1913, it said: "The Russian people are looking with sympathy to the emergence of a Great Bulgaria and a political unification of the entire Bulgarian nation. But we cannot sympathize with the Bulgarian imperialism, nor pander to the megalomania that has engulfed certain circles in Sofia." As the crisis exacerbated, the *Russkoye slovo* grew increasingly anti-Bulgarian. In May, it endorsed the idea of revising the Serbian-Bulgarian allied agreement of 1912, stressing that the Serbian and Greek armies had done for the Bulgarians during the war against Turkey more than the Bulgarians had done for their allies. "One can hardly insist on a unilateral implementation of the agreement that reserved the thorns for Serbia and the roses for Bulgaria." [22]

An opposite point of view was expressed by newspapers controlled by the liberal Constitutional Democratic Party (the so-called *Kadets*), which resolutely espoused the Bulgarian cause. This stance was due to the Bulgarophilism of the CDP leader, Pavel Milyukov. After living in Bulgaria as an émigré for several years, he came to the conclusion that the establishment of firm ties with that country should be Russia's political priority in the Balkans. Reflecting his views, the main CDP newspaper, *Rech*, wrote this: "For the Russian interests, Bulgaria is the most important ally in the Balkans. If we have to choose between irreconcilable demands, our choice should be in favor of a closer and stronger neighbor." [23] The *Rech* regarded Serbian claims to an area south of Skopje as totally ungrounded and warned that Belgrade's attempts to hold Macedonia by force would only weaken the Serbian state and would for long divert its forces to a struggle against the Bulgarian irredentism.

While *Rech* was unequivocally pro-Bulgarian in the Serbian-Bulgarian conflict over Macedonia, a number of Russian newspapers (*Novoye vremya*, *Golos Moskvy*, *Vestnik Yevropy*) condemned the Serbian government's position for other reasons, while not rejecting the Serbian arguments in the territorial disputes. They pointed out that Belgrade, while coveting Macedonia, might forever lose the chance to annex Serb-populated Austrian and Hungarian territories, for which it could only fight in alliance with Bulgaria or at least against the backdrop of its benevolent neutrality.

The *Novoye vremya* described the Pašić government's claims to Bulgaria a "major mistake": If the Serbs lost an outlet to the Adriatic Sea, it was Austro-Hungary and the great powers that were to blame, while Bulgaria could not pay with its territories for that. The newspaper was confident that it was to the Serbs' benefit to abide by the 1912 allied agreement, because the Bulgarians would reach Lake Ohrid and the Albanian lands should it be implemented. As a consequence, Bulgaria was likely to become allied with the Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks in their fight for the partition of Albania. True, *Novoye vremya* did not

believe in spring 1913 that the Serbian-Bulgarian dispute would escalate into a war between the two states. The newspaper saw a guarantee against this disastrous development of events in the fact that a war of this sort made no sense for the Serbs: They could only bring themselves to start a war against the Bulgarians for really vital interests like gaining an access to the sea. But even a victorious war against the Bulgarians in alliance with the Greeks would not allow the Serbs to achieve this major objective. [24]

The *Golos Moskvy* regarded the Serbian and Greek fears in connection with possible Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans as far-fetched. The newspaper pointed out that Bulgaria had reached the limit of its territorial expansion as a result of the war with Turkey, while Serbia and Greece were yet to annex a number of Habsburg- and Ottoman-controlled territories, after which they would prove much bigger than Bulgaria. The *Golos Moskvy* assumed that Bulgaria would emerge victorious from the war, if it began after all, because Austro-Hungary would join in as its ally. "Serbia is going to commit a major mistake, a mistake that is irreparable, fatal and perilous for the very existence of this small kingdom that somehow drags out an existence thanks to a collision of interests of the adjacent states. Declaring war on Bulgaria will be an act of political suicide for Serbia." [25]

Similar ideas were aired by *Vestnik Yevropy*, an authoritative liberal journal that opposed not so much the essence as the form of the Serbian claims. It stressed that a country should not reject an agreement with another country solely on account of a changed international situation, which the agreement had not foreseen. According to *Vestnik Yevropy*, there was no doubt that Serbia had done more for Bulgaria during the war than Bulgaria for its Serbian ally. Adrianople would have hardly fallen into Bulgaria's hands without the Serbian army's assistance. As a result, however, the Serbs had obtained much less than the Bulgarians. "The undeniable facts testify in favor of Serbia's moral entitlement to considerable concessions from the Bulgarians without detriment to the firmness of the league or any attempts to put an arbitrary interpretation on the allied agreement." [26, p. 393]

*Utro Rossiyi* also invited Sofia to meet Belgrade halfway: "Whoever feels stronger and satisfied beyond the preplanned measure should be more accommodating." A Serbian-Bulgarian compromise agreement could well take hold, the progressist newspaper believed, were it not for the Greeks, who were playing a provocative role. Being much weaker than Bulgaria militarily, Greece was seeking to pit the Serbs against the Bulgarians, since it was only a Bulgarian-Serbian military conflict that presented the Greeks with a unique chance to grab Salonika, the entire coast of the Orfanski zaliv, and possibly even the Kavala port. *Utro Rossiyi* expressed hope that the Russian government would not have to arbitrate between the former allies. According to the newspaper, the arbitration would lead to the worsening of Russia's relations with both Bulgaria and Serbia, because "no amount of arbitration in the world can satisfy all rivals in equal measure." [27]

While the Russian press gave different assessments to Serbian and Bulgarian policies with regard to the Macedonian issue, there was no doubt as to Aus-

tro-Hungary's role in the impending Balkan conflict. The Habsburg Empire was, with good reason, called the main agent provocateur pitting the Balkan allies against each other in the fight for Macedonia. (See [8, pp. 168-169; 11, pp. 143-149]) Most newspapers were positive that the Austrians were eager for the war to break out and active in preparing it in a bid to ruin the Balkan League, weaken all Balkan states, particularly Serbia, and restore its influence that had faltered after Turkey's defeat.

As early as February 1913, *Golos Moskvy* reported in an article entitled "Intrigues against the Balkan League" that the Austrian diplomacy was trying to pit the Balkan allies against each other. According to the newspaper, it was being hinted that Serbia could be compensated in Macedonia for its loss of Northern Albania and that Vienna was supposedly prepared to second Serbian claims to the areas that were to devolve to the Bulgarians and the Greeks under the 1912 agreement. [28] A few months later, the *Novoye vremya* stated with regret that despite the obviousness of the Austrian designs, Vienna had managed to make politicians both in Serbia and Bulgaria play its game. In the newspaper's view, the Pašić and Stoyan Danev governments that held irreconcilable positions and had actually evaded the Russian offer of arbitration sank as low as to play the role of puppets manipulated by the Austrian diplomacy and behaved as though they were implementing a Vienna-dictated plan. Nevertheless, *Novoye vremya* admitted that the Austrian intrigues were only a part of the explanation as far as the quarrel between the former allies was concerned and that much of the blame lay on the Balkan peoples themselves, who were not just clearing up the issue of Macedonia's ethnicity but were actually vying for hegemony in the Balkans. [29]

The *Rech* held that the Austrian diplomacy was playing a win-win game: "Austria will win in any case, whoever of the allies loses in an open conflict." [30] The CDP newspaper assumed that the Habsburg Empire would interfere in an interallied war on Bulgaria's side. The Vienna politicians were not afraid of a Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans, because they viewed a strong Bulgaria as a counterweight to Russia in this area. The liberal *Russkiye vedomosti*, an ideological twin of *Rech*, wrote that Austro-Hungary, being incapable of a radical rejuvenation, was seeking to retain its influence in the Balkans by pitting the Balkan peoples against each other the way the Turks did after 1878. [31] The *Moskovskiy vedomosti* noted that in Vienna and Berlin "a fratricidal war between the Slav states ... would be welcomed with delight as a German dream come true." [32] They were expecting that Bulgaria would soon come over to their side.

The *Russkoye slovo* claimed that an interallied war would benefit only the Triple Alliance that would be able to dictate its terms to the exhausted Balkan states. Austro-Hungary would get an opportunity to restore its control over the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, while Italy would chuck the Greeks out of Northern Epirus, turning it over to Albania, and consolidate Italy's hold on the Greek-populated Dodecanese Islands. L. Sokolovsky, Vienna correspondent of the *Russkoye slovo*, wrote in June 1913: "A war between the Serbs and the Bulgarians is Austria's last trump card and hope. If there is no war, the Austrian game in

the Balkans is lost irrevocably.” [33] The Black-Hundred *Russkoye znamya* was sure that the developments in the Balkans were benefitting Austria and Germany and that “it is their doing.” [34] The liberal *Vestnik Yevropy* looked at the problem in a wider perspective, putting the blame for the quarrel between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece on the European diplomacy as a whole, which should have insisted on Macedonia’s autonomy. A conflict between the allies over its partition could have been averted by declaring Macedonia a single and autonomous area. [35, p. 426]

But all attempts to prevent the war failed. On June 29 (16), 1913, Bulgaria, hoping for Romania’s and Turkey’s neutrality and active assistance from Austria, launched combat operations against the Serbs and the Greeks. [12, p. 184] Russia perceived the news as the collapse of all that the Balkan Slavonic peoples had achieved in the war against Turkey. The Russian press was dominated by pessimistic moods with regard to the future of the Balkan Peninsula. The *Novoye vremya* did not conceal its despair: “The agreement, the Balkan League, the common interests of the Southern Slavs—all of that has collapsed. What is left is to save the debris and build the charred ruins... the erstwhile dream about the Southern Slavonic peoples’ greatness, which was so close at hand and feasible, had dispersed as a morning fog.” [36] *Vestnik Yevropy* stated with regret that the Balkan states, which had only recently caused general sympathy in Europe due to their energetic and successful struggle against Turkey, were turning a very sad page of their history: “The idea of the Balkan League has been drowned in blood.” [35, p. 426]

The Russian newspapers offered different comments as to who was to blame for the disaster. The *Russkoye slovo* made Bulgaria accountable for the collapse of the Balkan League: “Had Bulgaria displayed a sincere desire to solve all the disputed issues peacefully and avoided being condescending towards its allies, the partition of Macedonia could have been carried out amicably. The trouble is that the Bulgarians think that they alone have the rights, while all others are left to be content with the duties.” [37] The *Golos Moskvy*, on the contrary, believed that it was not Bulgaria that was really responsible for the unexpected war but those who had provoked its campaign undertaken solely in the vital interests of the state’s defense. According to *Novoye vremya*, the culprits were not the peoples or individual countries, but the leaders of all the embattled nations—Pašić, Venizelos, and Danev—who were unable to calculate either the possibility of third forces (Austro-Hungary and even Turkey) interfering in the interallied feud, or the decline in each state’s importance after the collapse of the Balkan League. [38] The *Utro Rossiyyi* asked “what is to be done?” rather than “who is to blame?” And replied: The Russian diplomacy must do its utmost to localize the war and keep Romania and Turkey from being involved in this “Balkan family quarrel.” It was very hard for the progressists’ newspaper to take leave of illusions about the triumph of the “Slavonic cause”; the entire Second Balkan War seemed to it “nothing but a nightmarish incident, or a bloody interlude that unexpectedly rushed in into a peaceful environment of diplomatic negotiations regarding friendly arbitration.” [39]

The Russian public estimated the outbreak of hostilities between the armies of the erstwhile allies as a big victory for the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy and personally for Foreign Minister Count Leopold Berchtold. The *Russkiye vedomosti* emphasized that the war had created a totally new situation, where Austria “being a while ago on the verge of losing its game in the Balkans, now holds all the trumps.” [40] The *Novoye vremya* said that the postwar constitution of the Balkan Peninsula, regardless of the outcome of the armed conflict, would depend on Austro-Hungary rather than the Serbs, the Bulgarians, or the Greeks. Austro-Hungary will take action at an opportune moment and “will sweep all their cards off the table with its sleeve and distribute the gains and the losses as it sees fit for its own, not their, benefits.” [41] The *Vestnik Yevropy* was of the same opinion: “The Vienna cabinet is advocating the freedom of action for the Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks; it has nothing against Serbia being ‘taught a lesson’ by the Bulgarians so that the former allies gnaw through each other’s throat after excessive joint victories over Turkey. The Austrians hope that the time will come soon, when the flushed contenders will feel the need for Austro-Hungary’s benevolence and friendship, while Austro-Hungary, for its part, will be able to impose its terms.” [35, pp. 420-421]

The new situation that emerged after the start of the interallied war made it imperative for Russia to rethink its policy. Most media outlets believed that the Bulgarian-Serbian feud relieved Russia of the moral responsibility for the fate of the southern Slavonic peoples. Newspapers and journals declared that in the face of the collapse of the Balkan League that had been created by the Russian diplomatic effort and the clear disdain for Nicholas II’s appeal not to start a war over Macedonia, demonstrated by the Serbs and the Bulgarians, Russia should think solely of its own interests. These moods were forcibly expressed by the *Golos Moskvy*: “Since the Slavonic idea is in tatters courtesy of the Balkan Slavs, while Russia has suffered an unforgettable insult, there are no particular reasons why we should be concerned with the fate of our ‘small brothers.’ It’s high time we took care of our own interests.” [42]

The interallied war generated an immense disappointment with the Balkan Slavonic peoples in the Russian public, delivering a sensitive blow to the Slavophilism illusions. A well-known writer, Mikhail Menshikov, said in the *Novoye vremya* that by defeating Turkey the Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks and Montenegrins had won sympathies and respect in Europe, while “after quarreling and getting at each other’s throat, these small peoples have turned into a crowd of insignificant nations, whose hostility or friendship were equally of no great value.” [43] Another popular contemporary writer, Rev. Grigory Petrov, being under the impression of the bloody interallied feud and military crimes committed by those involved in the conflict, claimed that cultural sensitivity had not become second nature to the Balkan peoples and that European civility was for them “only a smart and showy suit.” [44] The publisher of the conservative journal *Grazhdanin*, Prince Vladimir Meshchersky, who even before had a highly negative view of the Slavophilism ideas, stressed during the Second Balkan War that the Russians should not sympathize with the Balkan peoples that “all without

exception wage war on the savage and beastly Papuan principles.” He regarded Russia’s entire latest Middle East policy as a string of mistakes and follies, including the liberation of the Balkan Slavs from Turkish dominance. This liberation, according to him, proved a “release of wild animals from their cage.” [45]

The Black Hundred *Russkoye znamya*, which was quite sympathetic of the struggle conducted by the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins against the Turks during the First Balkan War, was equally critical, in summer 1913, of the Balkan Slavonic peoples’ ethos. Now the paper claimed that the Balkan peoples, which had doubled the size of their possessions and nevertheless were ready out of avarice to stab and kill each other for the sake of an even bigger cut, did not deserve Russia’s protection and respect from the Russian public. [46] Another Black Hundred newspaper, *Zemshchina*, held that the conflict over Macedonia revealed the negative traits of the Slavonic national character. Its editor-in-chief, Stanislav Glinka-Yanchevsky, wrote: “We, Slavs, usually count other people’s benefits rather than our own. And if a neighbor earned more than what we think he should, we are agitated and restless, even though it doesn’t pinch us in any way... We have pettifogging in our blood and we are ready to waive all our property just to do a bad turn to the neighbor lest he gets something on top of what he already did.” Glinka-Yanchevsky came to an inauspicious conclusion about the future of the Slavonic peoples, which he regarded as incapable of self-government: “We need an iron fist for otherwise we become playthings in the hands of our enemies.” [47]

In the meantime, the Bulgarian offensive on the Serbian and Greek positions in Macedonia ended in a disaster. During a days-long battle against the Serbian army on the Bregalnica River, Tsar Ferdinand’s army was defeated. Simultaneously the Greek army launched an offensive in the south and quickly dislodged the Bulgarians from Aegean Macedonia, disarming a Bulgarian garrison at Thessaloniki. The anti-Bulgarian coalition was expanding. The Montenegrins joined Serbia from day one. On July 3 (June 20), Romania announced mobilization. A week later, Romania sent troops to Bulgaria, demanding a border adjustment and cession of almost the whole of Bulgarian Dobrudja. Meeting no resistance, the Romanian forces reached Sofia. The Turks also took advantage of Bulgaria’s plight and invaded Thrace in violation of the London Peace. Within a few days, they occupied Lule Burgas and Kirk Kilisse. On July 23 (10), they restored control over Adrianople, left without battle by the Bulgarian garrison. [3, pp. 107-108]

As the war expanded and involved ever new countries, the Russian press grew increasingly apprehensive of Austro-Hungarian reactions: It was not ruled out that Vienna, in order to avert the rout of Bulgaria and Serbia’s strengthening, would resolutely intervene into the war, the more so since in this case the Austrians would have an opportunity to derive benefits from the Balkan disturbance by occupying the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and finally consolidate its hold on Albania. It was noted that the independent action by Romania, which had actually joined the war on the side of Austrian-hated Serbia, had largely spoiled the game for the Vienna diplomacy. (For more detail on Austrian-Romanian differences during the Second Balkan War, see [2, pp. 225-249; 6, pp. 81-82].)

The *Novoye vremya* correspondent in Austro-Hungary, Dmitry Yanchevetsky, reported that the Romanian offensive was an unpleasant surprise for the Vienna and Budapest politicians, who were accusing the Romanians of betraying the Triple Alliance and siding with the Entente and the Serbian-Greek bloc. [48] His observations were confirmed by reports from the *Russkiye vedomosti* Vienna correspondent, Pyotr Zvezdich (Pyotr Rothenstern), who said that Romania joining the war against Bulgaria, which upset all Austrian plans in the Balkans, had produced “a stunning impression” in Vienna. The Habsburg Empire always felt an affinity with Romania, based on the fear of Russia and Pan-Slavism. Now the affinity was crumbling. “The closest friends are beginning to shy away from Austria as if it were doomed to failure,” he opined. [49] The *Russkoye slovo*, in turn, did not conceal that it was pleased with the Romanian incursion in Bulgaria. According to the newspaper, this action by the Bucharest government actually meant a rupture with Austria, in whose wake Romania had followed for the last 30 years. [50]

In July 1913, the Russian press focused not only on the Romanian attack against Bulgaria but also on the Turkish intrusion in Thrace and recapture of Adrianople. It was possibly only the *Novoye vremya* and *Moskovskiy vedomosti* that urged the Russian government to bring military pressure on the Porte in order to force the Young Turks to give Adrianople back to the Bulgarians and retreat behind the Bulgarian-Turkish border established by the London Peace Treaty. [51; 52] The overwhelming majority of other newspapers were against any aggressive actions directed against Turkey. It was argued that Russia’s action would only benefit Vienna and Berlin, which are seeking to make Russia and Turkey fall out with each other for good and thus to strengthen Austrian and German influence on the shores of Bosphorus. As the Second Balkan War went its course, Russian newspapers increasingly often pointed to the growth of pro-Austrian sympathies in Bulgaria, stating that it made no sense to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for a nation that might soon renege to the Triple Alliance.

The Second Balkan War ended in a crushing defeat for Bulgaria. Attacked from four sides, it capitulated on July 29 (16), 1913. The rapid rout of Bulgaria, militarily the strongest Balkan state, was a surprise for the Russian society. “Just a few months ago, after its mind-boggling successes in the war against Turkey, Bulgaria was at the height of its might and glory. How deeply must it now feel its humiliation!” said the *Russkiye vedomosti*. “Within a few days, it was deprived of everything that had been prepared by years of inner work, in the name of which such heavy sacrifices had been made, and what already seemed definitively achieved.” [53] The *Utro Rossiya* put the blame for the Bulgarian disaster on Tsar Ferdinand, who during 25 years of his rule made advances to Austria, to which “his personal sympathies, ancestral traditions and the call of his non-Slavonic blood powerfully propelled him,” instead of unequivocally orienting itself towards Russia. According to the newspaper, Ferdinand hoped that the war against Serbia would compromise the pro-Russia Danev government and deal a crushing blow to the Bulgarian Russophiles. [54] The *Zemshchina* believed that the actual outcome of the interallied war was not yet the worst of

possible options. Had Bulgaria, with its urge for dominance in the Balkans, been the winner, it would have ruthlessly finished off Serbia, enjoying Austria's sympathy. As far as Serbia and Greece were concerned, they did not aspire to pre-eminence and their appetites were more moderate. By this virtue, these countries would not be overly stubborn and advance excessive demands. [55]

Peace talks between the Bulgarians and their adversaries began in Bucharest immediately after the Bulgarian capitulation, which ended with the signing of a peace treaty on August 10 (July 28), 1913. The defeated Bulgarians had to give up the majority of what they had acquired as a result of the First Balkan War: South Macedonia with Thessaloniki and Kavala were devolved to Greece; Serbia received the whole of western Macedonia along the Vardar River with the towns of Skopje, Bitola, Ohrida, Kumanovo, Pirlpepe, and Istib. On top of that, Sofia ceded southern Dobrudja to Romania. Signed in Constantinople a month and a half later, a Bulgarian-Turkish Peace Treaty formalized the Bulgarian loss of a large strip of Thrace with Adrianople, which had been won in fall 2012. But even though the Bulgarians suffered a disastrous defeat, they managed to keep some of the captured territories, including a portion of Trace with an outlet to the Aegean Sea through the port of Dedeagac and Pirin Macedonia with the city of Strumica. [1; 7]

The Russian press unanimously assessed the Bucharest Peace as extremely unstable and fraught with new military clashes in the Balkans. The *Russkiye vedomosti* estimated the results of the two Balkan wars as a sign of the crisis of the entire system of international relations. The Bucharest Peace, in its view, created an even more artificial and dangerous situation in the Balkans than the 1878 Berlin Congress. The newspaper put the blame for this on the great powers' diplomacy: their London mediation "proved one of the biggest diplomatic bankruptcies, one of the most unreasonable and shortsighted political acts, and one of the most glaring manifestations of 'Europe's absence' and the collapse of its moral authority and its influence in recent history." [56]

*Utro Rossiya* described the Bucharest Treaty as "peace without reconciliation": "Peace has been concluded, but none of the signatories of the peace treaty believes in it. Some will expect an attack, while others will be preparing for it." [57] Serbia's condition after its brilliant victories in the two wars was even graver than before 1912: even though it had considerably expanded its territory, it was now surrounded by enemies on all sides—the Austrians, the Albanians, the Bulgarians. According to the progressist newspaper, the Bucharest Treaty was a major diplomatic defeat for Russia because it had failed to prevent an excessive weakening of Bulgaria. The *Utro Rossiya* did not doubt that the Bulgarians had accepted the humiliating peace solely in order to start military and diplomatic preparations for revenge as soon as possible. Thus, the future that lay in store for the Balkan Peninsula consisted of feverish militarization and the triumph of chauvinism.

The results of the Balkan wars caused indignation in the *Golos Moskvy*, which called the Bucharest Treaty "the gravestone over Bulgaria and the Slavonic population of Macedonia." [58] All neighbors of Bulgaria grew stronger at its

expense by grossly violating their own Balkan equilibrium principle. The newspaper put the main blame for Bulgaria's humiliation on Greece rather than Serbia. It was also indicated that Greece would be Russia's rival in the struggle for the Black Sea Straits and Constantinople. *Golos Moskvy* believed that Russia could reconcile itself with the Bucharest settlement only if the union of Serbia, Greece, Romania and Montenegro was consolidated and became an obstacle to the Austrian expansionism.

The *Novoye vremya* was skeptical of the Bucharest Peace Treaty's terms, pointing out that Serbia, Greece and Romania had committed the same mistake as Prussia had in 1871. As the annexation of Alsace and a part of Lorraine created a permanent conflict in relations between Paris and Berlin, so the deprivation of Bulgaria of almost all of its acquisitions in the war against Turkey created the conditions for new wars in southeastern Europe: "The Bucharest Peace that has no regard for the future is creating a tragic situation in the Balkans." According to the newspaper, the beneficiaries of the Second Balkan War were the non-Slavonic countries—Greece and Romania. The political preeminence in the region was passing to Romania that became extremely strengthened in consequence of the Bulgarian kingdom's defeat and arrogated the role of arbiter in the dispute between the Bulgarians and their adversaries at the Bucharest talks. The control over the economic life of Bulgaria, Serbia and partially Romania itself was devolved on Greece that received Thessaloniki and Kavala, two major Aegean ports, as a result of the war. [59]

After Bulgaria's defeat, the Constitutional Democrat's periodicals (newspaper), *Rech* and *Russkiye vedomosti*, continued to insist on the need for further diplomatic support for the beleaguered Bulgarians. Thereby the Milyukov-led party leadership sought to strengthen the pro-Russian political forces in Bulgaria and prevent the country from reneging to the Austro-German bloc. [10, p. 186] No wonder that the Constitutional Democrats were highly critical of the Bucharest Peace. The *Rech* wrote: "Rarely was there a peace that would be so clearly pregnant with future armed clashes." The treaty humiliated Bulgaria to the extreme and robbed it in favor of the Serbs and the Greeks. As a result of capturing almost the entire Macedonia, said the paper, the latter were turning from liberators into "peoples-abusers and constrictors that will have to digest, slowly and for a long time, the extraneous body they have impulsively swallowed." [60]

An important CD figure, Sergey Kotlyarevsky, urged the Russian government from the pages of *Russkiye vedomosti* to be more active in supporting Bulgaria, "which is linked by such strong historical and cultural ties with Russia." Otherwise Bulgaria would have to follow in the wake of the Triple Alliance. Kotlyarevsky wrote that after the two wars all Balkan states were very weak and this provided a certain guarantee against new complications in the near future. But this couldn't last long. "The artificial nature of the order that has been established in the Balkans is unlikely to be erased by time. Rather the contrary: vexations and grievances will pile up, as will national hatreds, and the Balkan Peninsula will sooner or later reemerge as an arena of bloody struggles." The Euro-

pean powers, in all likelihood, will seek, for the sake of their peace, to maintain the Bucharest *status quo* as they did with regard to the Berlin *status quo* after 1878. But they were unlikely to succeed in preventing another explosion in the Balkans, granted that they had failed to do the same in fall 1912. [61]

The extreme right-wing publications, *Zemshchina* and *Russkoye znamya*, were campaigning against Russian interference in the Balkan affairs in the interests of Bulgaria. Both regarded Bulgaria's hegemonic aspirations as the main cause of the interallied war and its defeat as rather a favorable factor enabling normalization in the Balkans. The Black Hundreds viewed Bulgaria as a bastion of Austrian influence in the region and urged Russian diplomacy to stake on Serbia. A stronger Serbia that had annexed Kosovo, Sanjak and a portion of Macedonia was, in their opinion, "the best protection against Austria."

Glinka-Yanchevsky believed that the Bulgarian delegation had betrayed its allies' interests way back at the London peace talks with Turkey by not insisting on opening an outlet to the Adriatic Sea for Serbia or leaving Scutari to Montenegro. He saw the reason for that in the person of the Bulgarian tsar, Ferdinand I von Sachsen-Coburg, who had close links with the Habsburg Empire. During his rule, Bulgaria had become "Austria's secret agent," while the Bulgarian throne was "an Austrian strong point." The editor-in-chief of *Zemshchina* was certain that Ferdinand was standing between the Bulgarian people and Russia as the main obstacle to restoring friendly relations between the two countries. [62]

If *Zemshchina* was still hopeful of better Russian-Bulgarian relations in the future, *Russkoye znamya* had no faith in this, stressing that Russophobic sentiments pervaded not only the Bulgarian elite but also much of the Bulgarian society. Claiming that the Bulgarians had repaid Russia for liberating them from the Turkish enslavement with nothing but insults, the mouthpiece of the Union of the Russian People inferred that Russia should stop sticking up for the ungrateful Bulgarians. The *Russkoye znamya* wrote openly that Bulgaria's defeat was to Russia's benefit, since Ferdinand's excessively close ties with Vienna could create a lot of problems for Russia in the future as Russia moved to take possession of the straits and Constantinople. The paper welcomed Serbia's victory. The only thing it regretted was the excessive strengthening of Greece. *Russkoye znamya* assumed that Greece would soon join the Triple Alliance and a joint Austro-Hungarian-Italian-Greek navy would dominate the Mediterranean. [63]

To sum up: The Second Balkan War was an important turning-point in Russian attitudes to the Balkan Slavonic peoples. It buried the illusions that it was possible to merge all Orthodox Balkan peoples into a powerful coalition friendly to Russia and faced the Russian public and Russian diplomacy with the need to put a stake on one of the irreconcilable adversaries—Serbia or Bulgaria. As subsequent events showed, the rapprochement between revenge-seeking Bulgaria and the Austro-German bloc left Russia practically no choice. Unlike Bulgaria, Serbia, a confirmed opponent of Austro-Hungary, was not laying claim to the straits and Constantinople and seemed a more reliable and valuable ally than Bulgaria.

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*Translated by Aram Yavrumyan*

## How Gogol's Selected Passages from Correspondence with My Friends Reached the Reader

Irina MONAKHOVA

*Abstract.* The author views various responses to *Selected Passages from Correspondence with My Friends* from Russian critics and public figures in the 19th and 20th centuries as milestones on the long and tortuous path traversed by this piece of spiritual prose before it could be appreciated by readers. The opinions of different generations quoted in the book reflect certain key features of Russian society in the corresponding periods.

*Keywords:* N. Gogol, biography, 19th-century Russian literature, spiritual writings, *Selected Passages from Correspondence with My Friends*, Russian literary criticism of the 19th—20th centuries, Russian social thought in the 19th and 20th centuries.

We have come to take for granted the attention, reverence and awe with which the wide readership regards classical Russian literature. Today it hardly occurs to us what an arduous path has been covered on the way to the situation when every Russian, just because he/she has studied at school, knows who Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky were and has at least some idea of their work.

And yet this has not always been the case. For example, Nikolay Gogol was not always immediately understood and appreciated. His play *Inspector-General* was seen by many of his contemporaries as a light-hearted farce missing its serious social message. About *Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka* some critics claimed that the author was not familiar with life in Malorossiya (Small Russia). Some described Gogol's works as vulgar, "salacious," "dirty," etc. It cost the famous critic Vissarion Belinsky and others considerable effort to oppose such a superficial perception of Gogol's work and discover for the reading public the depth and significance of the writer's fiction. It was Belinsky who in 1835 proclaimed him to be a great Russian poet and the leader of Russian literature. Sub-

sequently Gogol was praised by his contemporaries more than any of his predecessors. Nikolay Chernyshevsky wrote: "It was a long time since the world has seen a writer as important for his own people as Gogol was for Russia." [5, p. 11]

However, in Gogol's times the reading public formed a small fraction of the population while the rest were illiterate. Thus nationwide fame did not catch up with Gogol until universal literacy and school education were introduced under Soviet government which had a very reverent attitude to classical Russian literature. Gogol's books were published in thousands of copies and made into stage and film productions. As a result, Gogol's fiction is among the most popular Russian classics.

This was in striking contrast to the fate of Gogol the spiritual writer. Indeed, the very fact that he was a spiritual writer may come as a surprise to many readers. His contemporaries did not understand and did not recognize his spiritual prose. In fact only the last of Gogol's published books, *Selected Passages from Correspondence with My Friends*, was published in his lifetime—and then only in an abridged form. The censors had cut out the most poignant and probably the most important chapters. Other spiritual works (*Reflections on Divine Liturgy and Author's Confessions*) saw the light of day after Gogol's death.

During Gogol's lifetime he was thought to be semi-insane when he gave up writing fiction and began preaching Christianity and reflecting on the destinies of Russian society. He fell out of favor with the readers and the authorities. The inertia of misunderstanding and rejection of Gogol as a spiritual writer remained after his death and even increased in the Soviet times owing to ideological reasons. These works were not studied at schools or universities. At best they were passed over in silence and at worst were shrouded in legends about Gogol's "mental ill health" late in his life and about the harmful influence on him of some priests.

*Selected Passages...* were never published in book form, but only as part of collections of his works. *Reflections on Divine Liturgy* were never published, not even in the definitive *Collected Works*. As a result, toward the end of the Soviet period Gogol was totally unknown to the mass reader as a spiritual writer and religious thinker. That was a big gap in Russians' knowledge of their native literature. Scholars, of course, knew various facets of Gogol's work. Several works published before the 1917 Revolution attempted to present an unbiased view of Gogol's spiritual journey and his later works. After the Revolution the topic was addressed by Russian scholars living abroad. However, their books and articles were not published in the Soviet Union because the majority of Russian readers were simply unaware of their existence.

However, Gogol wrote not only for the critics and literary scholars, but for all his compatriots seeking to improve Russian society in general. As he noted in a 1847 letter referring to *Selected Passages...*, "I composed the book not in order to cause the ire of the Belinskys, Krayevskys and Senkovskys, I looked into the depth of Russia and not at the literary community." [6, p. 209]

A long path needs to be traversed before Gogol's spiritual works become, if not equal to, at least approximate the fame of his fiction works. The recent

decades have seen many publications about the work of Gogol as spiritual writer and religious thinker. At the same time works about Gogol written earlier by émigré Russian writers are being published. Gogol's contribution to the history of Russian philosophy is recognized. One modern encyclopedia writes: "Gogol undoubtedly is entitled to and must be regarded as a major Russian thinker who exerted a huge influence on the further development of all Russian literature, including philosophy." [13, p. 132]

Gogol's spiritual prose is being published as stand-alone editions. But this is only the beginning. After the publication of a book it may take a lot of time before numerous readers come to understand it. This is particularly true of *Selected Passages from Correspondence with My Friends*. It was no accident that Gogol urged his readers (in a letter to Belinsky) to read and reread his book: "It was not by chance that I implored everyone to read my book several times anticipating in advance all these misunderstandings." [8, p. 327] You have to peruse the book meeting the author halfway for its content to gradually reveal itself.

In a letter to Nikolay Yazykov he wrote: "A tree may grow on a gaunt rock, but it does not happen at once, first the rock is covered in barely noticeable mold, after a while visible moss appears in its place and then the first plant; after the plant rots it prepares the soil for a tree; and finally the tree appears." [9, pp. 236-237]

To pick up this metaphor, Gogol's work may be compared with a powerful blooming tree and his spiritual works as perceived by readers, with a bare rock. A tree has yet to grow on it in time.

Looking at the history of the discussion and perception of *Selected Passages...* from the very beginning one is first of all struck by the candid and clear-cut position of the book's publisher Pyotr Pletnev. The day after the issue of *Selected Passages...* he wrote to Gogol:

"A great event happened yesterday: a book of your letters has seen the light of day. But it will make a difference only to a select few; others will not find food for thought in your book. And yet I am convinced that it is the beginning of Russian literature proper. All that was before seems to me to be apprentice pieces on topics picked from an anthology. You were the first to scoop up thoughts from the very bottom and to fearlessly put them before the world." [12, pp. 271-272]

Pyotr Pletnev was probably the only person who saw the grandeur and significance of the book at once and told Gogol about it in the most complimentary of terms, sometimes getting carried away and going to extremes (for example, one cannot agree with his assessment of "everything that was before" in Russian literature as "apprentice pieces"—after all, by that time Russian literature already had produced Pushkin, Lermontov and Gogol's own fiction).

One convinced and staunch admirer of *Selected Passages...* was Aleksandra Smirnova-Rosset, Gogol's friend of many years, who never tired of arguing her case, including in disputes with Sergey Aksakov.

Those who agreed with Gogol's preaching, if only partially, were few and far between. They included Pyotr Chaadayeve, Pyotr Viazemsky, Stepan

Shevyrev, Apollon Grigoryev and Ivan Aksakov. Thus, Pyotr Chaadaye, while giving due to the depth and beautiful diction of *Selected Passages...* did not take Gogol's "mentorship" seriously attributing it to his greatly increased self-esteem fueled by the fulsome praise of his fans.

The clergy took a generally guarded view of *Selected Passages...* They lauded Gogol's engagement with the religious and moral themes in his book, but criticized him for taking up preaching. The only exception was *Three Letters to Gogol* written in 1848 by spiritual writer and theologian Aleksandr Bukharev. In a detailed review of *Selected Passages...* A. Bukharev did not only praise the work, but stressed that it was a logical sequel to all of Gogol's preceding work.

The high society Vielgorsky family with which Gogol was well acquainted and corresponded extensively took kindly to Gogol's book. Even Mikhail Pogodin, for whom Gogol had some harsh words in *The Testament* preceding *Selected Passages...* took a generally positive view of the book. At least he did not question the author's sincerity.

However, the few sympathetic, reasonable and more or less objective opinions were drowned out by the numerous and strident chorus of indignant voices. They were above all Gogol's fans who set great store not only by the artistic merits of his work, but also his criticism of the ugly aspects of Russian life. Those readers saw *Selected Passages...* as Gogol's renunciation of his satirical attitude in favor of praising the existing order of things. Thus the political aspect obscured for them the preaching of moral revival the author of *Selected Passages...* addressed to his fellow countrymen. Belinsky spoke for many of these indignant readers of Gogol in his famous letter from Salzbrunn of July 15, 1847.

A considerable group of readers rather liked *Selected Passages...* but were indifferent to the Christian message of the book. They simply thought that Gogol had given up artistic work dismissing his former books as useless, and had embraced reactionary political views much to their delight. Needless to say, for Gogol their praise was insulting rather than pleasant.

An apotheosis of what Gogol called "confusion" over his book, i.e., a negative reaction to it and practically total failure to accept the author as a spiritual writer, was the rumor about his madness. This was the firm opinion of the writer S. Aksakov, who had known Gogol for many years and admired his artistic genius. An analogy suggests itself with the alleged "madness" of Pyotr Chaadaye after the publication of his "philosophical letter" in 1836, less than 11 years before Gogol's *Selected Passages...* However, there was a notable difference as well. Chaadaye had been *declared* insane—such was the Tsar's verdict. As for Gogol, he was thought to have gone mad by some of his readers and even ardent fans.

This was the "zero" or "near-zero" point from which the long and arduous path toward understanding and a more serious perception of Gogol's book began. For the reading public it began several years after the writer's death when his works, unpublished during his lifetime, notably *The Author's Confession* (1855), *Reflections on Divine Liturgy* (1857) and some letters became known. They revealed how deeply the issues of religion and morality engaged Gogol's mind. Moreover, it became clear that *Selected Passages...* was not a hypocritical or

false book and its publication had no ulterior motives. Apparently, S. Aksakov was the first to come to this realization and repent of his rejection of the later Gogol (even before his posthumous publications). He wrote in March 1852 shortly after Gogol passed away:

“Few people knew Gogol as a person <...> He did not like to talk about his moral sentiments, or his life’s circumstances or about what he was writing or about his domestic affairs. <...> In short, not knowing Gogol well people might have doubted that he was writing from the heart and questioned many of the words in his last book. But now that he sealed by his death the sincerity of his moral and religious convictions, the time seems to have come to give full credence to his Christian love of people. This is not about whether or not some of Gogol’s thoughts and views were mistaken, this is about the genuineness of humility, the purity of his motives, the heartiness of his feelings and his striving for Good.” [1, pp. 379-380]

Responding to the publication of previously unknown Gogol texts, Chernyshevsky in his articles and reviews quotes large chunks from Gogol’s letters to show that in his personal correspondence Gogol expressed the same ideas as in *Selected Passages...* Thus, his last book presents Gogol as he really was. As for the chapters in which Gogol speaks about the monarch and other high and mighty people of Russia, this was not in order to curry favor with them, but to exert an ennobling influence on them and through them on all Russian life. For all that, *Selected Passages...* continued to be regarded as the writer’s delusion and a tragic mistake. The author of *Selected Passages...* was now on the receiving end not of indignation, but of sympathy and even compassion.

This was the attitude of Vladimir Korolenko, who wrote in 1909:

“The bitterness provoked by the ideas of *Correspondence*, which was very keenly felt in the early years, has long subsided, and the rueful image of the poet, in whose very soul the mortal clash between old and new Russia was taking place, stands in all its tragic allure. Even the mistakes of his thoughts that prematurely destroyed his great talent become no more than an extra trait that adds to his tormenting quests. It is hard to imagine a more exalted perception of the significance and role of literature than that which manifested itself so completely in the great images he had wrested from the fateful sickness and even the fateful mistakes of his *Correspondence*. [10, p. 214]

At the same time Leo Tolstoy saw in *Selected Passages...* not “fateful mistakes,” but profound thoughts and ideas very similar to his own—perhaps even to the surprise of his contemporaries. He wrote to Nikolay Strakhov in 1887:

“I was also greatly impressed <...> by re-reading for the third time in my life Gogol’s correspondence. Regarding the significance of true art I am rediscovering the America Gogol discovered 35 years ago <...> And the entire correspondence (with the exception of a few particulars) is full of the most substantive and profound thoughts <...> I have a dream of getting selected passages from the Correspondence published by *Posrednik* (a publishing house), with a biography. That would be a wonderful life for the people, at least they would understand it.” [14, pp. 106-107]

Tolstoy's attention to *Selected Passages...* was a precursor of a new wave of interest in Gogol—this time as a thinker and preacher—and a wish to understand him and solve the mystery of his later work.

At the beginning of the 20th century, an era of great upheavals, the poet Aleksandr Blok, showing a prodigious sensitivity to the spirit of the times, saw in *Selected Passages...* something that was very important for his contemporaries. He saw an underlying second layer in the book that was considered to be a call to humility and was itself so pacifying. He sensed that Gogol, endowed with an equally sensitive ear—had long been hearing the sinister sound of the historical storm gathering around him. In January 1918, Blok wrote in his notebook: “The terrible noise that is arising in me and around me. Gogol heard this noise (which he tried to shut out by calling for domestic order and Orthodoxy).” [4, p. 238] Blok also saw in *Selected Passages...* the valuable nucleus which in his opinion would be important for readers in post-Revolutionary Russia. He wrote in December 1919: “Much needs to be reappraised, in the first place Gogol's *Correspondence with My Friends*, by removing from it what is temporary and cherishing what is eternal.” [3, p. 385]

In reality, something else happened. Soon after the Revolution the quickened interest in Gogol the preacher and prophet moved abroad, as if emigrating together with many outstanding scientists and men-of-letters. In Soviet Russia, on the contrary, readers had, for ideological reasons, to consign *Selected Passages...* to oblivion. For them Gogol remained only a literary genius.

In the 1920s—1950s many Russian émigrés (Vasily Zenkovsky, Konstantin Mochulsky, Ivan Ilyin, Georgy Florovsky, Mikhail Gershenzon, Boris Zaytsev, to mention but some) were thinking intently about the prophetic aspects of Gogol's work. While Nikolay Berdyayev considered *Selected Passages...* to be simply a “theocratic utopia” (“Gogol in his zeal for religious and moral teaching proposed his theocratic utopia, a patriarchal idyll. He wants to transform Russia with the help of virtuous Governor Generals and their wives” [2, pp. 71-72]), many other authors paid attention to the phenomenon of “Gogol's spiritual journey” that led him to the writing of *Selected Passages...*

K. Mochulsky wrote this in his book *Gogol's Spiritual Path* published in Paris in 1934:

“In the realm of morality Gogol was endowed with genius; it fell to him to turn the whole Russian literature from esthetics to religion, shift it from the path of Pushkin to the path of Dostoyevsky. All the features characterizing “the great Russian literature” which became a world phenomenon, were already discernible in Gogol: its religious-moral mood, its civic and social character, its militant and practical character, its prophetic pathos and messianism. The high road, the world spaces begin with Gogol.” [11, p. 76]

Although Gogol's spiritual image was perceived in various ways the important thing is that he became the object of close attention and thorough study. Most importantly, these efforts were driven not by the wish to approach Gogol with preconceived opinions, but by a wish to understand the real Gogol, to discover new previously overlooked elements in his spiritual prose. And sure

enough, such elements were discovered. It turned out that what was perceived by Gogol's contemporaries as ridiculous, absurd and egregious, could be studied seriously and, given a certain commitment, could be understood by readers and be useful to them. This was the whole purpose of writing the book which Gogol himself described as "the cause of *the common good*."

V. Zenkovsky wrote in his book *N. V. Gogol*, first published in Paris in 1961:

"Gogol embarked on the path of religious life for his own sake, and once he embarked on this path he sought—boldly and honestly—to demonstrate to others the truth and power of religious understanding of life—for personal and historical life <...> With the audacity of a genius, with profound conviction of the truth of Christ's teaching Gogol surrendered himself to the "common cause" for which every human is called. Herein lies the value of Gogol's spiritual heritage, the truth and enduring value of his life's heroic feat." [15, p. 241]

*Selected Passages...* revealed itself to compatriots like a mysterious land. Russian writers, first-wave émigrés explained many of the book's "riddles."

In Soviet Russia interest in Gogol the author of *Selected Passages...* began to revive in the 1970s and 1980s when ideological pressure was eased somewhat and the primitive labels that branded the work as "grim" and "reactionary" and written solely under the negative influence of priests on Gogol, began to recede into the past.

More objective and serious assessments of the final stage of Gogol's creative career were published. *Selected Passages...* was seen not as a hostile, but as an "unfortunate" book, but in any case as a sincere and confessional one. However, the confessions were thought to be a failure because, on the one hand, the book was flawed and on the other, it proved to be obscure and unclaimed by the contemporaries. Accordingly, everything connected with the book (the ineptitude of the book and its being misunderstood by the readers) was interpreted as the tragedy of the later Gogol.

Thus, interest in this enigmatic work was revived. Of course, this referred mainly to critics and literary scholars and not to the broad readership. *Selected Passages...* was still not on the curricula of schools and universities, was not published in book form, so that the general public had limited access to it. Besides, the main idea—the preaching of Christianity—could not be openly expressed at the time. Otherwise Gogol would have had to be recognized as the author not just of an unfortunate, even if sincere, book, but as a preacher and a prophet whose text had to be perused to tease out conclusions about the relationship between society and religion and the influence of religion on every person and society as a whole. That of course, was impossible at the time for ideological reasons.

That obstacle is now gone and *Selected Passages...* can at last be defined as being what it is—a Christian sermon. The current situation is reminiscent of the times of Gogol in that then, as now, the Church had a great—if not unlimited—influence on society. Some had a critical attitude toward it as society struggled to find new paths of development while at the same time seeking to reappraise the traditional path. Gogol's visionary work was perhaps one of the most valiant attempts to do so. This may be why it is easier for us today to understand Gogol

the preacher. The historical experience our country lived through during the past century, replete as it was with turbulence and upheavals, demonstrates how well justified were Gogol's premonitions concerning his country's destiny. Hopefully, this has made it impossible to read *Selected Passages...* superficially which was (with rare exceptions) the case during the author's lifetime.

This is not to say that after a long and arduous path, the book has finally been understood by readers. It was studied mainly by literary critics, journalists, literary scholars while the mass of readers is even unaware of its existence. In that sense, the situation has changed little compared to the Soviet times. Perhaps the biggest challenge in mastering Gogol's heritage today is to make his spiritual and moral works, especially *Selected Passages from Correspondence with My Friends*, known to the public and to help the wide circle of readers to understand it. One scholar described the book as "a mirror of generations." Indeed, the attitude to the book and the degree to which it is understood speak not only about the book, but also about those who write about it and to some extent about the generation they represent. That is why the sequence of reflections in the "mirror of generations" may lead the modern reader to Gogol the spiritual writer, preacher and teacher.

Today, more than a century and a half after the publication of *Selected Passages...*, it is important that they should cease to be only the subject of scholarly studies and should gradually reach out to the numerous Gogol fans so that every reader should find in that book something he or she needs. Gogol, who claimed in *Selected Passages...* that his mission had to do with "*the soul and the solid business of life*" [7, p. 299], created not just a literary monument, but a work that can greatly benefit his compatriots.

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*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

## Locke's Razor

Anatoly YAKOVLEV

*Abstract.* The paradox of forbidden knowledge showing up most dramatically in the context of the 17th-century Millenarianism serves as a key to Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. The forbidden knowledge had provoked the Fall, and now appeared as a pre-condition for Christ's Second Coming. Is there any possibility, then, to shun the forbidden, and doing so to have the means of trespassing the imposed limits? Locke saw the criterion of the permitted in utility. The related method of analogical extrapolation made it possible to remain within the clearly circumscribed area of useful and at the same time to broaden knowledge by reasonably exercised accommodations.

*Keywords:* Millenarianism, forbidden knowledge, compass of understanding, way of ideas, angels, John Dee, Thomas Sydenham, Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, Isaac Newton, John Locke.

The idea of the limits to knowledge shows up again and again in the work of 15th—17th-century Millenarians, thinkers and practitioners, who on the one hand insisted on the need to increase knowledge in anticipation of Christ's Second Coming, and on the other hand did not forget for a minute that violation of the prohibition on certain knowledge caused the Fall. A muted debate was also unfolding about the notion of "forbidden," the criteria for considering something as either forbidden or permitted. After all, the Scripture suggested that knowledge was hidden only "until a certain time": "But thou, O Daniel, shut up the words, and seal the book, even to the time of the end." At such times "many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased" (Dan 12, 4), the "time of the end" meaning the time preceding the Second Coming.

John Goodwin, mid-17th century renowned preacher and theologian, interpreted these words as: "*many shall runne to and from*, [that is, shall discourse and beate out the secrets of GOD in the scriptures with more libertie and freedom of judgement and understanding, and traverse much ground to and againe, on which no man should set foot, till that time] and knowledge [by this means]

shall be increased." In the preface to the English translation of the Joseph Mede's *Clavis Apocalyptica* the words "many shall runne (or passe) to and fro" were interpreted to mean that navigation, trade and the restoration of knowledge "should meet in one time or age" (cit. from [14, p. 9, 10]).

Thus, the words "runne to and fro" were taken not only as referring to something new in and beyond the Revelation, but as a discovery of new lands through navigation, migration, development of new territories and trade. It may readily be seen that the adduced meanings are completely absent in the Russian translation which mentions only "reading' the Book and omits "running to and fro."

Yet even there, in the field of navigation and trade, some things remained forbidden. In 1498, after Columbus reached the mouth of the Orinoco during his third expedition, he wrote a letter to Ferdinand and Isabella. Everything suggests, he wrote, that Eden is not far away: four heads to the river, turbulent stream tumbling down the mountain, sweet taste of the water, naked savages and gold and precious stones in abundance. Columbus concluded that he was at the foot of the Holy Mountain, "close by the terrestrial paradise, but he knew, as he wrote to the Spanish sovereigns, that no one might enter it except by the will of God. Frightened by the forbidden paradise and the ultimate secret it held, he fled back to Hispaniola (Haiti.—*A.Ya.*)" [10, p. 60–61] However, his first perception of savages as a sign of the sacred was soon tempered by growing conviction of their implausible stupidity, and enchantment gave way to disillusionment.

In any case the forbidden territory seemed fairly dangerous. Crossing the boundaries, stepping over the limits of permitted knowledge could lead to grace, but it could as bring the final death. One could trust Francis Bacon, who insisted that the prophecy of Daniel meant science, more precisely science of his time and in his own interpretation [10, p. 21-23] The same epigraph appeared on the frontispiece of his *Great Instauration*: "Multi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia." Yet by the same token one could disbelieve Bacon. And then, what were the real limits and boundaries that one may not trespass in all and any circumstances?

The followers of Bacon, as well as pansophists and "enthusiasts" of The Royal Society of London, put their faith in the progressive development of humankind. They trusted in the imminent Second Coming and Millennium and had no doubt that the increase of "useful" knowledge was positive and saving enterprise. John Locke, on the contrary, talked about the *limits of "usefulness"* and ways of "accumulating" experience, without ever crossing the pre-assigned bounds.

We see that these two positions coincided only partially. Locke was neither a reckless adventurer - as Columbus sometimes felt himself to be, nor an optimist believing in scientific knowledge. He was not Francis Bacon or Robert Hooke, and he was also not happy about the central programs of the first scientific institution in human history, the Royal Society of London. The programs of the experimental philosophy and of the construction of universal language, derived inspiration from both Millenarianism and so called Hartlib Circle.

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Bacon's "great instauration" included a reform of science, medicine, education, industry, trade, all the areas of social life, as well as of nature itself, in anticipation of the Last Judgement and the Millennium. Famous "intelligencer" Samuel Hartlib, Christian ecumenist John Dury and a Moravian bishop and spiritual leader of the "Unity of Brothers" (religious community gathered from the surviving Hussites) John Amos Comenius met on 3 March, 1642, in London to sign a secret pact of cooperation. Comenius's task was a reform of education, John Dury's—bringing together Protestant (and after that all Christian) Churches, and finally Hartlib's task consisted in a reform of knowledge. The overall mission of the secret society was formulated as an enterprise to serve the "glory of God and general utility."

All three were members of the spiritual fraternity of reformers of knowledge and of "the whole world." Hartlib, the leader of English Millenarian reformers during the Civil Wars and Interregnum, was born in 1600 in Prussian Elbing, and in 1628 settled in England. While in Elbing he entered the ranks of Antilia, a brotherhood allegedly connected with Johann Valentin Andreae. Indeed, Hartlib came to England in search of a home for Antilia. The brotherhood was inclined to regard American Virginia as a likely and safe abode.

In 1641, John Amos Comenius arrived in England on the invitation of Parliament. There he wrote his famous *Via lucis* (*The Way of Light*), published in Amsterdam as late as 1668 and dedicated to the Royal Society of London. Comenius saw RS as an embodiment of his dream of the "College of Light" or "invisible college," and as an association of angels and holy men fighting with the "darkness of barbarism." John Dury who devoted his whole life to the cause of unifying Protestant Churches described this institution as the "College of Reformation."

Comenius's *Via lucis*, among other things, recapitulated projects of "universal character" and universal language, "absolutely new, absolutely easy, absolutely rational, in brief, a Pansophic language, the universal carrier of light" (cit. from [12, p. 114]). In 1642, Hartlib published a translation of Comenius's *Pansophiae prodromus*, titled *A Reformation of Schools* which claimed that God left his greatest gifts until the last days, and these were the times of the greatest Light, of the Kingdom of Light, radical Enlightenment, and filling the Earth with the knowledge of God.

Hartlib for his part believed that agriculture, industry, trade, science and education are to be unified under a program of "improvement" of nature, society and man in anticipation of the Millennium and pursuant to the prophecies of The Book of Daniel. The day of the Second Coming, according to the reformers' calculations, was nigh and might occur in the 1650s, most probably in 1655-1657 [20, p. XI-XIII, 86-87]. But with various methods of calculation in existence, there was no consensus as to the exact date. Thus, both before and after 1661 the date of the Second Coming was scheduled for 1666 (the sinister number) and also for 1678, 1683 and 1688.

Hartlib and his followers gave the projected center of new Reformation the name of the *Office of Address*, (also known as *Agencie for Universal Learning or College*), a would-be state-financed institution tasked to gather and disseminate information for “the common good” and “under predestination.” The Office was to act in three spheres: religion, education and science, and to function like a beehive to which the correspondents, like bees, would bring useful, that is saving knowledge.

The idea of an Office as a state institution never materialized, though came close to it in late 1650s. However, Hartlib achieved a great deal over a period of thirty-five years by connecting various enlightened individuals through correspondence. He developed a powerful information network, a sort of a hub, and accumulated a vast number of manuscripts on diverse areas of knowledge and crafts. Hartlib deemed it his duty to circulate information “uncovering scientific secrets” and to eliminate the very atmosphere of secrecy that reigned at the time among scientists and engineers.

The programs of Hartlibians found their practical realization, partly through English universities, partly through support of church and civil authorities, but mostly owing to activities of the “invisible college,” that privately managed scientific gatherings in the 1650s that preceded the creation in 1660 of the Royal Society. From the outset RS was conceived as a collective enterprise aimed at accumulation and circulation of knowledge. Among its founders were people of very different views and positions such as secretary to the Queen viscount William Brouncker or Sir Robert Moray. Both were friends of Charles II, and along with John Wilkins, Henry Oldenburg, Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, William Petty and Isaac Newton, formed the core of the Society at the earliest stage of its existence.

The ideal of utility or usefulness for Hartlibians as well as for no longer “invisible” brainchild, the Royal Society of London, included, along with regular demonstration of experiments, important military “applications.” President William Brouncker, for example, as a former soldier and commander, presented a report on the recoil of rifles, Robert Hooke developed methods of determining the explosive power of gunpowder, and Robert Boyle tried to find out what happened to gunpowder at the moment of gunshot. Prince Rupert presented a description of gunpowder which, according to some Dutch craftsman, was ten times more powerful because of the special sort of saltpeter [1, p. 255-256].

However, in its more general and fundamental meaning “usefulness” meant activities that contributed to restoring the dominance of man. The main movers in this providential universal process of reformation, according to Robert Boyle, were reformed natural philosophers, or experimental philosophers, or the “Christian virtuosi,” the champions of virtue who in their understandings would draw exclusively on authentic sources and listen to special “people of inspiration.”

In the second part of 1670s, and especially after the death of Robert Moray and John Wilkins, the activity of the Society suffered unfortunate changes. The initial enthusiasm of the “experimenters” gradually wilted, and demonstrations of experiments were held at growing intervals. After the death of Henry Oldenburg Robert Hooke even proposed to introduce a regime of strict secrecy, which ran counter to

the original intentions of the philosophers of “light.” The value of experiments as a way of confirming hypotheses came into doubt, and it was also proposed to shun “speculative hypotheses,” and to focus on natural history [7, p. 214–222].

After the famous polemic on priority between Hooke and Newton, held in the early and mid-1670s and touching upon the theory of light and color, the notion of “hypothesis” assumed an abusive sense. Hooke described Newton’s theory as “a hypothesis” and Newton insisted that his theory was not some kind of hypothesis but the truth corroborated by experiments. In Chapter III of his *Optics* Newton postulated that “the main business of natural Philosophy is to argue from Phaenomena without feining hypotheses, and to deduce causes from effects,” and that his own method was a ‘mathematical way’ of describing the phenomena, a way that avoids ‘all questions about the nature or quality of the force’ (i.e., gravitation.—*A. Ya.*.)” We also may read in *Principia*: “whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy” (cit. from [11, p. 159; 13, p. 239, 256-257].

The shift in the aims of the Royal Society surfaced sharply in the mid-1680s, precisely at the time when Locke was finishing *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, his best known work setting forth ideas on what should be counted as useful knowledge and what are its principled boundaries, or the compass of human understanding.

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Like Newton, Locke was an opponent of hypotheses, but for different reasons: he did not know mathematics and could not understand what mathematical description was, though he did not deny the significance and great merits of *Principia mathematica*.

Locke’s sentiments were in fact very far from Bacon’s belief in scientific knowledge: “Experiments and Historical Observations we may have, from which we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life: but beyond this, I fear our Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance.” Or, to cite another passage: “This way of getting, and *improving our Knowledge in Substances only by Experience* and History, which is all that the weakness of our Faculties in this State of *Mediocrity*, which we are in in this World, can attain to.” Thus, for example, “observing that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently one upon another, produces heat, and very often fire itself, we have reason to think, that what we call Heat and Fire, consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter” [9, p. 645, 665-666].

“Mediocrity” is not the worst characteristic Locke gives to man. We also may read: “inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a Creature,” “in all probability... one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings” [9, p. 554]. Human knowledge, which Locke, following medieval tradition, discusses under more general cate-

gory of understanding, or mind, or intellect is also notable for its mediocrity, being just one of many intellectual faculties and not the most important one.

Locke's principle of studying "*humane* understanding," namely the "Historical, plain Method," means that the investigation should be observing, cautious and drawing conclusions solely *by analogy*. His method is similar to that of a skilled physician who makes a diagnosis and keeps an eye on the clinical course. The physician proceeds from symptoms, stigmas and developments and does it, to use the language of Thomas Sydenham and the entire Hippocratic and Galenic tradition, "by the patient's bedside," focusing on the patient and forgetting about the despised general structure of the Universe. The more descriptions of various cases a physician (or scientist, or anyone who seeks to "understand") accumulates, including data never before encountered by him or other scientists, the more "plausible" becomes the analogy that he is looking for.

This very principle was held by Thomas Sydenham, an "English Hippocrates" and Locke's mentor in medicine. Being Millenarian and Hartlibian, Sydenham sought to improve conceivably the methods of treatment and to enhance medicine as science and craft. Treading the path of accumulating experience, he sought to broaden the range of his patients and increase the number of clinical "cases" by studying epidemics. Sydenham tried out various methods of healing and applied medications that did not harm patients. He agreed with Hippocrates that the best way to cure is to let nature itself do the healing, though at the same time trying to discern "curative indications," staying in close contact with the patient. For him experimenting consisted in finding out the right order of medical operations that would be in *harmony* with nature and *direct* physician towards recovery of the patient [3, p. 186, 179].

Locke extended this method to the whole realm of human understanding. For him, the reason plays only a limited, if not a secondary role in understanding; far more important is experience, similar to experience of a bedside physician, touching patient's hand, examining his body, and empathically penetrating his condition.

An important illustration and perhaps key to the Lockean "historical, plain" method is his attitude to data obtained by the so-called "complex" microscope consisting of several lenses and invented in late 16th—early 17th centuries (the actual effect of lenses known from time immemorial). Unlike the telescope, which played an important role in Galileo's hands almost immediately after it had been invented, the microscope, for various reasons, was much less in demand in science and practical medicine until the 19th century. There is nothing surprising or strange about Locke's oft-quoted words: "...if by the help of such Microscopical Eyes, (if I may so call them,) a Man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the secret Composition, and radical Texture of Bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an acute Sight would not serve to conduct him to the Market and Exchange; If he could not see things, he was to avoid, at a convenient distance; nor distinguish things he had to do with, by those sensible Qualities others do" [9, p. 303]. Indeed Locke distinguished the radical, root structure from the "surface texture," or the "outsides of things" staying in correspondence with the "natural eye" [15, p. 59, 238].

The word “radical” (basic, primary, simple, elementary) is noteworthy. Recognizing the role of telescope and microscope in expanding the intellectual universe and applying the method of extrapolation, Locke calls for a “return” to the surface, i.e., from the primary properties back to the secondary properties, as well as to the prescribed order of the Universe and to the place reserved for man and his understanding. This distinguishes Locke, for example, from Hooke who was inspired by the emergence of two new worlds, discovered by telescope and microscope and even dreamed that in the future all five senses and perceptive faculties would be improved to reveal new riches of the ever “expanding” intellectual universe.

Locke, for his part, wrote: “But to us in our present State, unalterable Organs, so contrived, as to discover the Figure and Motion of the minute parts of Bodies, whereon depend those sensible Qualities, we now observe in them, would, perhaps, be of no advantage. God had no doubt made us so, as is best for us in our present Condition. He hath fitted us for the Neighbourhood of the Bodies, that surround us, and we have to do with” [9, p. 304].

As Catherine Wilson notes, this place in *Essay*, Book IV, discussing the limits of our knowledge of substances, reveal the inner struggle between loyalty to Boyle, a champion of hypothetical and experimental science, and Locke’s loyalty to traditional, “anti-theoretical” and in this sense “reactionary” Sydenham [16, p. 103-104]. However, Locke does not oppose theory. He is referring to experience itself, because what we observe in a microscope is not theory. Sydenham too, did not deny the significance of the microscope, but rejected its data for a different reason: operations with observed microscopic bodies, he said, do not yield any useful knowledge that could be applied in medical treatment.

Moreover, when Locke arrived in 1686 in Delft to meet Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, the latter did not share with him all his achievements, though showed with the help of “microscopic eye” the discovered bacteria, red blood cells and spermatozoids. However, as Locke wrote in his medical diary: “the best of all his glasses and those by which he describes his spermatique animals we saw not, nor (as I heare) does he shew them to any one” [6, p. 273]. Indeed, sending letters to the Royal Society with descriptions of what he saw with the help of simple lenses (the first letter in 1673, and the famous one in 1677, on tiny living creatures, on bacteria in rainwater, which he named “living atoms,” and the following year on spermatozoids of a dog and a rabbit), Leeuwenhoek did not reveal—as the Charter of the Royal Society required,—the methods of making his simple lenses, as well as the procedures of observation and instruments he used.

Thus, Locke concludes, an instrument that sharpens vision, is of no use. Although it seems to be “experience,” and not “theory,” it does not have any practical (including medical) implications and must be considered *useless*.

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Co-operation with Boyle in the early 1660s and then with Sydenham in the late 1660s—early 1670s led to an important turn in Locke’s intellectual biogra-

phy. His main work, *An Essay on Human Understanding*, is not a panegyric to mechanismism or corpuscularism. Putting into question the “newest” experimental philosophy, and recognizing it as the best attempt made so far at “intelligible explanation of the quality of bodies,” Locke puts forward his own method of understanding which came to be known in the late 17th century as “the way of ideas.” His *Essay*, he says, only “clears the way,” provides a “critique” of existing natural philosophy theories and gives a sketch of the “natural history of thought” as the basis of entirely different “practical” approach.

Book IV of the *Essay* (“*humane*” meaning here “of men,” and not “of angels” or “of God”) is a discourse of knowledge and faith in the context of Locke’s key ideas. He discusses the limited character of human intellect; the boundaries of what is given by God; and what man has to be content with after the Fall. He talks of “us, who have Understandings and Comprehensions, suited to our own Preservation, and the ends of our own Being, but not to the reality and extent of all other Beings” [9, p. 203].

Locke certainly, like all enlightened men in England, knew about John Dee, mathematician, astrologist, optician, expert in navigation, alchemist, Cabbalist and counselor at the court of Elizabeth I, whose ideas became especially popular after publication of his works in 1659 [5]. Being a Millenarian, Dee advocated the expansion of the British territory and the Crown’s dominance over the northern hemisphere. In 1583 he moved to Prague, then under Emperor Rudolph II, to become, according to historian Frances Yates, one of the leaders of the movement for the “reformation of the whole world.” Dee believed that a universal magic language, healing and even reviving the dead, would enable him to summon angels, the servants of God in the natural world and potential “spiritual guides,” and obtain the necessary knowledge. “*Medicina dei*,” said he, promised by the angels with whom he allegedly conversed in “angel’s language” (*lingua adamica*), using “sryers” and “through the crystal,” might rid the world of diseases and imperfections [2; 17; 18].

The appeal of Dee’s ideas was such that many natural scientists came under their spell. Boyle, for example, believed that the contact of a natural philosopher with the higher levels of Cosmos could help him to find the philosophical stone. And so he staged several experiments with the aim to establish contact with angels, and to acquire an “angelic patron.” Moreover, he believed that the philosophical stone, in case it could be obtained, could serve as “mediator” on the frontier between the two realms, natural and supernatural, corporeal and incorporeal, and attract attention of spirits and angels. The most important questions would then arise: in what language and how one could possibly communicate with higher creatures, and reach so called accommodation.

Boyle is known for a lively interest in cases of “second sight” reported from Scotland, a country which he believed to be something like a gigantic occult laboratory inhabited, especially in its mountainous parts, by special people with special gifts [8]. A similar territory in France was said to be an area around Montpellier, the alleged home of “invisible colleges” and “invisible” Brothers of the Rosy Cross.

Many pages in *Essay* refer to angels (or spirits, or some creatures) endowed with superior abilities. Indeed with the help of the method of analogy and extrapolation Locke unfolds a grandiose picture of the intellectual world, “a greater certainly, and more beautiful World, than the material” one, and by the very fact of its perfection reminding us of the weak, mediocre and error-prone *human* intellect.

“Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle descents downwards in those parts of the Creation, that are beneath Man, the rule of Analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in Things above us, and our Observation; and that there are several ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in several degrees of Perfection” [9, p. 557, 666].

*Essay on Human Understanding* is also an attempt at critical discussion of the idea of restoring perfect knowledge and primary language, the language of God in which the Book of Nature was written, nature itself regarded as a language, a sign, a trace of God’s Design. Adam initially named things correctly in accord with their essence, and his language was in magic contact with reality. But after the Fall that language and that understanding were lost. Is it possible to bring them back? Or has the Fall locked man forever within the boundaries drawn by God, so that he cannot and must not cross them contrary to God’s will?

These themes were widely discussed by members of both the Hartlib Circle and the Royal Society. Pansophy as well as experimental philosophy were seen as programs of bringing back Creation to its original status, when the Earth was “without form, and void,” and after that covered with the Word that was “in the beginning” and made up of “real characters.”

Yet, Locke asks, is man really capable of such undertakings being a limited creature, unlike, for example, an angel? Or should he, with all his limitations and weaknesses, be content with the prescribed lot and rely only on Revelation as the path to salvation? This theme is played out in *Essay* in some detail [9, p. 302-303]. Towards the end of his life Locke elaborated it in *Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul*.

The most prominent advocate of “real character” in London, Cambridge and Oxford in the 1640s—1660s was John Wilkins. He thought that “real character” was an ideography similar to Chinese and Japanese, i.e. it had to be “emblematic.” From Wilkins’ point of view it was necessary to invent a “character” that would have a “real” connection to things or concepts but not to words (just like the sign “2” expresses quantity, as against the word “two” in different languages, for example, “deux,” “duo” etc.) [12, p. 1-2].

Moreover, for Wilkins the task of *constructing and thus restoring* (paradoxical though it may sound) the perfect and universal language, the one that could “at the same time describe and define natural phenomena” coincided in many ways with the task of ordering data in the informational and material “repository” of the Royal Society and thus “increasing” and transforming *knowledge* [7, p. 137, 144].

The “real characters,” as a matter of fact, were to serve as common communicative units or, better still, the totality of common concepts, a kind of seman-

tic (philosophical) field common to all languages. But did that system reflect “real substances” (Aristotelian forms or Platonic eidoses, or some other simple elements of the world), or perhaps it had to do only with “nominal” essences? This very question, according to Richard Yeo, a historian of ideas, is discussed in the third book of *Essay* (chapter 6, paragraph 9), and is its precise context [19, p. 13-15, 19, 22].

Locke wrote: “The Workmanship of the All-wise, and Powerful God, in the great Fabrick of the Universe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the Capacity and Comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent Man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious Man, doth the Conceptions of the most ignorant of rational Creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range Things into sorts, and dispose them into certain Classes, under Names, by their *real Essences*, that are so far from our discovery or comprehension” [9, p. 444].

This thesis, which follows directly from Locke's overall position, undermined the generally accepted picture of cognition, which could be described as follows: “Written words rested on spoken words or names, names rested on ideas of species, ideas rested on taxonomic structure, taxonomic structure rested on the species of things, the species of things rested on their essential characteristics, the essential characteristics rested on the essences. The beginning was in the solid bottom of the *prima materia* and the unmoved mover, the final turtle with feet planted firmly on the ground” [12, p. 82]. Locke's view implied that there was nothing, no “turtle” between the ideas of species and “the beginning.”

As for the projects of a universal language, and without specifying which project he had in mind, Locke wrote: “I am not so vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect *Reforming the Languages* of the world, no not so much as that of his own Country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that Men should use their words constantly in the same sense, and for none but determined and uniform *Ideas*, would be to think, that all Men should have the same Notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct *Ideas* of. <...> And he must be very little skill'd in the world, who thinks that a voluble Tongue, shall accompany only a good Understanding” [9, p. 509].

Locke assesses the project of a single universal language as ungrounded, not feasible and leading to absurd consequences. In other words, he views it as a project, based on speculative hypotheses about “real entities” and thus *useless*.

It has to be added that in Hannah Dawson's opinion, Locke denied the existence of any common semantic field. The ideas, however simple, differ from one person to another, and even more so from one language to another, and from one culture to another. “This is why languages are not inter-translatable: one only needs to observe, Locke says, that ‘great store of *Words in one Language, which have not any that answer them in another,*’ to discover the depth of ideational incommensurability” [4, p. 157]. Indeed, this is not yet the end of the story about an abysmal “quagmire” of “semantic heterogeneity.” Locke saw clearly that ideas change quickly over time even with one and the same person, and today's idea often differs from “that which he had yesterday, or will have tomorrow” [9, p. 478].

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John Locke's *An Essay on Human Understanding* is an attempt to draw the boundaries, and to define the limits of knowledge by placing man in a chain of being, in a hierarchy of the intellectual world. There man occupies one of the lamentably low places and, besides the Revelation, bestowed on him out of pity, can only rely on a painful and weak channel, which is his experience. But such is the dispensation of God who deprived Adam and all his progeny of all the higher gifts he previously had, leaving him only with the "innate" tabula rasa. Even that was an act of mercy, and gave a chance for self-healing and salvation, barely achievable, though still feasible, particularly with the help of other intellectual creatures.

An important reason that estranged Locke from "experimental philosophers" of the Royal Society and featured prominently in *Essay* was his conviction that the "new" visible/invisible world, like the one observed through microscope *did not belong to man*, and was not only *useless*, but mortally *dangerous*. Locke was convinced that mindless cognition of this world and circulation of obtained knowledge would bar the way to salvation; moreover, it would serve as a potential cause of the final death of man.

In Locke's view the notion of "useful" could play a part in resolving the paradox of knowledge. "Useless" pointed to trespassing or "forbidden," while "useful" might be a criterion and help to avoid the path leading to a life of "shame and everlasting contempt (Dan 12, 2). What we find in *Essay* is a critique of "useless" knowledge and the grounds for not regarding it as "useful." The more positive project of obtaining *new* "useful" knowledge seemed evident, but Locke failed to work it out in detail, although the experiential premises were in place thanks to the years of cooperation with Thomas Sydenham.

Towards the end of his life Locke tried—or at least had a plan—to formulate some rules for obtaining new knowledge in a chapter that was to crown the main work of his life, *On the Conduct of Understanding*. However, he could not reach beyond the framework of the negative approach, and so had to give up the idea of a *final and key* chapter. Perhaps this was bound to happen anyway, as experience cannot be captured by forms. Therefore gaining knowledge of its course, let alone managing it, was an insoluble problem. Locke would add: insoluble for *man*.

It seems that following this line of thought, one might only speak about experience in the negative, and criticize various illusory projects of the *theory* of knowledge. All the rest had to be left to the will of the Creator, who could make human experience yield useful and least dangerous fruit, suitable for such a pitiful and miserable creature.

The paradox of knowledge indeed remained unresolved, but the principle of usefulness, the criterion of cutting off any prohibited knowledge, survived in the history of ideas as a sort of reminder. This criterion tells us again and again that seemingly saving knowledge could lead to the last limit. Step over it, and you will find yourself in a lifeless realm of darkness.

The subsequent three centuries in the history of humankind, though, have shown that in spite of all the prohibitions and warnings Man is unable to resist the temptation of new knowledge. He is eager to completely reject the notion of “forbidden” with all that it implies, if only there is a chance of reaching towards the luring fruit. With all the consequences that are to follow.

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*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

## 21st-Century Liberalism: Crisis or Revival?

Sergey PEREGUDOV

*Abstract.* This article seeks to demonstrate the quantitative and qualitative amplification of the “liberal inclination or bias” in Western democracies’ party politics. This trend is due both to the expansion of liberalism as such and to the assimilation of the liberal credo by both social democratic and conservative organizations. In parallel, liberalism grows more “humane” and acquires an individual-group, “solidaristic” dimension. The progressing synthesis of party and group affiliations precipitates liberalism’s “hybridization,” enhancing its public and political prestige and importance. The counterbalance of the solidarist trend is set off by a surge in an ultra-conservative anarchic and separatist individualism. Both these extremes and what is between them reveal fundamentally different trends in public consciousness, making a study of them increasingly important both from a purely scientific and from a political point of view. Combating right-wing conservative fundamentalism imparts increasing importance to various kinds of organizations and communities, the leading role of which belongs to an international liberal think tank known as the *Policy Network*.

*Keywords:* liberalism; neoliberalism; social liberalism; “human factor;” solidarism; skepticism; authoritarianism; hybridism; liberal conservatism; social democracy; ultraconservatism.

DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2015.04.07

Before beginning to answer the question the title proposes, I will try to dwell briefly on the notion of “liberalism” itself. Though related to the notion of “democracy,” liberalism, nevertheless, is not identical to it. Moreover, one of its variations, the so-called neoliberal liberalism, is to a great extent opposed to democracy. Hardly anyone would claim, for example, that Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberalism and Ronald Reagan’s “Reaganomics” were essentially democratic rather than authoritarian.<sup>1</sup> It should be mentioned that many analysts described Thatcherism as an “authoritarian populism.”

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But the main specific feature—or distinction—of liberalism is not its ambivalence or “two-facedness,” but the very essence and “quality” of the public relations it personifies. I would characterize this quality as “human tint” inherent to these relations. Not always democratic, it is practically always “humanized,” informal, and, I would say, biased. More than that, this bias is equally characteristic of both neoliberals (who more often than not call themselves just liberals) and those essentially liberal groups that prefer to do without adding ideological harnesses. This confusion of notions has led to a situation, where “liberalism” and “liberal” require being prefixed with “neo” both under ordinary circumstances and in the public space, for otherwise these notions themselves end up distorted in an overwhelming majority of cases. This said, I’d like to stress that here and anywhere I use the notions of “liberalism” and “liberal” in their abovementioned true meaning.

Let me make yet another preliminary remark concerning the contents of this article: It will not analyze liberalism in general but only its party and political identity. In focusing on the latter, I proceed from the assumption that it is this institutional aspect of liberalism that has become highly topical in recent years both conceptually and practically.

Crisis of liberalism and concern for its future are sentiments that increasingly often stir both Russian and European public space. Held in November 2014, the Congress of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party urged the “reclaiming of liberalism.” The Congress outlined new objectives, including “putting an end to concessions made to social democracy” and upgrading liberalism’s priorities and policies. Measures to strengthen liberal parties organizationally have been mapped out and started being implemented [8].

These uneasy and occasionally alarmist moods come as no surprise, because the position held by the liberal parties and their leaders in European and world politics is more than modest. Only five out of 28 EU countries are headed by liberals; their positions are the weakest in countries witnessing a rise of Euroscepticism that directly affects the liberals’ endemic Europhilia.

Far from calling into question the gravity of problems confronting the liberal camp, I would like to challenge the assertion that liberalism is in decline and prove the opposite. To start with, the very notion of “liberalism” is not as univocal as it is often interpreted in the public space. There is “pure” liberalism (liberalism *per se*) and “combined” liberalism, that is, one contextually married with other trends. The latter is present in political parties as a kind of property or quality that defines the very essence and predestination of these parties.

If we proceed from this broader and, as I see it, more relevant understanding of liberalism, I daresay that liberalism in the early 21st century is gaining momentum and acquiring fundamentally new features rather than facing a crisis.

Let me start with the liberals *per se*, who, by virtue of “purity” of their liberalism, are asking to be put on top of the list.

After the bright and consequential flash of Thatcher’s asocial neoliberalism in the late 1960s—1980s, liberalism everywhere started acquiring ever stronger social orientation. A case in point is the search for a new strategy by the Free Democratic Party of Germany.

As early as between 1997 and 2000, the party drafted the *Principles of Wiesbaden for the Liberal Civil Society* [9], followed by a series of expanding and complementing documents. Eventually, this program is nothing but a sum of “dialogues,” the main of these being “The Readiness for the Future (*Bereit für die Zukunft*) as the Fundamental Dialogue for the Strategy of the Future” [10]. This and other documents of its kind defined the “subject line” for the party’s members and supporters to debate. The “line” was also the basis for a discussion between the Presidium members.

According to the discussion organizers, what mainly defines the nature and essence of these debates is the wish to find the “nucleus of the problems that determine our identity” [10]. What is meant in this case is not identity in general but the identity of individual participants in the discussions as personalities and individuals. This “humanization” of identity is the cornerstone of the new impulses generated by the “process of discussions.”

It is not surprising that this focus on renovation has had a strong influence on the party’s position in society. After its sensational defeat at the 2013 *Bundestag* elections, where it was unable to gain even 5% of votes (mostly because of its former neoliberal reputation), the FDP won one European Parliament seat in 2014.

Approximately the same changes are under way in the ranks of the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom,<sup>2</sup> in the Swedish People’s Party of Finland, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the Netherlands, and all other smaller parties affiliated with the *Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party*.

Looking in retrospect, however, not all liberal parties succumbed to the once so catchy neoliberal fad. As it follows, specifically, from documents published by the Liberal Party of Canada, not only has it consistently preserved its social reformist orientation but it has also launched, following the election of Justin Trudeau-Jr. as party leader in 2013, a full-scale search for its “humanization,” initiated way back by the Trudeau Sr. Posted in the Internet, the latest version of the new party program is entitled “*Your Family, Your Future, Your Canada*.” The new attitude it contains has brought tangible results right away.

As is common knowledge, an overwhelming majority of political parties in democratic states face a grave confidence crisis and a dramatic decline in their influence. Against this background, the Liberal Party of Canada’s popularity indices seem something out of the ordinary. Opinion polls demonstrate that the change of leadership in April 2013 and Trudeau-Jr.’s truly unprecedented swing towards “humanizing” the party program<sup>3</sup> was followed by a steep rise in the party’s popularity ratings. By fall 2014, its membership increased fivefold (from 60,000 in April 2013 to 300,000) (see [11]).<sup>4</sup> As a result, the party won the elections of October 19, 2015.

The Canadian example is still unique. But by demonstrating the “humanization” potential inherent to party strategies, this example gives every reason to think that the current “exception from the rule” can sooner or later (more likely sooner) cease to be an exception. The abovementioned reformatting of other liberal parties has every chance to raise their prestige consistently.

While within liberal parties, the turn from neoliberalism to social liberalism was often accompanied by all sorts of “squabbles,” social democratic and conservative parties avoided such obvious standoffs.

In the social democratic camp, the social liberal model triumphed almost at once between 1997 and 1998, as all socialist parties, no matter how they were called, accepted the Third Way ideology and strategy initiated by the British New Labour leader Tony Blair and the US Democratic President Bill Clinton. In 1997, i.e., after British Labour’s landslide victory, Blair, Clinton, Prodi, Schröder and other social democratic leaders convened a conference in London, designed to formulate the key Third Way principles. A year after his election victory (1998), Tony Blair published a booklet pretentiously entitled *The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century* [2]. Bill Clinton was also an active Third Way popularizer, but, unlike Blair, he was not trying to turn this idea into a fundamental concept, focusing on its managerial aspect.

The most remarkable thing in this process was that the Third Way went beyond Blair’s interpretation, which was essentially about imposing a top-to-bottom model (on the principle of the vertical) of relations both within and without the party. It was this model that he clearly outlined in his famous keynote address at the party conference in 1999, which also set forth his understanding of New Labour and the Third Way. In a flashy manner which he cultivated at that time, he declared that “New Labour, confident at having modernized itself, is now the new progressive force in British politics which can modernize the nation, sweep away those forces of conservatism to set the people free.” As for a “new Britain,” it should be created as a “nation, based not on privilege, class or background, but on the equal worth of all.” [13]

But inner differences and initial lack of experience shown by the new Labour leader, Ed Miliband,<sup>5</sup> deterred the party from leading the change. In the late 1990s, Labour was replaced by the biggest European social democratic party, Germany’s SDPG, whose leadership and activists had worked hard towards this effect.

As early as 1999, a congress of the Social Democratic Party of Germany set up a commission designed to draft a new party program. According to its concept, the party’s future should be mapped out by people from the midst of society (*Mitte der Gesellschaft*) rather than by those at the top, with direct involvement of party members and supporters. As the party documents stated, the results of the first dialogues in 2006 showed that “never before were the party discussions so broad-based and democratic, for our goal now is to feel the ‘nerve of the times’ and to respond to the 21st-century challenges.” [14]

Noticeable shifts are under way in the Swedish Model, a bulwark of European social democracy that asserted itself in Scandinavia. As early as 2006, Sergey Aksyonov presented a strong case convincingly proving that this model’s transformation was subject to the build-up of human capital and the ideas of economic democracy, tripartisanism, and collective co-ownership were pushed into the background by preferences for individual interests. However, he points to the “humanization of social capital,” while stressing that the principles of solidarity and tripartisanism, though put on the backburner, are here to stay, thereby postulating that in spite of the general trend pushing the transformations of the existing models,

these transformations are not devoid of both historical and sociocultural specifics. He notes that the model-related documents stated this: "Our operant motive and aim of our policies is human dignity equal for everyone." Apart from the traditional democratic institutions, they mentioned a wide-scale positive use of "personal" interests, declaring "human self-determination" as one of the main aims [1].

Like social democracy, conservative parties lack a well defined socioliberal inclination or bias. The important difference here is that the ambivalence of positions and policies in the case of the social democrats more or less fits in with the general socioliberal paradigm, while the difference of potentials and policies characterizing the conservative parties is of a fundamentally different and qualitatively significant nature. On the one hand, these differences were accompanied by incomparably more acute inner disagreements within most parties, while, on the other, by equally dramatic divisions between the parties themselves. A good example of the latter is the increasingly visible "human inclination" in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany and as clear a conservative-authoritarian "inclination" in the influential radical right-wing faction within the Republican Party in the USA.

Without confining itself to a declaration of the socioliberal credo and its "human dimension," the CDU became more active in holding conferences for its members, ministers of Land governments, and, what is even more important, meetings and rallies of party activists, like the "We Are the People" rally organized in Dresden for a number of years. As a *Nezavisimaya gazeta* correspondent wrote in late 2014, these meetings take place in many cities and tend to grow into a "phenomenon." [15] Concerned with increased activities by populist right-wing groups, liberal activists and ordinary citizens are seeking to reroute mass activities to this progressive path, one of their main objectives being to preserve and entrench this synthesis of individual and public identity.

This liberal conservative trend is most clearly demonstrated by the current German conservative leader Chancellor Angela Merkel. After taking over as the CDU leader in 2006, she took action on the 1999 party congress resolution to draft a new party program. She began by organizing a broad-based dialogue on its baseline provisions so that the future of German politics is forged in the thick of society via an active discussion rather than determined by resolutions from on-high. The preamble to the program stresses that "never before was there such a comprehensive and democratic involvement in efforts to feel 'the nerve of the times' and find answers to new challenges of the epoch... The dignity of all people is the point of departure and the aim of our policy." [16]

Merkel writes this in her brief autobiography: "For me, the CDU means preserving and equalizing the available values for them to be transferred to all societies, while multiplying their diversity. The firmer this diversity, the more fundamentally we draw near to a fair alignment of interests. For me, this is important, and I will continue my activities in the same spirit. Thereby I will promote the unity of our society and the opportunity for the people to implement their interests and their potential." [17]

Many other conservative oriented parties and organizations, where the attempts by the right-wing conservatives to ease their liberal opposite numbers

on the sidelines of party politics meet with strong resistance, are seeking, with some or other degree of success, to follow the same path. It is hard to say now who will have the upper hand in this standoff but, judging by the dynamics of public moods, it is this proliberal version of contemporary Western conservatism that has the greatest chances to succeed, the more so that it comprises both “extreme” and liberal-oriented “intermediary” currents.

A typical example of this pluralism is the British Tory party. Like in a number of other parties, here we can identify both authoritarian conservative and liberal conservative trends, as well as the “middle ground,” which the party leader, David Cameron, prefers to stick to.

However, a socioliberal inclination was clearly evident in the Conservative Party even before his election. After Margaret Thatcher’s deposition, the new Tory leader, John Major, attempted to distance himself from her social policies, putting an emphasis on improvements in education, health care and other social services. Thereby he actually renounced the “freedom of choice” principle in its neoliberal interpretation.<sup>6</sup>

While John Major sought to revise Thatcherism with the help of specific measures of this sort, David Cameron, who became Tory leader two years before the 2010 elections, and his associates, on the contrary, put a stake on a systemic ideological reform of conservatism, which was embodied by their Big Society ideology slogan promoted to symbolize it. (Thatcher was known for her repeated claims that she knew no such thing as “society.”)

Even though the current Tory leaders intend to use this latest faddish ideology to promote citizens “self-support,” i.e., to actually give it a neo-Thatcherite slant, its broad formulation and recognition by all other mainstream parties is nothing but a sign of a major ideological shift operated within them. A past master of political PR, Cameron<sup>7</sup> was sensitive enough to feel the spirit of the times and hit on a very fortunate formula, which, being too general and noncommittal, unequivocally pretended to become an important ideological brand. Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats, incidentally, have accepted it as their own.

As the British conservatism went through a rebranding process, Greater London Mayor Boris Johnson,<sup>8</sup> known for his “star” popularity (particularly among the young and middle-aged voters), announced his far-reaching political ambitions.

The French political heavyweight Nicolas Sarkozy is trying not to fall behind the Germans and the British either. As the head of the neo-Gaullist party, he is planning to “rebuild” it under a new name, attract young people, and “rejuvenate” its image. Even though his platform is still vague, elements of liberalization are increasingly emerging to the surface. It is in this way that his positions and mood are estimated by the *Economist*, which dedicated a special article to Sarkozy [19].

To be sure, far from all conservative parties succumbed to the new tendencies. Moreover, some of them, primarily the Republican Party in the United States, have grown even more conservative in their home and foreign policies. But this in no way contradicts our main conclusion that the liberal “inclination” has become an important factor of public and political life not only in the social democratic but also conservative camp in the West and particularly in Europe.

Aside from the just mentioned shifts, a thing of no small importance is a parallel modification in the quality of party affiliation that in a number of cases takes on a “hybrid” nature. The hybridization is based on an increased role and significance of organizations that are predominantly not so much parties as interest groups focusing on one or maximally two goals. A typical case in point are national, sub-regional, city, or local communities aimed at “regulating” migration and immigration. The same goes for various charities, Greens, and other rapidly proliferating issue groups of this sort.<sup>9</sup>

A couple of years ago, the annually growing vigor of the right-wing conservative fundamentalism made the liberally oriented *Policy Network*<sup>10</sup> publish a report, *The Democratic Stress, Populism and the Extremist Threat*, which became, in fact, its operational program. The report maps out a number of measures designed to monitor the changing public and political situation with better results, as well as to reflect its publications and the “growing role of identity politics.” Some of these measures are meant to reveal populist signals and threats of extremism, and the state of the problem of confidence, identity and culture. It also points to the need to study interconnections between “stress and crisis, and to develop a mainstream strategy capable of withstanding the authoritarian stress.” The role of contact democracy as an antidemocratic stress containment strategy is particularly distinct [20].

The abovementioned processes and innovations are persisting and continue to change the very quality of societal relations in Western democracies. Hence the increasingly insistent need for studying and rationalizing the nature of modern liberalism, which has turned, along with conservatism, into a mainstay of Western democracy. It is particularly important to study the influence of liberalization on individual and group identity, including within authoritarian and semi-authoritarian communities. This means that Russian (and not only Russian) political science should renounce its long-lasting disregard for liberal issues.

The author believes it is high time that Russian scientific publications focused on liberalism as a full-fledged topic on a par with social democracy and conservatism. Liberalism is not drifting away; it is being revived after a series of anything but simple metamorphoses.

The gravity and intensiveness of qualitative shifts under way in modern liberalism is convincingly confirmed by the importance that research on the “human dimension” has acquired in recent years. This research is conducted along both philosophical and sociopolitical lines. In the former case, the key role is played by the investigations pursued by Valentina Fedotova, D. Sc. (Philosophy) and her philosopher colleagues (see, for example, [3]) and in the latter works by the leading researchers at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, including Irina Semenenko, Vladimir Lapkin, Vladimir Pantin, and a number of their colleagues at the Center for Comparative Socioeconomic and Sociopolitical Studies of the same institute [5; 6; 7].

I think that the analysis offered above is quite enough for regarding modern liberalism as a qualitatively different version requiring special attention from both social science theorists and researchers studying specific problems of contemporary political development. Already as of now their research makes it possible to

state with full certainty that modern liberalism is a qualitatively new and constantly upgraded substance that exerts an increasing influence on the essence and nature of the public sphere and the political process in Western democracies. Liberalism is penetrating the pores of both traditional mainstream parties and new individual or group entities that set the rules of the game at the peak of public politics. In so doing, it inevitably invites fire from extremist groups generated by the expansion of chaotic individualism. This results in an increasingly urgent need for identifying and studying the new and upgraded individual and group liberal identities that are potentially capable of getting the upper hand in an aggravating confrontation with their antipodes. Moreover, aside from studying this phenomenon, it is increasingly necessary to encourage and support it, for in a number of cases we can thereby determine the course and outcome of this confrontation. The role of the subjective factor in politics is growing perceptibly, and this growth embodies the public and political innovations inherent to modern liberalism.

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### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> What was said in no way means that "Thatcherism" and "Reaganomics" were opposed to democracy and denied it as an important system-forming factor in the political system of

the United Kingdom, the USA, and other Western states. As I explained in detail in my book [4], the former emerged as a reaction to statist-bureaucratic distortions of the post-war *Butskellism* (derived from the names of Tory and Labour leaders Richard Austen *Butler* and Hugh *Gaitskell*) and on the whole met the objective needs of economic and societal modernization. It is another matter that on performing (albeit with characteristic extremes) their anti-statist “mission,” Thatcherism and the Thatcherites continued mechanically to “sit tight” and thus turned from a motive force of history into its brake. This, incidentally, applies in full measure to the current Russian version of Thatcherism, whose adepts hold it up (like Margaret Thatcher herself) as a model to emulate.

- 2 One still has to be very cautious speaking about a “change of landmarks” by the LDP. To make a career, the Liberal Democrats leader, Nick Clegg, joined David Cameron’s government. This clearly unnatural union with the Tories triggered off a sharp drop in his popularity ratings and led to his defeat at the May 7, 2015 parliamentary elections (which the British media had predicted as an accomplished fact).
- 3 Speaking a short while after his election as party leader in August 2013, Justin Trudeau declared that the authorities should be elected on the bottom up principle rather than in the traditional up-down way and that state governance should cease to be bureaucratic administration and become a partner relationship between a wide range of stakeholders and the state. This “humanization” of social liberalism is one of the key aspects of its renovation (see [11]).
- 4 In assessing the situation in January 2015, the party leadership stated that the Liberals continued “keeping momentum” throughout 2014 and remained the only party that built up voter support at by-elections after Justin Trudeau became leader (see [12]).
- 5 Judging by the latest opinion polls, the majority of voters tend to favor Ed Miliband over David Cameron as they asses periodic “duels” between the party leaders.
- 6 As is common knowledge, Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal course was known as neoconservatism while she was the British Tory leader. It is only after her deposition that the Tories began mastering their neoliberal brand.
- 7 Before embarking on a political career, Cameron headed an external division at a major company. The new conservative political wave reveals such an extravagant capacity to swamp other currents that even a liberal newspaper like *The Guardian* was writing about a “stress of liberal democracy.” See [18].
- 8 An evidence of the seriousness of his ambitions was his standing for election to the Commons in May 2015. His plan was to get nominated for Tory leader after being elected. As mayor, Johnson launched a drive to modernize Greater London transport networks and metropolitan infrastructure as a whole.
- 9 According to incontestable estimates, members and active supporters of the three main political parties in Western democracies—the conservatives, the liberals and the social democrats—made up 90% of the entire non-member mass in the 1960s, whereas today their share has shrunk by one-third.
- 10 For more detail on the organization, its sponsors, activities and publications, see [21].

*Translated by Aram Yavrumyan*

## **Liberals and Pseudoliberals: Psychological Profiles**

**Andrey YUREVICH**

*Abstract.* The article recognizes that liberalism is unpopular in contemporary Russia. The author believes that what is really unpopular is not true liberalism but its pseudoliberal “mutation.” The main differences between the liberals and pseudoliberals are the interpretation of freedom, the attitude to patriotism and morality, the basic ideologems, the style of thinking, way of life, the correlation between principles and interests, etc. The author formulates the main tasks that need to be tackled to restore a positive attitude to liberalism in our country and predicts that the confrontation between true and pseudoliberalism may in the coming years become a major arena of ideological battles.

*Keywords:* liberalism, liberals, pseudoliberals, psychological profile, macropsychology, attitude to freedom, attitude to morality, patriotism, trust, attitude to the State, corruption.

### **Unpopularity of Liberalism**

“Liberal” is one of the concepts whose emotional implications have undergone the most dramatic change during the years of Russian reforms. Today it belongs to the list of terms that have a negative, rather than a positive tinge, along with such notions as “democrat,” “privatizer,” “reformer” and so on.

While agreeing that “liberalism as a sociopolitical ideology has always had bad luck in Russia” [14, p. 11] let us add that it is still “down on its luck” today. The reasons for that are fairly obvious and have been extensively described in both scholarly literature and journalism. They stem mainly from the unpopularity with the bulk of our population of the so-called liberal reforms of the 1990s and the people who initiated them. As Sergey Kortunov points out, “the word *lib-*

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*eral* has become much more of a cuss word than the word *kommunyaka* (*Com-mie*) at the end of the *perestroika* era. The responsibility for this rests with the politicians who called themselves liberals in the 1990s and who in fact had nothing to do with liberalism” [10, p. 193]. Those who study the problem invariably stress that liberalism itself is not to blame for it. In the event, like in the case of Marxism, we witnessed a typical Russian tendency to change the ideas that have come to us from the West beyond recognition and, proceeding from them, carry out transformations which are very remote from their initial intent.

Liberalism has always had many faces. As Aleksandr Bogdanov wrote back in 1904, “liberalism could not remain in its former shape, but took many new guises; it broke up into parties and groups with very different aspirations and ideas, no single liberal doctrine exists anymore” [1, p. 6]. The *New Soviet Encyclopedia* published in 1938 noted that “the content the term has been invested with gradually expanded over the hundred-odd years of its existence” [17, p. 737]. Sergey Kortunov writes that “one of the features of the world liberal ideology is that there never existed a single model of liberalism” [10, p. 254]. Some scholars outside Russia stress that “liberalism” is an “umbrella” term having a collective meaning rather than an exact term [6, p. 7]. Others stress that there has never been one liberalism but there have been liberalisms, there has never been one liberal experiment, but there have been liberal experiments” [2, p. 7]. Yet others believe that any attempt at *a priori* enumeration of liberal ideas imposes a false order and precision on a moving and changing phenomenon [7, p. 26]. Nor is the concept made any clearer by the proposition that a liberal is anyone “who considers himself or is considered to be one by his contemporaries” [2, p. 27]. Moreover, it bolsters the claims of modern Russian pseudoliberals to being true liberals. Viktoriya Chalikova notes that “the notion of liberalism has changed its meaning so many times since it was first used as to become theoretically meaningless,” though she adds that “while it is impossible to define a liberal theoretically” “in practice it is impossible not to recognize one” [4, pp. 5, 7].

Those who study classical liberalism note that it has undergone major transformations in the direction of,

- first, socialization, renunciation of the initial indifference to the social sphere (thus, the modern liberal may well turn out to be a champion of social justice and leveling of incomes in society, for example, through a progressive taxation scale),
- second, towards democratization (original liberalism was fairly undemocratic, as witnessed by the opinions of Voltaire and Rousseau about “the mob”),
- third, towards etatization, i.e., recognition of the role of the state, fourth, nationalization, i.e., renunciation of the initial cosmopolitanism,<sup>1</sup> and fifth, towards modernization of its philosophical, sociological and ethical foundations [14]. Against this background, present-day Russian pseudoliberalism is much closer to the original liberalism not modified by its encounter with reality than to its modern, more developed version.

Psychologized interpretations of liberalism are also widespread. "Liberalism, like its supporter, socialism, is at once theory, doctrine, program and practice. It is also an attitude (in a more fundamental way than in the case of socialism), i.e., predisposition of the mind, or a perspective that addresses the problems facing an individual in managing his social life," writes Georges Burdeau [3, p. 7]. He is echoed by Serge-Christophe Kolm: "Liberalism is not a doctrine. Rather, it is an angle of vision, rationalized or applied perception of the world, an ideological and emotional landscape, a constellation of the principles and arguments of reason" [9, p. 27]. In the opinion of Philippe Nemo, "Liberalism means basically antitraditionalism, rejection of any given intellectual, moral or political norm" [16, p. 264]. "Liberalism is not just a doctrine or credo, it is something immeasurably greater, that is, a type and mode of thinking," and "it is a system of views and concepts regarding the surrounding world, a type of consciousness, politico-ideological orientation and principles that is not always associated with concrete political parties or a political course" [14, p. 45]. It is not surprising that Russian psychological science has developed a methodological position called "methodological liberalism" [32]. Yet another point of view is that the philosophy of liberalism has been created by people of a certain psychological mould who are particularly sensitive to freedom. Interestingly, Prometheus, "who dared to challenge the gods to liberate people from their absolute power," is considered by some to be the first liberal [14, p. 44].<sup>2</sup>

The image of liberals in Russian public consciousness has changed beyond recognition. With a bit of simplification it can be said that in the Soviet times the image of a liberal was associated with an English gentleman holding a walking cane in his hands (think of the image of William Gladstone in Soviet history textbooks) and with the founders of Russian liberalism such as Mikhail Speransky, Boris Chicherin, Pyotr Struve, as well as with pro-Western Russian intellectuals critical of the Soviet system. It is indicative that the term "liberal intelligentsia" sounds natural whereas expressions such as "liberal-minded market vendor" or "a liberal highway robber" sound odd.

The image of the liberal changed dramatically in the early 1990s largely owing to the milieu from which the new liberals were recruited and the social groups whose members rushed to join their ranks. Liberals were recruited from amongst former Communist Party and the Young Communist League (YCL) functionaries,<sup>3</sup> the pioneers of the new Russian business who had adopted its criminal behavior, mobsters, career-seekers of every stripe who used liberal slogans to further their selfish ends and other such types. Not surprisingly, in those years a liberal could be someone who has served a jail sentence for economic crimes or just for any kind of crime.

The image of the Russian liberal characteristic of our time is also somewhat weird, conjuring up individuals with high incomes (in modern Russia a poor liberal is something of an oxymoron), who have made their fortunes in dubious ways, have a dark past (and often no less dark present) and often costly real estate abroad where they send their children to study, hefty accounts with foreign banks, villas, yachts, luxury cars and of course "liberal" ideas expressed in sen-

tences such as “your happiness is in your own hands,” “every man is the architect of his own fortune,” “a person’s value is what he earns,” the state prevents people from exercising personal freedoms and must withdraw from the main spheres of economic and sociopolitical life, etc. Not surprisingly, these attributes of modern Russian “liberals” are bitterly resented by the mass of the population which calls them by far less respectful names.

There is much to suggest that this attitude of the majority of the population stems not from its Soviet mentality (our neo-liberals have coined a word for it, *sovkovost*) or people’s adherence to Soviet traditions and intolerance of wealth. There is no doubt that the founders of Russian liberalism—M. Speransky, B. Chicherin and P. Struve—would have been shocked to learn who are considered to be liberals in modern Russia, would have shared the same attitude to these people and would have been chagrined by the fate of liberalism in our country. Personalizing the issue, S. Kortunov writes: “Liberalism is not Chubais, Burbulis, Aven, Yavlinsky, Khakamada and Gaidar. And certainly not Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Liberalism is Voltaire and Diderot, Ch. Montesquieu, Holbach and Benjamin Franklin, Th. Hobbes and J. Locke, J.-J. Rousseau and M. Weber, Th. Green and Franklin Delano Roosevelt” [10, pp. 193-194]. Aleksandr Tsipko also stresses that the so-called “liberalism” which has established itself in modern Russia has nothing in common with the Russian national traditions of liberalism and that present-day Westernizers are a far cry from their prerevolutionary precursors [30].

And yet it can be argued that true liberals do exist in modern Russia although they do not hold key positions, that liberals and pseudoliberals represent entirely different social and psychological types. The evident differences between them have been described in copious scholarly and journalistic writings in which the latter category is referred to in a more “politically correct” way as “pseudoliberals,” “the so-called liberals,” “neoliberals” and also sometimes as “quasiberals,” “highway robber liberals,” “paraliberals,” [14], “protoliberals” [10] and so on.

### Differences of Psychological Types

First and foremost, true liberals and pseudoliberals have fundamentally different ideas of freedom which both declare to be one of the highest values of civilization: “Freedom in liberalism is unconditional and self-sufficient: it is not a path towards happiness and perfection, but a value in its own right” [14, p. 43]. For true liberals freedom does not abolish social control over the individual, but transforms it from external to personal form, turns control by external social institutions into self-control. As ever, “the main problem of liberalism is that of optimum correlation between personal freedom and social institutions” [14, p. 44]. From this it logically follows that abolition of such institutions is only possible if there is a high level of self-control, hence by no means all the peoples and cultures are mature enough for its abolition, which, in the absence of the proper degree of self-control, may have destructive consequences for society.

Pseudoliberals are convinced that there is no need for a control over man and believe that freedom is a value in its own right and is good in all cases, they interpret freedom as a total lack of taboos or bans and ignore the fact that freedom releases not only the best but also the worst human qualities “thus activating the destructive potential residing in the innermost depths of the human psyche (think of Freud’s *Id.—A. Yu.*). This leads to a kind of “ungovernability” which has been mentioned more and more frequently in the past decades and which basically amounts to anarchy. Freedom becomes a “Greek gift” (*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*) [10, p. 215]. It is rightly noted that “the main enemy of true liberalism is not conservative restoration, not “communalism” and not even despotism. Its main enemy, like in the case of all other civilized projects, is barbarism and chaos.” [14, p. 57].

Likewise, one has to agree that “liberalism introduced ‘from without,’ from a context that is organic to it into a context where there is no objective need for it, often degenerates into destructive individualism, provoking social chaos,” and “if ‘the liberal precautionary steps’ are socially unprepared, society may find itself powerless in the face of the onslaught of ‘new barbarianism,’” which apparently happened in Russia in the 1990s. It has to be said though that “the context in which there is no objective need for liberalism” requires at least a clarification. “The temptation of arbitrary will is the key problem of which the classics of European liberal thought were fully aware.” As a result, “the task of liberalism has become not declaring the freedom of the individual in general, but protecting the freedom of the individuals who have reached a certain level of development and have proved (in accordance with the criteria set by liberalism) their civilized status” [14, p. 58]. This highlights one of the main distinctions between genuine, civilized liberalism and modern Russian pseudoliberalism which is quite comfortable with barbaric manifestations of “arbitrary will.”

It has to be noted that the pseudoliberal notion of freedom has struck deep root in present-day Russian society thanks to the pseudoliberals, because we are not ready to exercise freedom in a civilized way and due to some Russian national traits. “If one looks at freedom in the ‘negative’ sense, as freedom from something, it turns out to be simply a lack of external constraints.” Besides, “freedom is proclaimed equally for all, but the absence of the dominant moral element results in everyone interpreting it in his own way. For some it is freedom to transfer capital to countries with lower taxes and to export radioactive waste to the Third World, for others, it is freedom to shave one’s hair, or to dye one’s hair green or maroon... For a drug addict liberal freedom means freedom to use narcotics and to die a painful death” [10, pp. 216, 218-219]. Opinion polls show that a considerable number of our fellow citizens understand freedom as... being released from prison [9]. The current state of the Russian society, some indicators of which are provided in the table, is due in large part to the pseudoliberal understanding of freedom which logically leads to the degradation of part of the population.

An important characteristic of pseudoliberals that sets them apart from true liberals is their attitude to patriotism. The former either take an aggressively neg-

ative view of the phenomenon (their favorite expression being *kvass patriotism*, roughly equivalent to jingoism) or treat it in a rather odd way, for example, as the need to change this country entirely in accordance with Western models. Predictably, in modern Russia patriots are seen as antipodes of liberals, leading to the “liberalism—patriotism” dichotomy when any public debate on any hot social issue, for example the attitude to the antics of the Pussy Riot group or the propaganda of homosexuality sharply polarizes the two sides. At the same time it is worth recalling that at the dawn of Russian liberalism such a confrontation would have been meaningless because such recognized Russian liberals as Pavel Milyukov, Nikolay Berdyayev and Pyotr Struve were at the same time ardent patriots, held their Motherland sacred and during the First World War, for example, advocated waging war until victory [30].

Foreign students of Russian liberalism such as Daniel Field and Eugene Lampert, all Russian liberals were “statists” convinced that only state power could be an instrument of progress [5; 13]. The antistate attitudes of present-day Russian pseudoliberals were profoundly alien to traditional Russian liberalism.

*Table*

**Selected Indicators of the State of Present-day Russian Society, 2011 [24; 27; 28]**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Indicator's value</b>	<b>Russia's place according to the indicator</b>
Homicide rate per 100000 people	11.7	1st place in Europe and Central Asia
Suicide rate per 100000 people	21.8	3rd place in Europe and Central Asia after Lithuania and Kazakhstan
Death rate from accidental alcohol poisoning per 100000 people	11.4	1st place in Europe and Central Asia
Deaths in road accidents per 100000 people	13.5	1st place in Europe and Central Asia
Life expectancy at birth (number of years)	69.83	Penultimate place in Europe (ahead of Ukraine)
Number of children left without parental care per 100000 people	61.88	4th place in Eastern Europe and Central Asia after Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova
Number of divorces per 1000 inhabitants	4.7	1st place in Europe and Central Asia
Number of registered crimes against children and teenagers per 100000 people aged 14-17	241.1	7th place in Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Gini coefficient (index of income concentration)	0.417	2nd place in Europe after Macedonia
Corruption index (from 0 to 100 points, the higher score corresponding to the lower level of corruption)	28	133rd position in the world, along with Honduras, Guyana, Iran and Kazakhstan out of 176

Thus, lack of patriotism is not a “generic” feature of liberals, but merely a characteristic of its pseudoliberal “mutation” which is also noted for its “propaganda of cosmopolitanism,” and the wish to join the ‘world community’ at any price and in any capacity, also declared as a national goal” [10, p. 233]. That is why A. Tsipko, for example, characterizes contemporary Russian pseudoliberalism as antinational and anti-Russian regarding as its chief enemies the traditional Russian statehood, claims to being a great power and Russian national consciousness [30]. One has to note the following, however: “After the 1998 default which demonstrated not only to Russian citizens but to the whole world the collapse of Russian “liberal” reforms, our liberals quickly turned into ‘supporters of the strong state,’ ‘statists,’ ‘nationalists’ and even ‘imperialists.’ And instead of repenting for their mistakes and failures they brazenly tried to dissociate themselves from the liberal (actually pseudoliberal) policy of the 1990s for which they were directly responsible to their country and its people” [10, p. 240]. Such strategic “mimicry” makes it hard to identify pseudoliberals in modern Russia making it necessary to invoke a complex of criteria rather than going by their often false self-identification.

The attitude of pseudoliberals to patriotism is matched by their attitude to morality. They seem to be allergic to this word and react very aggressively to any calls for its restoration in Russia, a reaction that is not surprising considering their own low moral qualities. In this context it has to be stressed that today the psychology of morality is asserting itself in Russia as a new area of research which is actively pursued at the RAS Institute of Psychology and helps to understand and explain many social phenomena arising in Russian society [15; 20-23]. Pseudoliberals often claim that morality is “bad” for the economy, that it impedes free enterprise and the development of market relations, that “everything that is not forbidden by law is allowed,” which essentially means writing off morality as a prejudice that society has no need for. The contradiction that stares one in the eye in this case is that, as Max Weber<sup>4</sup> and his followers demonstrated [31], the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe was greatly influenced by the Protestant ethics and moral principles play a huge role in the activities of modern corporations. It is also indicative that having occupied key positions in various sub-structures of our society, pseudoliberals have consistently followed this principle. For example, having gained the commanding heights in the Russian education system in the early 1990s, they introduced the idea that the main function of the school is “rendering education services” (which practically turns the teacher into something like a restaurant waiter) dumping the educational function, whereas since the times of Anton Makarenko the unity of education and character training has been the cornerstone of this system. No wonder that any attempts to restore moral principles meet with resistance in contemporary Russia on the part of the adherents of the pseudoliberal idea that “morality infringes upon freedom,” despite the fact that genuine freedom, including its liberal interpretation, far from contradicting morality is premised on morality because “freedom” not backed up by the moral law (the law within us, according to Immanuel Kant) is doomed to degradation because it turns into a free-for-all and moral mayhem” [10, p. 196].

In general *the main ideologems* (let us call them “liberalogems”) promoted by modern Russian pseudoliberals and introduced, with some success, into our mass consciousness, is one of the key features of that social group. Among these principles are: “bans are ineffective,” “no problem can be solved by prohibitive measures,” “harsher punishment does not diminish crime rate,” etc. One is struck by the absurdity of such claims that are challenged by scientific data and the entire experience of humanity. Thus it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the development of civilization started with bans, half of the Ten Commandments are also bans, the majority of laws perform first and foremost the prohibitive function and in general lack of prohibitive measures turns the life of humanity into a “war of all against all,” an image that has inspired many socio-philosophical and journalistic works. It is significant that the toughening punishment for traffic offenses reduced the annual number of deaths in road accidents by almost one and a half times (in Russia that number exceeded the number of lives claimed by the Soviet war in Afghanistan). However, pseudoliberals prefer not to notice such facts. As indeed the fact that their “liberalogems” contradict reality.

Such an attitude to reality, as well as the main ideas and concepts that they display on their banners can be seen as one of the main attributes of pseudoliberals. Their thinking has all the main features of Soviet ideological thinking (it will be recalled that many of them were recruited from Soviet Party and Young Communist League functionaries who changed their ideological “convictions” overnight) which, being “nonontological,” took great liberties with reality. For example, it treated the ideas and concepts borrowed from the West and the very image of the West in a very arbitrary “creative” way. Oblivious of the fact that the so-called West has many faces and is a motley conglomerate of peoples, cultures and social practices, Russian pseudoliberals, proclaiming “Western models” as the only correct benchmark for the development of humanity, first, create an artificially uniform image of the West and second, bring to our mass consciousness a grossly distorted idea of what is actually taking place in the Western countries.

For example, such a measure of counteracting corruption as confiscation of the property of corrupt officials and their relatives is regarded as “uncivilized” and contradicting Western experience although in fact it is used in the majority of Western countries and international anticorruption organizations, which Russia has joined, are strongly recommending us to introduce that rule [25; 35; 37].

Another example is the way the pseudoliberals and their supporters who have occupied important positions in managing Russian science are imposing on our scientific community the science-metric criteria of assessing scientific productivity (citation indexes, impact factors, the Hirsch indexes, etc.) on the grounds that they are universally used in Western countries. The reality is very different (see, for example, [34]) and in general Russian pseudoliberals are keen to introduce in our country “on behalf of the West” the social practices the West has never used or if it has used them, has discarded them or is in the process of discarding them. These situations witness elementary ignorance of pseudoliber-

als and their very vague idea of the world civilization and a rather strange, manipulative way of treating “Western experience” which often has nothing to do with the West but corresponds to the personal and group interests of the pseudoliberals. Such strategies have nothing to do with true liberals who see the West the way it really is.

An important feature of pseudoliberals is their *way of life*. The representatives of the so-called “comprador elite,” who keep their savings in foreign banks, register their businesses in offshore zones, send their children to study abroad and do not want them to return, use liberal ideas as a cover for their way of life and do everything they can to prevent the adoption of laws that make such a way of life more difficult. All this has become a calling card of our pseudoliberals. Naturally, the resentment the bulk of the population feels with regard to this way of life which runs counter to the interests of Russia and its prosperity, is projected on the allegedly liberal ideas which supposedly justify their way of life. At the same time many of our citizens, above all among the intelligentsia, earn miserly salaries and are leading a very different way of life while embracing liberal views. It is this social group that forms the social base of true liberalism in modern Russia. There are many representatives of other strata in Russian society that consider the liberal idea of freedom to be one of the bedrock values of modern civilization, but at the same time are aware of the need for reasonable constraints and abide by them in their behavior.

Perhaps one more distinguishing feature of Russian pseudoliberals is their appearance, although that claim may be challenged. It is not only the fact that in modern Russia it is hard to imagine a modestly dressed pseudoliberal who does not wear an expensive watch but the fact that his appearance, as indicated by studies [29; 12], that inspires trust or mistrust is a major quality, for example of successful Western politicians (the Western electorate does not vote for politicians it does not trust) [19]. The people usually regarded as liberals in present-day Russia, as a rule, do not have the trust of the mass of the population, which is expressed in the electoral unpopularity of right-wing liberal parties in recent times. One prominent Russian politician who played a major role in wrecking various pseudoliberal organizations that he headed, obviously made them still less popular by his appearance, though not only by it.

An important feature of our pseudoliberals is their undemocratic behavior. Although they have made active use for their personal and group interests not only the ideas of liberalism but the more catchy slogans of democracy, its key principles are obviously at odds with their behavior and talk. For example, pseudoliberals have famously declared that until the market economy is finally established in Russia the bulk of the population, which is not market oriented, should be debarred from state politics. The main reforms of Russian society in the 1990s were carried out in ways that were far from democratic and the fact that they contradicted the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population did not worry the reformers, which led to the events of 1993. Later reforms were also undemocratic. It is symptomatic that pseudoliberals have opposed the holding of referendums which are one of the main forms of democracy.

It has to be said for fairness sake that liberalism and democracy, which are frequently confused in our mass consciousness, have always been uncomfortable bedfellows. As Milton Friedman wrote, “if one understands by democracy the rule of the people expressing its sovereign will by voting, then the liberals were not democrats until almost the middle of the 19th century” (quoted from [32, p. 67]). S. Kortunov notes that “liberals have nearly always been ready to sacrifice political freedom for the sake of economic freedom.” One of the founders of economic liberalism, Anne Turgot, is thought to have said, “give me five years of despotism and France will be free” [10, p. 207], a statement highly reminiscent of those of some of our pseudoliberals here in Russia.

At the same time, as noted above, liberalism subsequently evolved towards democracy and it is hard to imagine a modern liberal who advocates “liberalism for the elect” and denies the basic democratic values.

As the English liberals claimed as far back as in the 19th century, people’s happiness is more important than people’s wealth if the latter is distributed evenly (an idea that chimes with present-day positive psychology); it is better if a hundred people live comfortably than if one person lives in luxury, high wages are more important than profit [14]. The people who in modern Russia can be regarded as true liberals simultaneously adhere to democratic values while “liberalism” which brings benefits only to a small proportion of the population—those who keep their capital abroad and register their businesses in offshore zones—is considered to be undemocratic and “antipeople.”

True liberals “prefer methods of evolutionary-reform transformations of social structures to radical, explosive revolutionary methods. Liberalism sees revolution as an action which, destroying elements of the old system, does not impact the essence of state power, i.e., naked force” [18, p. 125].

This attitude of liberals to the revolution and revolutionaries goes a long way to explain the attitude of revolutionaries to liberals. Vladimir Lenin considered them to be the “bitterest enemies of the working class,” “militant enemies of the Soviet state,” reviling the “bankruptcy of liberalism” and its “bourgeois” character, etc., while Joseph Stalin was happy to announce that “now not a trace of liberalism remains” [26, p. 11]. Both leaders expressed their attitude to liberalism not only in words, but through their deeds. Liberalism was getting more than its share of criticism in the work of ideologists at the tail end of the Soviet period and in Soviet textbooks of the time.

As regards modern Russian liberal reformers their psychology is very similar to that of the revolutionaries who act in accordance with the principle “raze everything to the ground and then...” as witnessed by the reforms in the early 1990s and later. They are afflicted by reform-mania which can arguably be regarded as a social deviation. To them reforms are an end in themselves regardless of their results, they perceive permanent reforms as the normal state of society and their absence as “stagnation” and lack of development.

A more apt description of such liberal reformers would be “liberal terminators” and their style of reforming activities that smashes the structures being reformed to smithereens is accompanied by a corresponding attitude to the struc-

tures and the people who work there, and in the case of reforming Russia, to its citizens in general, an attitude that is devoid not only of respect but of any other natural human sentiments, such as empathy, sympathy and compassion, etc. It is symptomatic that some of our pseudoliberals argue that the market economy would not be really established in Russia until the current “nonmarket” generation dies out.

This style of “reformism” has little in common with true liberalism, it is much closer to the revolutionary style of the Bolsheviks, which lends substance to the description of modern Russian liberal reformers as neo-Bolsheviks—in terms of their mentality, way of thinking and acting. Thus for example, “the Marxists have taken their doctrine about equality beyond the framework of shame, conscience and sin. Present-day liberals have separated the concept of freedom from conscience, shame, personal guilt and responsibility... Thus they are compromising liberalism on a world historic scale, just as the Bolsheviks compromised socialism by radicalizing it to the point of absurdity” [10, pp. 236-237].

This analogy fits in neatly with the Marxist style of thinking of the pseudoliberals which embraces “economic determinism,” a conviction that everything that happens in society is determined solely by economics while the social superstructure is secondary. “Our present-day liberalism here took on board another famous Marxist principle, economic determinism, i.e., linear causal relationship between economic and political change, which turned economics into an absolute state priority,” writes S. Kortunov [10, p. 239]. Thus, for example, Yegor Gaidar, who formally repudiated Marxism but retained the main qualities of Marxist thinking,<sup>5</sup> explaining the collapse of the USSR in his book, attributes it to purely economic causes, the fact that the world oil prices had dropped and the country’s treasury was empty [8]. In the process he sidesteps both the numerous sociopolitical factors of the country’s disintegration and the obvious circumstance that it preserved its integrity in much leaner times and in the late Soviet period, with the world oil prices plummeting, none of its citizens starved to death. However, such explanations highlight not only the “economic determinism” of our liberal reformers but the “defensive” character of the ideologems that they put forward, the wish to justify what they have done, including the destruction of the country, by invoking some “objective” circumstances. It will be recalled that at the time pseudoliberals were in power our state policy concentrated entirely on economic indicators—the size of the GDP, the exchange rate of the ruble, etc., while not being overly concerned with the fact that the country’s population was physically dying out.

This brings us to yet another cardinal difference between liberals and the pseudoliberals which has its roots in the systems of values they espouse. True liberals embrace values that embody principles, pseudoliberals pursue their personal and group interests, which in many ways explains the appeal liberal ideologems held for the masses generated by the heavily criminalized Russian market economy and the distortion of these ideologems in order to justify such an economy. It is obvious that the main pseudoliberal ideologems are tailored to the interests of our comprador elite and the corresponding way of life of pseudolib-

erals described above. The “justifying” character of the pseudoliberal ideology as a whole will be seen from the fact that it was formed in accordance with the “vested interests” mechanism well known in political psychology [19].

### **Alternative to Pseudoliberalism (in Lieu of a Conclusion)**

Thus the present-day Russian pseudoliberals differ from true liberals on many counts such as: social strata forming their background; their concept of freedom; the attitude to patriotism and morality; the main ideologems; style of thinking and attitude to reality; way of life; democratic attitudes; the style of reforming activities; the relationship between principles and interests and even their appearance.

The above described differences between liberals and pseudoliberals suggest the main tasks in the development of Russian liberalism in order to reverse the “bad luck” noted at the beginning of this article.

- First, it is extremely important to clearly distinguish true liberalism from its modern Russian “mutation,” explaining these differences to the masses and accordingly forming the right attitude to genuine liberalism and true Russian liberals.
- Second, it is necessary to “cleanse” liberalism of distortions introduced in it by the modern Russian pseudoliberals.
- Third, it is necessary to form a liberal alternative to pseudoliberalism in modern Russia which is opposed not by genuine liberalism, but by various types of nationalism, with pseudoliberalism wrongfully usurping the value and meaning-related space of liberalism and its historical achievements.
- Fourth, the abovementioned “nationalization of liberalism” to lend it its typical patriotic character, like in the early years of the last century, would render irrelevant the juxtaposition of liberalism and patriotism.
- Fifth, the ideological packaging as well as the introduction in our sociopolitical life of a balance between freedoms and the necessary restrictions that is optimal for contemporary Russia, the search of ways to “reconcile” the values of freedom and statehood is very important.
- Sixth, it is necessary to introduce in mass consciousness and consolidate an adequate concept of freedom which inevitably implies restrictions internalized by the personality in the shape of moral principles, norms and rules of behavior and life in general.
- Seventh, it would make sense to introduce in this consciousness the correct (adequate) understanding of other liberal ideas which would gradually oust the widespread pseudoliberal ideologems.

This path may well lead to the revival in Russia of true liberalism as an ideology and mentality, the use of its inherent positive impulses for the good of soci-

ety in order to lend a truly civilized character to our hard-won freedom. Radical pseudoliberalism because of its extremely destructive impact on Russian society should probably be equated with political extremism, including at the legal level.

The confrontation between true and pseudoliberalism may in the coming years become a major arena of ideological struggles in Russia which should involve not only the professional producers of ideologems, i.e., ideologists, politicians, etc., but also representatives of social and humanities sciences, including the psychologists who seek to enhance the “social relevance” [33; 36] of their science.

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### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> It has been noted among other things that “‘nationalization’ of liberalism is a common phenomenon in the transition from the old classical to the new postnonclassical liberalism”; “The leaders of liberal parties have started arguing that their liberal party is the national party, the party of national defense, the party of patriotism” [14, p. 74]; “Liberalism has different colors in different countries and is defended in different ways by their national leaders. Its various types are represented by English, American, German, French, Italian and Spanish liberalism” [10, p. 254].
- <sup>2</sup> It has to be noted that this viewpoint has been criticized. For example, if by liberalism we mean not the doctrine but “a certain feeling of the world, the ideological and emotional landscape, a constellation of the principles and arguments of reason... in that case the number of people “liberally perceiving the world” becomes infinite, making the history of liberalism plainly impossible. It would likewise be odd to proceed from the thesis that a liberal is anyone who considers oneself to be one or who is called a liberal by contemporaries” [14, p. 60]. In that case the distinction between true liberals and those who call themselves liberals in modern Russia is erased.
- <sup>3</sup> Political scientists have rightly pointed out that these people, who in the Soviet years have been strenuously persuading themselves and others that capitalism is “barbaric,” “plunderous,” etc., when they came to power, built precisely this kind of capitalism in this country simply because they did not know any other.
- <sup>4</sup> S. Kortunov notes that “an important element of classical liberalism in some European countries initially was the Protestant work ethics described by Max Weber in his famous book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* [10, p. 203].
- <sup>5</sup> In this connection it would be appropriate to describe Marxism not only as “dogma” or “a guide to action” but also as a style of thinking.

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

## Civic and Ethnic Identity and Image of Desirable Statehood in Russia

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*Abstract.* The article analyzes problems connected with the idea of civic identity in official discourse, discourse among the scientific elite and the way it is reflected in mass consciousness. The focus is on the dynamics of multiple identity, the congruence and balance of civic and ethnic identity of the ethnic Russians and Russia's other ethnic groups. The analysis is based on representative nationwide research and samples from a number of RF constituent republics conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2013-2015 as well as on the results of a discourse-analysis of doctrinal and scientific space. The article elaborates respondents' understanding of the notion of civic identity, and its place in consolidating state unity and cohesion; it is substantiated the concept of the state-civic identity which most adequately reflects modern-day Russians' perceptions about their community. The article also dwells on the balance between state-civic and ethnic identities among the ethnic Russians and the titular ethnic groups of the RF constituent republics. It shows evidence of the compatibility of these identities when they are positive in character. The authors demonstrate that ethnic identity in the ethnic Russians is just as important and relevant as it is in titular nationalities of the Russia's republics. As for civic identity, they see a closer link to ethnic identity than people in other ethnic groups. The idea of a common statehood is the basic segment connecting civic and ethnic identity. This applies both to Russians and other nationalities. But various social and ethnic communities have distinct perceptions of the kind of the state they want to see. For that reason society and government alike need to heed this fact in order to maintain loyalty to the state as a "common home of many peoples." In order to strengthen civic

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identity it is important to develop a sense of responsibility for the state of affairs in the country. This position is currently shared only by 30-50% of citizens, depending on the region concerned.

*Keywords:* civic and state-civic identity; ethnic identity; identity of Russians and titular nationalities of the republics; preferable state; status of ethnic Russians; equality of the people.

DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2015.05.03

### **Problem Formulation**

Civic identity is just as important for the sociopsychological state of the people in the country as it is for the government because it has an interest in a close link between the structure of political order and “the collective whole beneath it” [3, p. 37]. Russian identity has been studied by researchers in various social sciences in the last two decades.<sup>1</sup> They have made quite a good deal of effort to make the authorities and society aware of its importance, promote such concepts in international and Russian publications and pointed to the need to study how they are reflected in mass consciousness. It would seem there is now a consensus on “the question of gaining and strengthening national identity as a matter of a truly fundamental nature for Russia.” That is what the President of the Russian Federation said about it at the Valdai Forum in the fall of 2013 [25].

And yet even the name of civic identity in Russia is still under discussion. The debate is about whether it could be called national identity in the sense of a political nation if a nation is understood both as a countrywide community and as an ethnocultural community. For over twenty years RAS Academician Valery Tishkov has been trying to assign only a civic and political meaning to the notion of “nation.” Meanwhile, the notions of ethnos and ethnicity have been established in official political discourse, and they are being used to good effect. Even so, in accordance with Russian tradition, the notion of nation is routinely used to describe ethnic communities, notably those in the republics, and identify their titular nationalities. Today even V. Tishkov, the architect and champion of filling the notion of nation with political content, attempts to “save the situation” by pushing the formula saying that “we are a nation of nations” [24, p. 9] like Castilians and Basques in Spain, Scots in Britain, and Quebecers in Canada. And that means that agreement has yet to be reached on how All-Russia identity should be called, in particular on whether it could be called national identity.

It is neigh impossible to impose an official name on this community. One might form or claim something if there are grounds for that which derive from a customary, comprehensible patterns (small wonder the shape of the early motorcars was that of a carriage). The grounds might be found in history and particularly in mass consciousness. That is why sociological research, including research underlying this article, studies people’s perceptions of what unifies them as citizens and what values cement Russia’s community. The identification patterns that prevailed before the 1917 Revolution and during the Soviet period have left no

fundamentals that could be shared by influential groups of elites and accepted by the majority of the population. New fundamentals are still in the making, but even when they are theoretically sound and empirically proven they are used by “actors of political games,” with each of them interpreting those fundamentals in their own way [15], and that is the reason why they require further argumentation. And, finally, the problem of compatibility between pan-civic identity and other collective identities, primarily ethnic, local, regional and ethnoconfessional requires a detailed elaboration. There are alternative concepts of identity ranging from rivalry between them and their incompatibility, a rigid hierarchy of their constructs or simply the possibility of a single civic-cultural identity forming in the future [25]. Such identities may also become compatible provided they are positively inclined toward the need to understand “others” and achieve mutual understanding and “unity in multiplicity.” But that will require constant access to the dynamics and trends of the transformation of such identities.

At a time when globalization shores up the common material and technological basis of the multicultural space and in one way or another bolsters the potential of ethnic and local consolidation rather than rules it out, a relevant question concerns meanings and mobilization interests in those unifying fields. The identity issue thus acquires special importance inasmuch as it shapes our attitude toward those contradictory tendencies. A further theoretical elaboration of the question of forming and strengthening Russian identity and its compatibility with other identities requires an analysis of current theoretical and methodological approaches to the issue based on the study of the results coming from empirical research. In this article we will attempt to answer some of the questions raised here drawing on available theoretical work and monitoring research by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2011-2015 (the research was done under the guidance of Academician Mikhail Gorshkov)<sup>2</sup>; the authors of the article were involved in the project. Besides, we used data from other monitoring studies (Levada Center, the Russian monitoring of the population’s economic situation and health, *RLMS*, European Social Studies and others). We also made use of our representative research in Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) conducted jointly with our colleagues in the republics in 2012-2013.<sup>3</sup>

### Research Methods

Researchers in Russia began studying the phenomenon of civic identity more thoroughly in the 1990s. Psychologists see identity mainly as self-identification focusing on the “we—they” confrontation as the basis of its formation.

Political scientists studying ethnic identity focus on the difference between civic and ethnic self-consciousness as they point to the historical legacy of Russian identity, its meanings as well as political and cultural components [24]. Political scientists regard the identity of a civic nation as a macropolitical one. It is focused on an identity constructed by the state and “groups of interests” [16].

This kind of identity is necessary for outlining a strategy of nation-building in the modern world [7] and for interpreting a single political space [11] divided into ascribed groups constructed as hierarchies sharing the picture of the world according to Rogers Brubaker [1]. This kind of political space includes multifarious forms of collective identities.

Sociologists were some of the first Russian researchers to study civic identity using representative empirical material ( Mikhail Gorshkov, Yelena Danilova, Leokadiya Drobizheva, Andrey Zdravomyslov, Nataliya Tikhonova, Vladimir Yadov). Their studies concerned both “who we are” and “what kind of people we are.” Among other things, they analyzed how far social and ethnic groups are associated with the “we are citizens of Russia” image, the intensity and the degree of their perception of this link with it, corresponding perceptions and factors impacting the character of national identity.

It is obvious that there is no rigid interdisciplinary divide in the study of identities. Whether researchers study identity in its broad sense—(“what kind of people we are”) —or in a more “targeted” one—(“who we are”)—they draw on the works of Erik Erikson, who regarded identity as a “self-identification” in a sociocultural environment. He took note of its link to ideology [4; 5]. Researchers also make use of the conclusions made by Henri Tajfel and John Turner about categorization as a property of the social and group perception of man [22] and George Herbert Mead’s concept of identity being formed in the process of interaction with others [9].

There are different interpretations of civic identity. Political scientists see it as “the individual’s interpretation of social reality,” a commonality of collective perceptions of the world, including “the image... of the group as a microcollective whose framework makes for an integrated picture of the world... and self-identification with the collective...” [11]. Some researchers stress the special importance of loyalty to the authorities. Aleksey Miller speaks of nation as the object of association through identity [10].

National identity for V. Tishkov is “one of the forms of group identity indicating its association with the nation” (in the sense of a state-territorial community with a distinct political and legal system), “the citizens’ perception of their country and people shared by all and a sense of belonging to them.” He makes a special point by stressing that he means a community “pertaining to the state,” one that “recognizes itself as being part of the state” [24, pp. 64, 66-67, 105-106]. Sociologists seek to give operational definitions which could be verified empirically. As far as we are concerned, we regard civic identity as self-identification with the country’s citizens, perception of the state and country as the “we” image, and a sense of community, solidarity and responsibility for what is going on in the country.

Like other forms of collective identities civic identity includes regulatory as well as cognitive and emotional components. From our point of view, more often than not it is active elements that make the difference between civic identity and an identity only with the country and the state, for instance. They are stimulated by political, social and personal interests.

The perceptions and emotions that are associated with civic identity are shaped by the education system, the media, artistic culture, historical legacy, symbols, rituals, language and religion. Historical heritage means part of cultural capital rather than just a knowledge of history [23, p. 627]. According to David Lowenthal, history is not a digression into the past but glorification of the past, often mythologized, but one of crucial importance to collective identity (see [8, p. 110-111]). In this sense Eric Hobsbawm metaphorically described history as a form of inspiration and an ideology. He felt there was a risk in the construction of identity on the basis of history [6, p. 357]. Artistic culture too serves as a basis for the formation of identity. The elite and the state are responsible for the process of accumulating the country's historical legacy. It is the state that has an interest in making sure that civic identity serves to consolidate society, its commitment to territorial integrity, loyalty to the nation and the state and cohesion of society's social fragments. On the other hand, society too is interested in a positive identity in order to ensure a comfortable social and psychological environment for its members and their consolidation (unity in multiplicity) as a resource of social development.

All identities (collective and individual alike) are dynamic. However, their variability depends on the state of society, stability of the historical and cultural heritage, innovatory political processes, people's moral conceptions and their value orientations as well as on the efforts made by the constructors. That is why we are going to look into possible causes of change as well as the dynamics of civic identity, on the one hand, and ethnic and local identity, on the other.

Modern-day people have multiple identities. Their meaning for concrete individuals in different conditions varies, but what is important is that more often than not such variations are not incompatible. This study focuses on the relationship between civic and ethnic identities. We shall review their dynamics before a substantive discussion of the issue.

### **Balance of Civic and Ethnic Identities**

When the Soviet Union lost its habitual territorial outline in the course of this country's disintegration and its history was subjected to a revision against the background of predominantly negative appraisals of its social structure, many people lost a clear understanding of their national self-identification. According to polls conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1992 (under the guidance of V. Yadov) and the Institute of Concrete Social Studies in 1998 (conducted under the guidance of M. Gorskov), about a half of respondents (47%) were still associating themselves with "the Soviet people." At the same time 71 to 74% said they had a sense of communion with the people of Russia (either often or from time to time) [13, pp. 75-83]. In 2006 and 2008 polls conducted by *RLMS* and *ESS* covered large areas and took into account a wider ethnic diversity. They recorded civic identity among 66-68% of respondents. In 2012-2015 74-84% had a sense of communion with

the country's citizens, according to figures released by *ESS*, *RLMS* and the Monitoring Service of the RAS.

Although many Russian nationally oriented politicians and politicians of other nationalities said they did not like the word combination "the people of Russia," more than two thirds of the population stuck to the "we are the citizens of Russia" concept. Russians and people of other nationalities alike have an almost unanimously positive view of that formula—74% and 68% accordingly).<sup>4</sup> Studies conducted in Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, the Republic of Sakha, Mordovia, and Chuvashiya at the time demonstrated that both people representing the titular nationalities of those republics and the Russians living there preferred civic identity in equal measure (in the abovementioned republics—80% and more) [2, p. 6].

A number of factors such as stable indicators showing a strong link between citizens (they almost do not depend on age, education, orientation, the state's values, and a stable level of trust in the authorities and others—all that indicated the formation of a new civic identity in Russia during the 2000s and especially during 2014-2015. The Sochi Olympics and the events in the Crimea only pointed up society's orientation toward consolidation.

Ethnic identity during that period was still relevant too. It was slightly less intensive among Russians than among other nationalities in Russia. Analysis of responses to the following question revealed the affiliative component of identity: "Which of these groups do you associate with by saying 'that are we?' Indicate how close you are to them." A sense of cohesion with people of their own nationality—the "we" notion—is characteristic of 80% of Russians as well as people of other nationalities. Of those respondents 25% of Russians and 39% of people of other nationalities said they were "fairly close." How much people see themselves as Russians does not depend on age, education or professional status. Most likely the somewhat lesser degree of Russians associating themselves with their own ethnos is the result of the nature of the ethnic environment. Most Russians live in their ethnic environment, and unlike people of other nationalities they do not have to face ethnic peculiarities of people around them or mark themselves out. The study also recorded a fairly high degree of importance of religious identity both for Russians and people of other nationalities.

Given that Russia is a large country, identity reflecting a friendly association of people from the same area is about the same as ethnic identity (34% of respondents were aware of the former as against 27% of adherents of ethnic identity). This makes for the formation of social consolidation also on the basis of a local or ethnoterritorial community.

It is noteworthy that while in the early 1990s the Russians considerably lagged behind people of other nationalities in terms of their sense of mutual solidarity, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century they were no different from people of other nationalities in Russia in this respect.

Ethnic solidarity and people's historical memory make a notable contribution to the formation of modern-day civic nations [19, p. 16]. According to the nationwide study, 80% of Russians and 76% of people of other nationalities

share the view that in our time people should see themselves as part of their nationality (this view is fully shared by 30% of respondents in both categories). Ethnic solidarity does not depend on education, but it is related to age. This opinion is supported by 77% of people in the group of 60 years and older, and 68% in the 18-30 age group.

The studies we conducted in republics and regions of the Russian Federation in the 1990s and early 2000s<sup>5</sup> demonstrated that Russians and people of other nationalities had different views of thoroughgoing transformations in society. One of the conclusions indicated that in the 1990s Russians perceived social transformations in the country as a process having different effects on its citizens. On the one hand, the people of the titular nationalities of the constituent republics had received a good opportunity for free ethnic and cultural development. They were experiencing a revival of their ethnic self-consciousness and a sense of national dignity. On the other, most Russians reacted morbidly to the loss of "Big Brother" status and great-power self-consciousness.

This had an impact on how Russians saw the situation in the sphere of relations between people of different nationalities, their material situation, their social status (Russians did not associate themselves with the middle class as much as others did), and their perception of their life prospects and sense of confidence in the future. Analysis of the strategies of economic motivations adopted by Russians revealed their perception of socioeconomic and political transformations in the post-Soviet period. A 1999 study [21] made it clear that in comparison with titular ethnic groups the Russians were less reliant on themselves with respect to strategies designed to avoid poverty, were more passive and tolerant to factors of economic and social deprivation.

The same tendency was found in the 2014 nationwide study.<sup>6</sup> In comparison with people of other nationalities Russians gave more pessimistic appraisals of the situation in Russia: 55% of them and 45% of people of other nationalities described the current situation in the country as "tense and crisis-ridden.;" 45% of Russians and 35% of people of other nationalities thought "the changes that took place in Russia in the past year were for the worse." 50% of Russians and 41% of non-Russians felt that "next year Russia will be faced with hard times."

Throughout the entire post-Soviet period the Russians demonstrated opinions indicating a less positive perception of their own situation (in comparison with people of other nationalities). This tendency also manifested itself in 2014: 34% of Russians and 41% of non-Russians gave "good" marks to their position in society; 27% of Russians and 35% of non-Russians regarded their job situation as "good." This may be the result of the fact that most Russians live in cities, and that is why they have higher requirements for living standards and a better position on the job.

It is noteworthy that the positive solidarity of Russians is a resource of their optimistic perception of the outlook for Russia's development. The people who were optimistic about Russia's future development ("the country's prospect is successful development") included a higher than average share of those intent on ethnic solidarity ("in this day and age people need to perceive themselves as part


of their nationality”)—79% and 72% accordingly. In this context ethnic solidarity was stronger among those Russians whose sociopolitical orientations classed them among supporters of the country’s revival as a great power (84% as compared with 72% on average), but such aspirations showed no growth among adherents of Russian nationalist ideology.

As can be seen from the example of the Russians, those who hold strong opinions concerning ethnic solidarity have a more optimistic view of Russia’s development. They are more loyal to the state and society, and their love for their mother country and great-power orientations are stronger. But ethnic solidarity is also current among people of other nationalities in Russia. That is why the emotions of solidarity that unite people in the polyethnic space are so important. Above all this means the common positive sentiments that citizens of Russia associate with their country. Most of the people polled treat Russia with love, pride and respect regardless of their nationality (such sentiments were noted by 66% of Russians and 64% of non-Russians).

Similar attitudes toward ethnocultural distinctions are a no less important indicator of nationwide solidarity and compatibility of the civic and the ethnic identities.

**Identification as Basis of Compatibility of Civic and Ethnic Identities**

Quite a few consolidating senses and meanings become obvious when integrators in identities under study are analyzed (see Figure 1).



**Fig. 1. Foundation of the Civil and Ethnic Identities (Monitoring Data of the RAS Institute of Sociology, the second wave in 2015, %.)**

In Russia today too the Russians predominantly identify themselves with citizens of the Russian Federation against the background of researchers and politicians debating the question of forming civil society and an obvious rise of ethnic (ethnonational) consciousness. Previous studies too demonstrate that ethnic Russians living in regions of Central Russia predominantly populated by Russian identify themselves with the whole Russia's population *per se* (to call themselves "*Rossiyane*," i.e., people of Russia) ever since the end of the first decade of the 21st century. In some regions they even outnumber those who see themselves only as ethnic Russians [12, p. 26]. This study also shows that more than 70% of Russians identify themselves with Russia's citizens. And in several republics the share of the Russians who are aware of a strong affinity with the *Rossiyane* is even bigger than it is throughout Russia (around 50% and more as against 27% nationwide. For instance, in 2013 45% of Russians in Sakha (Yakutia) felt *considerable* affinity with Russia's citizens whereas 40% said they were attuned to people of their own nationality [2, p. 59, 67, 72].<sup>7</sup>

The civic identity of people of various nationalities that extends to national level is primarily based on a single state (66%), and their notions of territory (54%), the official language (49%) and historical past (47%). This is followed by culture, symbols and festive occasions (32-37%) and, last of all, typical traits of character (8%).

In the case of ethnic identification the main indicators are the language of the ethnic group (75%), culture, customs and holidays (47-63%), native land and nature (53%), history (49%), statehood (33%), religion (32%) and characteristic traits (20%).<sup>8</sup> Above all, the most important and definitive ethnic integrators are language, culture, native land and historical past.

Although the integrating indicators of civic identity are slightly less expressive, they are quite definitive too: statehood, territory, official language and historical past. These are followed by symbols, culture and festive occasions. The study reveals a credible correlation between the degree of belonging to one's own nationality and Russia's citizens as such: this correlation is borne out by Pearson correlation coefficient (phi coefficient) and contingency tables.

With Russians ethnic identity is more related to civic identity than it is among people of other nationalities insofar as Russians identify themselves primarily in terms of language and culture, considering that the Russian language is not only their mother tongue but also the official language. Professional culture of peoples inhabiting Russia has been developing primarily on the basis of the Russian language. Historically the All-Russia cultural fund including the cultures of all ethnic groups has had a Russian dominant. Russia is no exception in this respect. All modern-day co-citizenships (nations in the political sense of the word) have a complex ethnic, racial and religious composition of the population, with the culture and language of the majority forming the basis of its national culture. In Britain it is the English component, in Spain it is the Castilian component and in China it is the Hun component. Small wonder, therefore, that more often than not ethnic and civic identity are equally widespread among Russians and just as important to them.

As for people of other nationalities, their sense of ethnic identity is somewhat stronger (it is more meaningful to them): 38% among them as against 27% among Russians.

Notions of the common historical past are an obvious component of civic (as well as ethnic) identity. The new post-Soviet states that emerged in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union aimed to come up with their own versions of national history (in particular this was demonstrated by a special international review of school textbooks sponsored by the Georg Eckert Institute). The complexities involved in a revision of historical events were reflected in books with symbolic titles such as *War of Memories: Myth, Identity and Politics in Transcaucasia* [17]. The battle for history as a component of national (state) identity is going on in all countries. Attempts to expand the teaching of general history in European schools have triggered a campaign to consolidate the national versions of history in each of the countries [23]. According to Anthony Smith, the national past as a component of identity contains historical facts subjected to idealization, allegory and distortions. Together, he maintained, they comprise a generally shared historical story about the heroic past that meets a collective requirement at present and in the future [18, p. 53]. Perceptions of national interests, loyalty to the state and love for one's native country are formed through culture and versions of the common historical past.

But emotional experiences and a sense of attachment to one's motherland is one thing. When identity's regulatory component drives people to action, this is a different matter. 32% of respondents in a 2015 nationwide poll and 30 to 50% in regional polls conducted in 2011-2013 regarded responsibility for the country's fate as a necessary element of civic identity. These include a slightly bigger number of respondents who feel that people should take active action in order to safeguard their rights and interests. It is noteworthy that this is exactly the main indicator of civic identity. Meanwhile, it is the state that still plays the role of the main integrator in Russia's mass consciousness. It is for that reason that we feel civic-state identity is the proper name for our nationwide identity, given the realities of the day.<sup>9</sup> In our opinion, it corresponds to the task of strengthening citizens' responsibility for the situation in the country and their role in bringing about images of desirable society and statehood.

### **Concerning Desirable Statehood**

For a fairly long period after the disintegration of the Soviet Union sociologists dismissed people's frustrations and compensatory reactions as being the result of this country losing the status of a great power. In the early 21st century "a desire to have living standards restored" followed by "a revival of great-power status" moved to the fore.

According to the latest studies, one fourth of Russians and as many people of other nationalities spoke out for the return of "the Soviet Union's superpower

status” as one of Russia’s aims in the 21st century. But twice as many respondents wanted to see Russia as “one of the most developed and politically influential countries in the world” (over 50% of Russians and more than 40% of people of other nationalities). People in Russia are much more concerned about the chances of an economically viable state as an effective player in the modern world with equal political rights rather than about superpower status.

Even most of those who maintain that Russia should become a great power say this should mainly be done through “a developed modern economy” (some 60% of Russians and people of other nationalities), “a high level of well-being” (53% and 52% accordingly), “a high level of culture and revival of the national spirit of the people of Russia” (39% and 33% accordingly).

Russia’s ethnic groups share some notions of the kind of state they want to see. But ever since the time when the Soviet Union was still in existence the debate has centered on the hierarchy of such notions. It is no coincidence that when a draft strategy for state nationalities’ policy was under discussion, one of the most intensive debates was focused on practically incompatible formulas: “we are a multinational people” and “the Russians as a people forming the nucleus of the state.” Before the presidential elections Vladimir Putin is known to have formulated his views on policy in this sphere in an article titled *Russia: Nationalities’ Question* in which he demonstrated the important role the Russians play in the state: “The great mission of the Russians is to unite and cement the civilization.” He called the Russians “a state-forming people” on the basis of Russia’s existence. “The self-determination of the Russian people,” the article said, “means a polyethnic civilization cemented by the Russian cultural nucleus.” This thesis sparked a wide-ranging public debate. Some saw a link between the article and the fact Russians account for the majority of the electorate in an election campaign. Others detected a link to events on Manezh Square. In his article V. Putin paid special attention to civic identity as a factor unifying all of Russia’s nationalities [26]. In December 2012 the President signed the State Nationalities’ Policy Strategy. In it the Russian people are interpreted as a systems-forming nucleus in the state, one that unifies Russia’s peoples by means of a single cultural code.


Nationwide monitoring studies by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and studies conducted in Russia’s republics have made it possible for us to show the dynamics of representations about the desirable nature of the Russian state from the point of view of the place occupied by ethnicity in it. In 1995 most people in Russia (65%) agreed with the view that “Russia is a common home of many peoples. All of Russia’s peoples should have equal rights, and nobody should have any privileges.” 11% felt that Russia should be a state of Russian people while 14% maintained that “since Russians form the majority they should have more rights because they are mainly responsible for the fate of the nation as a whole.” In 2001-2007 the number of supporters of those two positions nearly doubled rising to 19% and 31% accordingly. But the number of respondents who chose “a common home for many peoples dropped from 65% to 50% in 2014 (see Table 1).

Table 1

**Representations about the Nature of the Russian State,  
1995, 2007, 2011, 2014, %**

<b>Opinions</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2014</b>
Russia should be a state of Russian people	11	16	14	9
Russia is a multinational country, but Russians form the majority, and for that reason they need more rights	14	31	31	32
Russia is the common home of many peoples. All of Russia's peoples should have equal rights. None of them should have any privileges	65	48	47	50

The attitude to those opinions depends on the age of respondents. Today 56% of respondents over 50 years of age share the view Russia as a common home providing equal rights for all. The same opinion is share by 43% of respondents aged 18-30 years. 37-38% of people in older groups agree with the view that Russia is a state where the ethnic majority should have an advantage over other others. The figure for the young is 46%. There is a significant difference between the opinions expressed by Russians and people of other nationalities. (See Figure 2). Most of the latter respondents perceive our state as “a



**Fig. 2. Opinion of Ethnic Russians and People of Other Nationalities of Russia about Russia as the Common Home for All People of Russia (Monitoring Data of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the First Wave in 2014, %.)**

common home.” It is noteworthy that more Russians in several republics support the view of Russia “as a common home for many ethnic groups” than the number of people in the Russian space as a whole. For instance, such ideas are shared by 80-90% of Russians in Bashkortostan, Tatarstan and Sakha (Yakutia) [2, pp. 62, 322].

On the whole, the national state project with Russia’s multiethnic nation including representatives of other nationalities is capable of being implemented. Judging by the results of the research, it is the project that has the support of the biggest share of respondents in 2014-2015: 47-50%. Here the share of the people with aspirations for civic identity and supporting the notion of “common home” is somewhat larger (50% against 43.7% of others).

On the other hand, as can be seen from the above, the share of those who believe that Russians should have more rights has also grown. Attempts are being made to raise the status of Russians by improving life conditions in the regions where they form the majority of the population, creating the conditions for their social development, and embedding nonconfronting all-Russia and Russian identities. V. Putin formulated the idea at the Valdai Forum: “The right of the minority to have distinctive characteristics should be respected, but the right of the majority should not be subjected to doubt either” [25].

### Conclusions

Research results demonstrate that there is a growing nationwide civic identity among a clear majority of Russians (75-80%). It combines with ethnic identity and increasing “Russianness.” The latter more clearly manifests itself among young people, who account for more supporters of preferential rights being given to the ethnic Russians; patriotic sentiments are more widespread among them. In comparison to the 1990s when ethnic identity was more massive and intensive among titular national republics, in the 2000s (in particular starting from the second half of the first decade) the ethnic identity of the Russians overcame crisis phenomena of the 1990s to become just as integrating as it was among other nationalities.

Nationwide civic identity is largely civic-state identity. It is impacted by the state of civil society as a political nation in formation. Those who prefer such self-identification are ready to share responsibility for the country’s fate (from 30% to 50% depending on regions) although it is obvious that they are not ready to share this responsibility in any case—far from it.

The authors prefer the civic-state formula rather than national-civic identity because although the notion of nation in its political meaning has entered Russia’s scientific and public space, it has retained its ethnocultural meaning. Civic-state and ethnic identities combine in situations where each of them is far removed from their hypertrophied forms. These collective identities conflict in contexts of chauvinism and radical nationalism.

Russians and other ethnic groups and nationalities in Russia want to see the country regaining “great-power” status. They maintain this could be done only through a developed economy and high living standards (more than 50% of respondents). As a rule, in 2014-2015 mass consciousness did not associate “great-power status as a desirable goal” with outward aggressiveness. Rather this thesis was mainly related to nostalgic sentiments and rejection of a position of inequality in the world community. There are elements of imperial sentiments among the Russians, but they do not hold dominant positions and are oriented toward domestic goals such as safeguarding justice and national dignity instead of promoting diktat outside of the country’s borders.

The value field underlying civic and ethnic identities requires special attention, but it is already obvious that nonhyperbolized identity is associated with such positive tendencies as growing trust within society, increased self-confidence and orientation toward achievements shoring up the people’s awareness of being masters of their own country.

Obviously, the state and the elites play a major role in the formation of identity. Although an ideological monopoly should be ruled out, the ideas expressed by the leader are important. “By questioning the multinational nature [of our country] and exploiting the theme of Russian, Tatar, Caucasian, Siberian or any other kind of nationalism and separatism we embark on the path of destroying our genetic code.” Such was V. Putin’s position on this score which he made clear in 2013 [25]. But the methods of bringing those ideas to the public through the education system, artistic culture and the media are far from optimal. Therefore, it is worthwhile reminding the public of those words spoken by the President of the Russian Federation, considering that the poll results show the complicated and sensitive divide between the conflicting interests of people of various social and ethnocultural environments and different self-identification models.

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### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The number of books directly dealing with the subject alone exceeds 170.
- <sup>2</sup> In 2015 the selection of respondents totaled 4,000; in 2011-2014 the figure was 1,750. They represented the country's adult population aged 18 years and older living in the main territorial-economic regions. This is a representative selection for the Russians; as for the "other nationalities" group, it represents the entire selection rather than each of the concrete nationalities (see [14]).
- <sup>3</sup> The aggregate selection by republic totals 1,000-1,034 respondents, thereby representing the most numerous nationalities of the autonomous republics. (See [2]).
- <sup>4</sup> The project titled *The Dynamics of Social Transformations in Modern-day Russia in Socioeconomic, Political, Sociocultural and Ethnoreligious contexts—a study by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2015* (supervised by Dr. M. Gorskov; henceforth—Monitoring Data of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, second wave).
- <sup>5</sup> Research projects: *Ethnic and Administrative Boundaries: Factors of Stability and Conflict (1997-1998)*, *Social Inequality of Ethnic Groups and Integration Problems in the Russian Federation (1999-2001)*, supervised by L. Drobizheva. The research was conducted in the Republic of Tatarstan, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and in Orenburg Region; it was organized by the Ethnic Sociology Division of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The researchers used the territorial, stratified and plausibility selection model—a three-phase one for the urban population and a two-phase model for the rural population. In 1997 the selection total amounted to 1,121 persons in Tatarstan, 918 respondents in Sakha (Yakutia) and 999 persons in Orenburg Region. In 1999 the selection aggregate amounted to 1,050 in Sakha (Yakutia), 1,000 in Tatarstan and 1,160 in Orenburg Region (see: [20; 21]). The project's author is L. Drobizheva.
- <sup>6</sup> Monitoring data of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, first wave, 2014.
- <sup>7</sup> This may have been the result of the fact that a sizable number of Russians in Sakha (Yakutia) have come from other regions of Russia. They live mainly in a Russian environment, notably in Mirny.

- 8 Monitoring data of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, second wave.
- 9 Time was when this identity was described as national-civic identity, but if we accept the “we are a nation of nations” definition, then the earlier definition will have to be abandoned.

*Translated by Gennady Nikiforov*

**В. ТАМБОВЦЕВ. Экономическая теория  
неформальных институтов.  
М.: РГ-Пресс, 2014, 174 с.**

**V. TAMBOVTSEV. *Economics of Informal Institutions.*  
Moscow: RG-Press, 2014, 174 pp.**

The author of this book set himself a very difficult task: to define “informal institutions” and describe their “life cycle.” He rightly notes that informal institutions are often defined simply by listing their forms or, in other words, the more or less distinct images they present to the world. In support of this, he points to an article by Douglass North (in effect, his Nobel Prize in Economics lecture at the award ceremony in 1993), in which North speaks, in connection with informal institutions, of such things as norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct, and their enforcement characteristics. Vitaly Tambovtsev draws the conclusion that North follows the sociological definition of informality (p. 6).

Indeed, informal institutions have had no luck with specific definitions. Even in the most prestigious publications on institutional theory, it is often impossible to find a clear definition of informal institutions or even simply to get a comprehensive idea of what they are. The author cites a number of sources where considerable attention is paid to the study of the nature and structure of informal institutions. At the same time, Tambovtsev himself has made a significant contribution to this area. According to his definition, “informal institutions are those that include *non-specialized* enforcement mechanisms” (p. 45).

The author classifies informal institutions by two attributes at once: form of enforcement (non-specialized) and form of representation (mental or system). Informal institutions can occur in two cases:

- (1) when the non-specialized form of enforcement is combined with mental representation (implicit understanding shared by the members of some community), and
- (2) when the non-specialized form of enforcement is combined with system representation, which includes both external symbolic representation and internal mental representation (pp. 45-46).

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This review was first published in Russian in the journal *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 6, 2015, under the title “To Understand the Informal (On the Book by V. L. Tambovtsev *Economics of Informal Institutions*)” (abridged).

In addition, the main claim made in the book under review is that the indignation and even anger causing the intention to punish those who violate informal institutional constraints are an effect of cognitive dissonance, or frustration caused by inconsistency between expectations and the actual state of affairs (p. 50). Incidentally, such a definition of informal institutions implies that the informality of an institution depends on the state of the social system.

The author's desire to distinguish informal institutions from the related concepts often used to define them deserves recognition. These concepts include social norms, values, practices, culture, social capital, and trust. Some of the author's arguments against this conceptual confusion sound convincing, while others require further study or clarification. Here is the main problem.

If we define informal institutions as a phenomenon that amateurs (actors not affiliated with the government function) are ready to protect and whose rules they are ready to enforce, we can also expect them to be ready to act in a similar way towards related concepts. For example, according to Tambovtsev, values are certainly not informal institutions: they are generalized characteristics of the states of individuals that give them satisfaction or pleasure (p. 80). But what if someone acting outside the scope of their official (professional) duties decides to enforce values on others and voluntarily acts as their guarantor?

The chapter on the methods of analysis of informal institutions (their detection, identification and measurement) is probably of particular interest to those involved in such research. They will find a detailed overview of different approaches to each component of the above triad. The author's general conclusion is as follows: "Overall, a comparison of currently known methods for detecting and identifying informal institutions and phenomena associated with them leads to the conclusion that the former are more developed than the latter. As for measurement of informal institutions, the situation here is ambiguous" (p. 117).

Without going into the specific questions that arise in the study of informal institutions, let me note that experimental economics is destined to keep running into the problem of uncertainty of results due to the fact that participants in the experiment are aware of the game nature of the process (experiments with animals are free of this shortcoming because animals cannot distinguish a game from reality). Take the "public goods game" discussed in the book. According to experimental data presented by the author, players are prepared to contribute 50% of their income to a public pot provided they get a certain share of the contribution of all other players (pp. 109, 111). But in reality even religious communes fall apart due to the free rider effect (Canada's Doukhobors, literally "Spirit-Warriors of Christ," are a case in point), not to mention other heterogeneous territorial communities not connected by a common idea.

Identifying the social norm based on the game decisions of people is difficult and often impossible. It appears that sociologists and especially anthropologists, who give priority to participant observation as the main method of studying the behavior of people in their natural environment (often through the eyes of a researcher pretending to be an insider), have a much more effective method for studying informal institutions than economists, who seek to imitate the meth-

ods used in the natural sciences. Unfortunately, although one of the undeniable merits of Tambovtsev's book is that it goes far beyond the scope of economics in the analysis of human behavior models (in particular, by turning to the achievements of psychology), participant observation is not included among the considered methods for studying informal institutions.

The second and, in my subjective view, most interesting part of the book is devoted to the life cycle of informal institutions: their emergence, functioning and change. As regards their emergence, Tambovtsev identifies two basic variants: spontaneous appearance and deliberate introduction. As the author rightly emphasizes, revealing the content of the former is a very difficult matter. In his opinion, "*spontaneously* arising norms of behavior are 'geared,' by the very mechanism of their genesis, to realize the *private* interests of the individual with the maximum potential for violence." At the same time, if this norm meets the interests of other individuals, it will be socially effective (p. 131).

It is difficult to agree with this thesis. In all likelihood, the spontaneous appearance of institutions is not geared to anyone's interests "by the very mechanism of their genesis." It is *an unintended consequence*. An example of this approach is the well-known book by Deepak Lal, *Unintended Consequences* (1998) [1], where the emergence of institutions conducive to the development of capitalism (in this case, it does not matter whether these institutions are formal or informal) is viewed precisely in this light. And who will benefit from these unintended institutional consequences will be decided automatically *ex post*. As for voluntary arrangements, Tambovtsev rightly notes that as a mechanism for creating institutions they are applicable only to small groups.

The functioning of institutions is considered in the book based on models of human behavior. Readers can see for themselves that economics in this area is much poorer than social psychology. Economists among the readers will be truly amazed at the author's knowledge of socio-psychological models. For economists, such models are *terra incognita*. Were it not for the psychologist Daniel Kahneman, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002, the section on human behavior in economic theory would have consisted of two or three sentences describing the notorious *homo economicus*, or *Max U*, as Deirdre McCloskey contemptuously calls this figure.

Let me note Tambovtsev's classification of types of interaction between formal and informal institutions, with emphasis not only on the schemes themselves, but also on the finally appearing case studies.

The concept of institutional entrepreneurship (IE), elaborated by Tambovtsev, is of particular interest in the theory of institutional change. There is every reason to support the basic tenet about the endogenous nature of the forces that determine the actions of a person as an institutional entrepreneur. For Tambovtsev, the driving force here is knowledge: "subjective information represented in the structures of the brain" (p. 170). Changes in knowledge direct the actions of people towards institutional change, thus generating IE.

In this context, the author criticizes North for his view of changes in relative prices as the most important source of institutional change (pp. 161-163), that is,

an exogenous source (external to the individual). At the same time, let me note that North's views changed over time. Tambovtsev refers to his work published in 1990 [2]. Later on, in a book entitled *Understanding the Process of Economic Change* [3], North altered his position, shifting the focus to beliefs.

All in all, one can say that Tambovtsev has fully achieved what he himself called the main purpose of his book: to show that a purely economic analysis of informal institutions will always be incomplete and that it is necessary to draw on the results of other sciences studying human behavior. He has also achieved the second purpose of his book: to attract the attention of economists to incorporating traditionally "non-economic" categories into economic analysis (pp. 172, 174).

I would also like to draw attention to a fundamentally important point in the study: the conclusion about the need to abandon the deterministic picture of the world, which is inseparable from the standard economic approach. The author notes that the world is *stochastic*: along with risks, measured by probabilities, there is room in it for uncertainty, which makes the results of human activity unpredictable (p. 173). Thus, the author agrees, at least in part, with the world view of members of the Austrian school of economics, who have insisted, ever since the days of Ludwig von Mises, precisely on uncertainty and unpredictability. Or, in the words of Nassim Taleb, the author of the famous book *The Black Swan* [4], the world "is dominated by the extreme, the unknown, and the very improbable."

The general conclusion is as follows: if we accept the view of Arjo Klamer that economics is simply a conversation, then we have to admit that the conversation has proved to be meaningful, intense and informative. Any economist (and not only) who wants to take part in the conversation about informal institutions will find this book indispensable.

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4. Taleb N. *The Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable*. New York: Random House, 2007.

**A. Zaostrovtssev**

*Translated by Yevgeniya Lipinskaya*

**О. ШКАРАТАН, В. ЛЕКСИН, Г. ЯСТРЕБОВ (ред.).**  
**Россия как цивилизация: материалы**  
**к размышлению. М.: Редакция журнала**  
**«Мир России», 2015, 464 с.**

**O. SHKARATAN, V. LEKSIN, G. YASTREBOV (eds.).**  
***Russia as a Civilization: Materials for Reflection.***  
**Moscow: Mir Rossii, Editorial Office, 2015, 464 pp.**

The discussion on the choice of Russia's path of development, which began more than two hundred years ago, is still relevant today and is acquiring new meanings and logic. Central to this discussion is the question of what civilization Russia belongs to. The answer to this question determines the possible vectors of transformations. The contribution made to this discussion by the authors of the monograph *Russia as a Civilization: Materials for Reflection* edited by Ovsey Shkaratan, Vladimir Leksin and Gordey Yastrebov can hardly be overestimated. The book seeks to gain insights into the institutional, cultural, historical and geopolitical dynamics of Russia in the context of current civilizational studies. As the subtitle of the book suggests, the monograph offers materials for reflection. This means that the authors of the chapters written on the basis of papers presented at the seminar "Types of Civilizations and the Character of Socioeconomic Development" and published articles do not purport to pass the final verdict on the problems under consideration. Being aware of their extreme complexity and multifaceted character, they are looking to present different approaches to the solution and thus engage the reader in further discussion of the topic.

The articles focus on the key challenges facing modern social studies and on the development of Russia as a civilization in the context of these challenges. In accordance with the optimistic conviction that prevailed in the 20th century, modernization based on gradual transition to an industrial market economy, political democracy, liberal values accompanied by the leveling of sociocultural and civilizational differences has a "universal" character. In the context of the modernization theories the concept of "civilization" began to lose its original meaning of opposing developed societies to barbaric ones, i.e., in modern vocabulary, backward societies which have yet to make "the right" sociohistorical

choice. For a while the discourse of “catch-up” modernization was predominant in social thought, which reflected the main trends of the development of the Third World and post-Soviet societies in the 20th century.

The rival discourse, asserting that civilizations are multiple and the matrices of cultural and institutional development cannot be reduced to Westernization and “catch-up” modernization going back to the ideas of Nikolay Danilewski, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee were pushed in the 20th century to the margins of social theory. Beginning from the middle of the century it was promoted by the few opponents of modernization and champions of original paths of development, such as the theories of Buddhist or Islamic economies. It was not until the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries that the ideas of multiple forms of modern civilization and the existence of a non-European modern civilization gained wide currency in the academic community and posed a real challenge to the idea of “catch-up” modernization.

In the context of the competition between mono- and multi-linear approaches the issue of the specificities of the institutional and cultural system of Russian society and the path of postsocialist development takes the shape of a choice between “catch-up” modernization and the corresponding Western-style value-related and institutional transformations and Russia as a distinct civilization which, like China, India and Japan, can find its own path to modernity. The contributors to the monograph repeatedly stress that the postsocialist transit of the Central and East European countries, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other former Soviet Union countries, while sharing the overall direction and content of reforms, reveals specificities determined by the civilization features of each of them.

The linear paradigm of “catch-up” modernization Russia adopted in the 1990s resulted in the emerging socioeconomic structures diverging from the logic of development dictated by its civilizational identity. The materials of empirical studies cited by the authors, suggest that the reason for the worsening conditions of individual development in post-Soviet Russia against the background of other post-Soviet societies and the CEE countries was the discrepancy between the quality of human capital which is determined by civilizational affiliation and the character of the institutions called upon to ensure its growth. That discrepancy accounts for the inefficiencies of the state social and cultural policies which are not making Russian society more viable. Thus, the borrowing of Western development models, far from creating modern economic and political institutions, turned out to be an obstacle to increasing Russia’s human, creative and innovative potential.

In the 2000s the need began to be increasingly felt for a new methodology and set of categories for understanding the specificities of the historical development and institutional order in Russia. Scholars have been more and more attracted to the civilizational multilinear approach as a discourse that is a viable alternative to the linear “catch-up” modernization. The civilizational paradigm came to be regarded as a methodology that could not just reveal the features of Russia’s institutional and sociocultural development in the historical retrospect.

tive, but identify the causes of the problems and contradictions of post-Soviet transformations and possible future vectors.

The questions of the civilizational specificities of Russia's development raised by the authors determined its central *methodological* problem: bringing out the analytical meaning of the category of civilization in contemporary social studies. An entire chapter in the monograph is devoted to the diverse approaches to the study of the phenomenon of civilization, which is the subject matter of many sciences, including history, sociology, social philosophy, etc. Each of them singles out one area connected with individual aspects of the phenomenon, but none is capable of capturing the whole of it, which is why multiple and even alternative approaches to civilization studies can be expected. At the same time comparative analysis and systematization of various concepts enable the authors to identify a number of universals on the basis of which the irreducible variety of the world of civilizations can be studied by applying a single category apparatus. Such universals include the systems of values ("the spiritual nucleus," "cultural program," "motivating values," etc.), the psychological make-up and mentality, language and the language picture of the world, religion, specific institutions that shape and reproduce political, social, economic relations, etc. It is an open-ended list which can be enlarged depending on the cognitive attitudes, the goals and subject matter of the study.

It has to be noted that in their sociological interpretation of the concept of "civilization" the authors turn to the theoretical legacy of Max Weber. That recognized classic of sociology did not use the word "civilization" in the plural form, but his analysis of specific forms of rationalization characteristic of world religions makes it possible to identify civilizational communities united by a shared picture of the world, that is, ideas of the world, their assessments and proneness to specific ways of acting in daily life. Although sociologists more commonly interpret Weber's ideas in the spirit of Talcott Parsons as monilinear development, his works devoted to non-Western societies might just as well justify a multilinear approach based on the specificities of rationalization in various societies.

The authors do not fail to notice, however, that the heuristic potential of the civilization theory has not been fully tapped by modern sociology. Although the monograph under review here is an interdisciplinary study its approaches can arguably help to quicken the interest of sociologists in the cognitive potential of the concept of civilization. In particular, the analysis of the link between the civilizational foundations of society and its institutional system, social structure and conditions for human development appears to be a promising avenue of research into the specificities of postsocialist transit of the Central and Eastern Europe and CIS countries.

Civilizational analysis implies above all identifying the "value nucleus" of a civilization, its spiritual and symbolic foundations. In the case of the Russian civilization such analysis is conducted in several directions each fruitful in its own way. In keeping with the tradition of the civilization-based approach the authors look at the specificities of religion, Orthodox spirituality and its impact on the

sociohistorical development through a specific understanding of nature, the essence of the individual and the meaning of life. Civilizational analysis of Russian society regards Orthodox values as motivators that legitimize a certain mode of actions stemming from the idea of the place and role of man in the Universe.

A profound analysis of Orthodox anthropology leads the authors to the conclusion that it is oriented towards “escape from the world,” renunciation of mundane daily concerns and joys for the sake of transcendental salvation, which “is not conducive to the development of earthly activism and a sense of responsibility for what is taking place nowadays.” (p. 230). Denial of the religious, soteriological significance of daily life in the Orthodox tradition does not merely rob it of its spiritual and moral value, but results in the absence of specific religious regulation. Economic, political and social activities are outside religious and ethical framework and therefore are not regulated by shared spiritual and moral principles.

In line with Weber’s approach to the analysis of the role of religion in economic modernization of society, the authors claim that “Russian Orthodoxy did not provide higher spiritual sanctions for active work in the earthly world,” which accounts for the nonmarket quality of the Russian national character (p. 132). The authors share the widespread opinion that orientation towards inner spiritual and moral improvement, which forms the nucleus of the Orthodox concept of Salvation, has downgraded the value of labor and entrepreneurial activities, as well as innovativeness, and has generated a tolerant and compassionate attitude to poverty. On the whole the Orthodox ethics contributed to the reproduction of a redistributive economic culture.

The analysis of the historical material by the authors attests that the Russian Orthodox worldview determines the adherence to the symphony of the Church and the state, so characteristic of Russian society. The impact of Orthodoxy on the reproduction of the ideology of state paternalism was partly due to the tradition of the subjugation of the church to the secular authorities inherited from Byzantium and greatly reinforced during the Russian Middle Ages. The authors note the current revival of the Church-State symphony centered on cooperation in educating citizens and protecting human rights interpreted above all as the right to fulfill oneself spiritually in the bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church and not in the spirit of liberal values.

The special place of the state and state paternalism in the civilizational system of Russia is stressed by practically all scholars, including the contributors to this monograph. This can be traced to the specifics of the historical development and geographical position of Russia that faced our society with exceptional challenges. The mobilization and defense function of the state prompted the need for monopolization of the state control of some basic sectors of the economy. A major factor contributing to the formation of the mobilization system was the harsh natural and climatic conditions that increased economic risks in Medieval Russia. The great role of the state in the economic life of Medieval Russia is seen by the authors as grounds for referring our society to the so-called “Asiatic mode of production” whose key feature is the fusion of power and property.

The authors do not believe that it is realistic for modern Russia to become part of Western civilization not only because it is in thrall to its past, but also because the Western civilization is fast losing its attractiveness against the background of intensive economic and sociocultural growth of societies belonging to Eastern civilizations, mainly the Confucian part, and partly the Islamic part. The authors draw an interesting and promising conclusion that Russia does not merely identify itself as a distinct civilization, but can derive benefits from the situation of institutional competition between East and West.

The authors consider Russia to be a representative of the Eurasian civilization and note that in the 20 post-Soviet years of economic reform only those CIS countries have achieved “relatively positive results” which have opted against copying the “European way” and have chosen the “Eurasian way,” as did Belarus and Kazakhstan (p. 62). Their experience, and even more so the far more spectacular achievements in modernizing China, Singapore, Malaysia and other countries prompts the conclusion that Russia has an opportunity to create a modern information economy based on market and free enterprise without renouncing its civilization foundations and existing political institutions and social structure even if they appear to be authoritarian and archaic from the Western point of view. What is needed for such development is real economic freedom, social equality, political transparency and security of the personality, which is impossible without first creating democratic institutions and embracing liberal values.

I would go along with the position of the authors that success of further socioeconomic transformations in our country would depend on the existence of social forces capable of reversing the situation in the confrontation between comprador and national capital, bringing about a social consensus around the idea of increased creative endeavor, the development of a modern information economy on the basis of the values and sociopolitical structures of the Eurasian civilization. The challenge facing scholars is still the diagnosis of the state of the Russian civilization and the vectors of its transformation in the modern world. This is all the more important because the global character of modern world development demands that Russia determine its own civilizational identity as a part to global communications, “and assert itself as a civilization clearly and unambiguously,” something it has yet to do (p. 83). The monograph *Russia as a Civilization: Materials for Reflection* makes a tangible contribution to the solution of these problems.

**N. Zarubina**

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

**И. МАКСИМЫЧЕВ. Россия и Германия. Война и мир. От мировых войн к европейской безопасности. М.: Книжный мир, 2014, 512 с.**

**I. MAKSIMYCHEV. *Russia and Germany. War and Peace. From World Wars to European Security.* Moscow: Knizhny mir, 2014, 512 pp.**

Igor Maksimychev divided his book into 40 chapters; some of them—the chapters dealing with “displaced art” (“looted art”) or Germany’s national problems in the context of an analysis of Thilo Sarrazin’s *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany abolishes itself)—differ from the rest. In certain respects the book looks a bit patchy (as Nataliya Narochnitskaya has justly noted in her Introduction) yet the picture geared to the author’s consistently exposed political position remains integral. It is based on the idea of Russia and Germany as two power poles in Europe. He writes that their relationships “determined the political atmosphere in Europe and, until recently, in the world” (p. 21). I. Maksimychev respects the German people and dreams about a politically united Europe in which Russia and Germany will play the leading roles: “In all times, cooperation between Germany and Russia was and remains a *sine qua non* of sustainable peace in Europe” (p. 477). This explains the author’s close interest in how the Russians and Russia are perceived in Germany. Their image is closely connected with the history of both countries.

The author proceeded from the history of the Russian-German relations (highly ambiguous or even tragic) or, rather from the stretch of their relationships that began in 1914 World War, to arrive at making wide-scale generalizations. He polemicizes with the historians who, together with Eric Hobsbawm, used the term “the short 20th century” to describe the period between 1914 and 1991. Igor Maksimychev states that the century has not yet ended so long as the Cold War echo can still be heard in speeches of prominent politicians (p. 18). This logic can be contested since the disintegration of the world socialist system can be regarded, with good grounds, as the end of an age of ideological confrontation (“the age of extremes,” according to Hobsbawm). The “short 20th century” perfectly fits the traditional European periodization of the history of the Modern Times that began in the 17th century and consisted of alterations of long and short centuries. Reunification of Germany was an important reckoning point in German history and in the history of Russian-German relations.

On the other hand, Igor Maksimychev's resolute refusal to accept "the short 20th century" concept leaves the monograph unfinished and, therefore, riveted to our days. The author does not give grounds to expect negative developments of bilateral relations: he relied on historical evidence to prove that they have normally been sustainable, tightly closed and mutually advantageous. He has to admit, however, that an influential part of the German ruling class is anti-Russian (p. 386). In his attempt to tie together the recent 100 years of joint Russian-German history Igor Maksimychev relies on the thesis that Russia and Germany are united in many respects and that there are practically no factors that might disunite them (p. 477). Some of the Russian experts on Germany disagree with this thesis as an illusion for which Russia had to pay dearly many times. It seems that these disagreements have lost much of their relevance: today Germany's foreign policy is part of European and Euroatlantic policy and is gradually merging with it. Back in 2001, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (the author has highly assessed his contribution to Russia-Germany bilateral relations) described his country's Russian policy as a component part of Europe's Eastern policy [3]. Speaking at the 2014 Munich Security Conference the leading German politicians confirmed that responsible foreign policy of their country was geared to its allied duties within the EU and NATO as absolute priorities; this is confirmed by Berlin's position on Crimea.

The current developments add importance to the educational and enlightening aims; the author speaks about his book as a contribution to the struggle against the "self-denigrating" sentiments and the nihilist attitude to Russia's present and past; he strives to restore objective assessments of Russia's history (p. 490).

I. Maksimychev opposes the anti-Russian mythology widespread in the West with his own countermyth in which Russia is invariably right and unappreciated. In view of the fact that anti-Russian views are widespread the countermyth might prove useful; it might balance out the anti-Russian sentiments or become an antidote. The way the author has interpreted certain episodes of World War I offers the best example of his methodological approach: he hypertrophies Russia's positive role in that war. Thus he somewhat exaggerated the role Russia played in saving France, particularly, in France's victory in the Battle of the Marne in 1914. Together with Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhaylovich he explains the victory by the fact that the Germans removed two corps and one cavalry division from the Western Front to strengthen their positions in the east. In his *Memoirs* the Grand Duke pointed to the fact that General Aleksandr Samsonov had deliberately allowed himself to be trapped by Erich Ludendorff. In fact, Samsonov's army had been routed even before the forces removed from the Western Front were deployed in the east. Removal of German divisions from the west to East Prussia helped the allies win the Battle of the Marne yet it was not the only reason of the German defeat. Supplies were moved across Belgium that was a far from easy task, while the French had strengthened their army. On its side, when planning an offensive in Prussia, Russia did not plan a defeat (this is amply proved by the Battle of Gumbinnen). The Russian offensive of 1916 known as the Brusilov Offensive was undertaken within the strategic plan of the Entente for 1916, rather than to save France, and it took into account the shortage of shells in 1915.

The author's involvement in the political discourse has forced him to silence

certain successively exposed facts. He has written about the Germans who lived in Russia but said nothing about the numerous Russian émigré community and its important role in the cultural life of Berlin in the 1920s. It seems that this was done deliberately to avoid references to the domestic policy of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). While arguing with the concept of totalitarianism the author says nothing about Stalinist repressions carried out against people of certain nationalities, Germans included. He writes that those who compare the regimes of Stalin and Hitler should separate the outer side of the dictatorship from its inner meaning. He has correctly pointed to the fundamental difference between Soviet internationalism and the genocide organized by the Nazis. He has the following to say about fascist dictatorship: "At all footsteps of the ladder of power there were big and small '*führers*' appointed from above and slavishly devoted to the '*great Führer*'" (p. 262). It seems that with minor readjustments this can be applied to Soviet realities of the 1930s filled with the fear of the Great Terror.

The book is brimming with little known facts of the history of Russia-Germany relationships the author used to make profound generalizations of his integrated interpretation of historical processes. I completely agree with I. Maksimychev, who writes that the pernicious effects of the catastrophe of 1914 have not yet been fully assessed for the history of the humankind. His diagnosis of Soviet foreign policy of the 1920s as political schizophrenia deserves attention: the illness was rooted in the struggle between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs headed by Georgy Chicherin and the Comintern headed by Grigory Zinovyev. In the chapter entitled "Foreign Policy Dualism" the author completely justifies Stalin's foreign policy activity as adequate.

The author has formulated a very original idea about an interconnection between the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Treaty of Versailles: "The conditions of the Treaty of Versailles would have not been so harsh had Germany behaved in a more civilized way in Brest-Litovsk" (p. 64).

Igor Maksimychev has covered the history of Germany after the Second World War in detail and proved beyond doubt that the West was guilty of the country's division. He polemicizes with contemporary German historians who do not hesitate to distort the history of the German Democratic Republic. An analysis of the political and social life in the GDR is closely connected with the political situation in the Soviet Union, which can be described as a strong side of the monograph. The author's opinion that throughout its existence the GDR remained in the focus of the Soviet Union's foreign policy is less clearly stated.

The Section "The Forgotten Friends" reminds one of the drama of *perestroika* and its fateful repercussions for Russia-German relations: it points to the fact that the Soviet/Russian leaders abandoned their former allies, the German Communists, to their fate. The author offers an opinion of the reunification of Germany as seen from the GDR, something that cannot be found in works of contemporary Russian historians. He has generalized the main provisions of his earlier monographs *The Fall of the Berlin Wall. Notes of Minister-Counselor of the USSR Embassy in Berlin* [1] and *The Last Year of the GDR* [2].

It should be said that the book is not free from certain shortcomings probably inevitable in a monograph of this scope. For example, the Prussians are called Slavs

(pp. 29, 399) while the academic science relates them to the Baltic tribes. In some places a too concise exposition might create false impressions. This relates, for example, to the description of migrations of German tribes: "In the Age of Great Migration of Peoples, starting with the late third millennium BC the Indo-European ancestors of Germans having crossed Europe from the east to the west reached La Manche; they they turned back to the east pushing the ancestors of the Slavs that were moving behind them even further to the east" (p. 29). Real dynamics was slightly different though it can hardly be fitted into one sentence. The Yastorf Culture that archeologists relate to the earlier Germans appeared in the 8th century BC on the territory now occupied by Denmark and neighboring territories. While moving to the rich lands of Rome German tribes crossed Slav-populated lands leaving numerous linguistic evidence in the Russian language and in the legends that survived as parts of *The Lay of Igor's Host*. The notorious *Drang nach Osten* and assimilation of Western Slavs began not earlier than the Carolingian Empire. The author was obviously unwilling to overburden the book with numerous minor details yet these inaccuracies look lamentable in the otherwise good book.

The monograph has another and no less important advantage: the author, who was directly involved in the historical process demonstrated consistency and integrity and made no attempt to inflate his own role in the events described. For 36 years Igor Maksimychev was employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; during 17 years he worked at the embassies of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation in the FRG and GDR. He could have enriched his analysis of the published documents with his recollections and with what he had heard from other people directly involved in political decision-making during the reunification of Germany. He has avoided the temptation to stress his own contribution and to criticize some of his former colleagues. He never tries to avoid his own responsibility for the past but is convinced that it is "his duty as an eyewitness and participant in the tragedy of global dimensions" (p. 13) to describe the events and to "pass on to the next generations the baton of an undistorted picture of the light and dark days of the past" (p. 483). Due to his professional experience he has somewhat overestimated the role of the Russia-German relationships yet he has remained absolutely sincere in his feelings and judgments.

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2. Maksimychev I. F., Hans Modrow. *The Last Year of the GDR*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1993.
3. Schroeder G. "Deutsche Russlandpolitik—europäische Ostpolitik." *Die Zeit*. 2001. No. 15.

**N. Meden**

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**Москва в годы Первой мировой войны.  
1914—1917 гг. Документы и материалы.  
М.: ГБУ «ЦГА Москвы», 2014, 1104с., илл.**

***Moscow During World War I. 1914-1917.  
Documents and Records. Moscow:  
GBU "TSGA Moskvу," 2014, 1104 pp., ill.***

A great city in a “Great” war is the subject of a collection of documents put out by The Central Government Archives of Moscow in accordance with a Federal *Plan of Keynote Events to Mark the Centenary of the Start of World War I*. This 1,000-page work combining research and journalism contains 800 documents and newspaper reports, 1,400 names—most of which are supplied with biographical notes—and original illustrations.

Ye. Alekseyeva, the executive editor, notes in the Introduction that the book represents an attempt to show Moscow as a “vivid” example of “selfless public cohesion” in the face of war-generated upheavals, brings out an invaluable lesson of history and highlights an “instructive experience” delving in effect into “the most important aspects of everyday life concerning the government, civil society and individuals across Russia” (p. 12). It is only natural, therefore, that the titles of the book’s sections containing thematic groups of documents bear emotion-charged dicta in the form of quotes from works by Anna Akhmatova, Valery Bryusov, Aleksandr Vertinsky or from the sources quoted in the book themselves. The compilers’ task becomes complicated by their desire to adapt the work to academic needs as well. This requires the observance of all standards of archeography, which inevitably means that a quite narrow circle of specialists could have access to the work. In any case the fact that the libraries now have such a comprehensive set of sources means that the sources could be used for ideological and educational as well as scientific purposes on a broader scale. The compilers have achieved both goals they set themselves.

The choice of documents reflects a modern approach to covering society’s state and life in conditions of the “Great” war. It is radically different from the standard scheme typical of documentary materials published in the age of “historical materialism.” The first priority is given to materials indicating the desire of various social circles to help the war effort at the front and ease the plight of the wounded, refugees and poverty-stricken people rather than those showing war-related social tribulations or manifestations of class conflicts or clashes

between different social groups. The spotlight is on the traditionally leading role of gentry in Moscow's affairs (this is also characteristic of the current state of historiography), notably courtiers, the Church and the merchants. There is no doubt that it is those social groups that held power in the city.

The absence of favorable conditions for the emergence of a truly social milieu in city life is just as evident. This is because of such a permanent centuries-old feature of the situation of the people of "all of Russia" as the pervasive tradition of control and tutelage over the everyday life of "the younger brother"—myriads of poverty-stricken and alienated people.

The war situation gave rise to noble impulses among some business and intellectual circles, who wanted to assume many of the costs easing the situation of the city's distressed population through charity, donations and direct participation in the work of medical and social services. The documents published in the book demonstrate the personal attempts of those circles to compensate for the failure of the administrative vertical to take responsibility and provide material assistance to "the little ones," a vertical that used to imitate and advertize its own concern for people in distress while shunning anything that looked like an initiative taken without regard for the authorities.

Each initiative by community representatives required consent and permission from provincial or city administrative, police or military authorities. The Moscow Slavonic Committee called for a fundraising campaign for the Montenegrins and Serbs ("consanguine brothers of the same faith"), but it could not have taken this initiative of its own accord: "Reported to the assistant superintendant of the Moscow Mayor's office. Permission obtained," says the instruction on the petition (quoted on Page 587). Even such an undoubtedly "godly" and humanitarian landmark as the famous All-Saints (Brotherly) Cemetery could not have been founded at the time on the city's outskirts without the explicit permission of the emperor. The documents of the section "Shining Deeds" reproduce in detail the entire organizational history of the memorial, emphasizing the role of Grand duchesses, princes and some courtiers in that righteous deed. The same section (pp. 953-954) features an excerpt from a list of buried people in February—November 1915. It contains only the names of Army officers and nurses. This angle of view is predetermined not only by the character of identified documents but also by the very spirit permeating the hierarchical perception of world order of the time. This kind of perception affects the work of historians and publishers. Some of the documents are redundantly quoted in full in this and other sections. They might have been more appropriately used as a basis for the notes or quoted in the introductory article.

In early September 1914 the Mayor was evidently concerned about the prospect of "large-scale disturbances" as he described "the horrific situation of the wounded in Moscow: currently there are more than 35,000 of them there. There are no beds for them in the hospitals. Many of them walk the streets in robes, begging for alms from passersby... The way military superiors have organized the evacuation of wounded convalescents is abominable" [2, p. 546]. Judging by the documents contained in the book, the city's authorities focused their efforts on helping the wounded (the provision of hospitals and ambulance trains) and the refugees. They demonstrated ingenuity in organizing numerous cam-

paigns to collect winter clothing and other “gifts” to be sent to the battle zone. That was indeed what Muscovites of all walks of life could do in response to the military disaster. The common folks were doing what they could to mend the miscalculations of the military authorities, the Red Cross, and the Empire’s quartermasters who had failed to prepare the Army for war.

Considering that citizens who had been deprived of normal earnings, as well as refugees and disabled people were being provided with means of subsistence at sewing workshops run by the city authorities. The workshops made underwear and uniforms for the soldiers. The need for such improvisations in organizing supplies for the front was interpreted as a manifestation of high morality, helpful care and patriotic solicitous concern for the motherland’s defenders. Trainloads of mostly symbolic “gifts” for the soldiers were sent from Moscow (as well as from Petrograd) during Christmas in 1914 and Easter in 1915. Improvised military supplies in themselves could not save the situation while their shortage was only partially offset by millions of meters of cloth, leather work pieces, and hundreds of thousands of pairs of footwear supplied from overseas; business enterprises in Moscow were behind the supplies; the central authorities had to accept their assistance, but were trying in every way to control and curtail truly public activity whenever it manifested itself.

The city authorities were fully aware of the real meaning of the public initiative and they also knew that the central authorities would resist it. From the very beginning they realized that “the quartermasters and the war department in general as well as the Ministry of Interior will not cope with the task entrusted to them; this is fraught with the threat of the Army being deprived of what it needs”; there was no doubt that the authorities would “never agree” to provide independent organizations with “corresponding rights,” with the result that their work “will have no practical meaning” [2, pp. 642, 543, 535-536, 580-581, 654]. Nevertheless, the government had to yield to the public initiative.

Most of the activists in the city’s independent trusteeship organizations catering to the poor were “democratic elements (school and university students, female students/medical assistants, employees of trade and industrial enterprises, etc.)” they could be called “manual workers among social workers” who received no rewards for their efforts. “Since the employees do this work amidst people embittered by poverty, it requires from them a high degree of selflessness because love for a fellow creature is its only stimulus and a sense of fulfilled duty is their only reward. He who looks for popularity and a desire to satisfy his vanity in social work will never engage in trusteeship; nor will undertake trusteeship activity those who resort to phrasemongering instead of doing real work.” That is how the employees of the organizations concerned saw their situation (p. 684). For their part, the church authorities were creating their own trusteeships through fundraising campaigns among philanthropists and parishioners in churches and parishes, and in thus they sought to bar agencies other than those belonging to “the church department” from collecting donations (pp. 687-688, 727-733). But by the end of 1916 even the clergy were expressing doubts about “parishioners being hardly ready to heed the call for donations as before: the people were shouldering too heavy expenses with the exacerbation of the current situation” (p.739). Evidence

pointing to the harsh situation of the workers (and Moscow's population in general) crop up in numerous materials concerning trusteeship and philanthropy. They are borne out by reports summing up wages—which were considerably lower than the rate of inflation.

As a result of the compilers' desire to break with old stereotypes, materials reflecting Moscow's wartime industrial development hold a modest place in the book. The principal role in the war economy was played by the Moscow region and regions (*gubernias*) associated with Moscow: Vladimir, Vologda, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan, Smolensk and Tver. Those regions were on a par with the industrial potential of the Petrograd region and Baltic countries. For that reason it is hard to understand why Moscow-related materials on the subject occupy little space. The very active Association of Factory Owners and Manufacturers of the Moscow region is mentioned only in a few documents.

The workers' movement was evidently extinguished. The book mentions only a few wartime strikes. Some of them get only a brief mention in half a dozen documents. In any case they do not paint the whole picture. In a sense this is a new solution of the issue. By ignoring the modern approach to the issue the compilers have in fact doomed themselves to underestimating the role of the police force in the city's life. P. 342 bears the Mayor's order concerning "workers leaving the workplace without permission" in war-related industries. A note to this document elaborates: unlike in Germany, in Russia a free workforce market was still in existence, that is to say, workers had not been deprived of the right to change workplaces (to the displeasure of Moscow industrialists—see the document on p. 340). But what the Mayor had in mind was something different: Article 1359 of the Criminal Code to which the Mayor referred in his order did not allow workers to strike rather than ban them from changing enterprises. In Germany the workers of war industrial enterprises liable for conscription could change their jobs too, provided they received consent from a special committee representing an equal number of factory owners and labor union members [1, p. 13477]. In Moscow labor unions could play no such role because of their absence.

Two telltale final documents stand out—they somehow rehabilitate the coverage of industrial life in the second capital (pp. 403-409): one contains the outcry of the Moscow Stock-Exchange Committee over the ongoing deep fuel crisis, with crucial wartime plants closing down one after another. The outcry was aimed at the Minister of Railroads on February 4, 1917. For the same reason the Stock-Exchange Committee also compiled "list of enterprises announcing work stoppages" (February 21, 1917).

Pages 734-736 quote the *Moskovskiy tserkovnyye vedomosti* newspaper as giving a colorful description of the icon-bearing procession in the Kremlin on May 27, 1916 to mark the sendoff of a miracle-working icon to the front. "The long crimson ribbon of the clergy walking in pairs was in the focus of the procession. The route from the Assumption Cathedral to the Spassky Gates was lined with units of the Moscow garrison and brass bands. As the procession moved along, the bands struck up the hymn *How Glorious Is Our Lord in Zion*, with the troops 'presenting arms.'" That was followed by a prayer service pleading for a gift of victory. The crimson velvet vestments of the clergy bore the image of "the Cross of Christ with

the inscription *Thus We Will Win.*” Undoubtedly what was meant was victory not only over obvious infidels but also over brethren in Christ. But what about the Lutheran Church? Did it call for the annihilation of the impudent enemy during the years of the fratricidal war? The volume supplies no answer to that question.

It is regrettable that the somewhat graceless headings of the documents (most of the headings were formulated by the compilers) and obscure graphics make the book less intelligible.

The absence of a historical map makes itself felt too. A table translating the city’s old placenames into today’s language would likewise have been to the point. The occasional explanation in commentaries does not solve the problem as a whole. The predilection for organizational, prescriptive and propaganda materials at the expense of materials reflecting real practice with its problems and contradictions seems to be of little use. There is a controversial choice of sources and their dating. The authors’ suggestions as to how text gaps could be filled in are likewise open to doubt. The book also contains inaccurate commentaries and names mentioned.

As for the choice of documents, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the work to publish documents concerning the subject reflected in the book’s title is only in its initial phase although a hundred years have passed since those times. I agree with Ye. Alekseyeva who says that “up until now nothing has been done to undertake a comprehensive study and publication of the vast mass of documents that have been kept in the funds of the Central State Archives of the city of Moscow although a hundred years have passed since that time” (p. 13). The issue cannot be resolved through the publication of just one albeit such an important, book. A more labor-consuming undertaking might well be envisioned for the future. Once the jubilee time trouble becomes a thing of the past, such useful work will apparently be carried on.

There is an obvious need to reveal a set of documents reflecting even more forcibly the real state of the lifestyle of the mass of Moscow’s population. As is already seen from the collection under review, the state of affairs in that sphere was determined by objective conditions as well as by the aspirations of bureaucratic, social and pseudosocial establishments and by the activities of benefactors and the clergy. Moscow’s historians and archivists will have every opportunity to undertake this sort of work. As a result, the picture of the people of Muscovites of all walks of life demonstrating cohesion in the face of war might become less one-dimensional. In any case, the combination of realities that shaped the everyday life of Muscovites in those “interesting” and indeed instructive times should become more obvious.

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**V. Polikarpov**

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**Эпоха Наполеона: Русский взгляд.  
Книга первая / Предисл., сост., коммент.  
И. Бордаченкова, вступ. ст. В. Ярошенко.  
М.: Центр книги Рудомино, 2013. 640 с., ил.**

***The Epoch of Napoleon as Seen from Russia.*  
Book One. Compiled, prefaced and commented  
by I. Bordachenkov; introductory article  
by V. Yaroshenko. Moscow: Rudomino Book Center,  
2013. 640 pp., ill.**

The publication of the first volume of the legendary journal *Vestnik Evropy* (Messenger of Europe) for the years 1802-1803 (when it was supervised by famous writer and historian Nikolay Karamzin) is an outstanding event. Now it is published with Igor Bordachenkov's solid commentaries and an excellent introductory article by Viktor Yaroshenko, who continues the cause of Karamzin as Editor of *Vestnik Evropy*. This is not a new reprinted edition of the early issues gathered under a common cover: it is a high-quality and convenient format designed to familiarize lovers of Russian literature with the living texture of the Napoleonic epoch, or rather of the time when the common European myth of Napoleon familiar to all Russians from Pushkin ("We all expect to be Napoleons") and Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment* ("Oh, come on, don't we all think ourselves Napoleons now in Russia?") was just taking shape.

The journal's importance goes far beyond this: very much like Karamzin's other creation, multivolume *History of the Russian State*, it is a valuable source of information about Russian literature and Russia's social life in the 19th century. This edition can be described as a delayed message from the distant past that supplies answers to the burning issues of today. We have to admit that the history of Russia regularly repeats itself and has been asking and answering the same questions for many centuries. Today, they are still high on the list of Russia's priorities: To what extent is Europe and the European way of life important for our country? What is true patriotism? What can we do to instill good taste, love of reading, universal responsiveness and sincere humanity?

In his "Letter to the Publisher" which opened the first issue of the new journal Karamzin presented his credo of a Freemason and enlightener that developed

the idea of Nikolay Novikov and his circle: "It is equally noble and pleasing to assist in moral enlightenment of the great and strong people, the Russian people; to develop ideas, reveal new attractions of life, feed the soul with moral delights and unite it in sweet feelings with the blessings of other people!" (p. 58). The pretentious and mawkish style, very alien to the cynicism of our days, should not alienate or deter us; this language teaches us elegance of opinion and word, nobility of thought, sincere inspiration, and respect for human dignity, in short, everything indispensable at all times.

The years during which Karamzin remained editor of *Vestnik Evropy* were a rare period of peace in Russia and Europe. This long awaited peace raised a wave of enthusiastic comments as the highest treasure of all nations. This emphasis on the values of peace can be easily explained by the fact that the journal's publisher was convinced that popular journals (which at that time played the role of newspapers, TV, radio and the internet taken together) were guilty of igniting warfare. The journal exposed irresponsible journalists as war mongers who fanned hatred; this is equally topical today when irresponsible people more and more frequently talk about an indispensable and unavoidable information warfare in which anything goes: "Each state in which war is at its height or where there are disagreements has a wealth of journals that can be described as the echo of battles, horrors and ireful passions. He who aspires to pacify this unfortunate state will arm those people against himself who live on the misfortunes of people and will, therefore, be an enemy of the journalists" (p. 137).

In his "Letter to the Publisher" Karamzin hoped that the recently concluded peace "will probably be firm and lengthy" (p. 57); the journal went as far as to quote a peaceful speech of First Consul of France Bonaparte, who had said that "the most successful war and its splendid successes cost a lot, the victor pays with bitter tears; the peoples pay with the most precious and the holiest of their possessions—the happiness of their families and blood of their children" (p. 75). We all know that a year later, when Karamzin had already left the journal to become historiographer another war broke out with France, Russia and many other states involved. Russia was moving toward its defeat at Austerlitz, the doubtful Treaty of Tilsit, invasion of Russia by La Grande Armée and the fire of Moscow...

Karamzin's *Vestnik Evropy* pictured Napoleon as a progressive-minded European politician, victor and peacemaker concerned with the well-being of his people and a paragon of an ideal ruler. Later, the Russian press was indulging in insulting cartoons of the famous military leader; in disparaging stories that unmasked him and spoke of him as Antichrist. At first, the publisher who quoted all sorts of information, jokes and rumors remained favorably disposed to Napoleon: "Bonaparte is loved and he is very much needed for the happiness of France; no madman can rebel against his beneficial power" (p. 81).

It goes without saying that when publishing varied information about politics and the state of social, cultural and legal affairs in France, England, Holland, the United Territories of America and elsewhere in the world the publisher compared them, albeit indirectly, with the state of affairs in Russia led by young Tsar

Alexander I. His rule bred the hopes that the spirit of enlightenment would triumph and that Russians would become part of the civilized peoples: “Today the active mind in all its states and in all lands has already become aware that it needs knowledge and demands new and better ideas. Today, all monarchs in Europe have already accepted patronage of enlightenment as their duty and glory. Ministers use the language that fits the tastes of the enlightened people. The courtiers want to pass for lovers of literature, the judge reads and feels ashamed of the old nonunderstandable language of Themis; a young man of the world needs knowledge so as to look nice in polite society or even philosophize on suitable occasions” (p. 57). This sounds very much like what the Russian enlighteners say today; they point out that Russia will profit from its openness to the world and that society will find it useful. The ideological thesis—Russia is not Europe—formulated by the reactionary circles of Russia is opposed to this openness.

Karamzin, a Russian European, had his own program of enlightenment that was an inalienable part of his ardent patriotism. In his article “About Love of Fatherland and People’s Pride” he wrote that “patriotism is love of everything that brings wealth and glory to the Fatherland and the desire to promote them in all respects. Patriotism requires reasoning; this explains why not all people are patriots” (p. 100). In other words, patriotism as perceived by the publisher of *Vestnik Evropy* was a quality of those who could think and argue, not a mere instrument of politics: “The best philosophy is the philosophy which derives happiness of man from his position. It says that we should love to be useful to our fatherland since common good is inseparable from our own good; that enlightenment of our fatherland creates many joys for us; that its peacefulness and virtues shield our family joys; that the glory of fatherland is our glory and if it is an insult for a man to be called a son of a contemptible father it is no less insulting for a citizen to be called a son of a contemptible fatherland” (p. 100).

Patriotism is closely connected with fairness and good deeds when dealing with individuals: “A patriot who loves virtue in all lands adores it in his own fatherland; it is the most important service to the state; its example not only consoles; it is very useful in civil contacts by its beneficial influence on common mores” (p. 114).

Igor Bordachenkov has rightly written in his Introduction that the collection is highly valuable: so far the articles that had appeared in the journal in the early 19th century were never published in chronological order and, therefore, nobody had a chance to read them in their continuity. It leaps to the eye that the variety of subjects looks very much like a friend list of a Europe-oriented and well-educated Russian in Facebook. There is everything: assessment of current politics, opinions about new laws, short stories full of jokes, literary works, letters, surveys of the press, etc. This similarity cannot but amaze one since Russia is still divided into the capital and the provincial cities and its civil society is still immature.

Those who are concerned with the state of morality in Russia will find the publication very useful. Here is what they will find in Issue 12 of 1802: “The main treasure of its inner condition is the present common peace in the hearts

which is the most precious and the most pleasing; it is the truest proof of the wisdom of civilian rulers. On the other hand, a friend of people and a patriot sees with joy that the light of intellect pushes back the dark area of ignorance in Russia; how the noble and truly human ideas are being confirmed in minds; how reason confirms its rights and how the spirit of Russians is being ennobled. We find worthy members of the state among the noble people who know what the state needs and who judge people and actions fairly not only in the capitals but also in the far-way gubernias” (p. 216).

Immersion into the texts stirs a complex and rich gamut of feelings and thoughts about different subjects directly related to our life at the personal and social levels. The main leitmotifs of Karamzin’s project is his faith in education and the victory of the light of reason over the darkness of ignorance: “What is more sacred than the temple of sciences, the only place where man can be proud of his dignity in the world amid the richness of reason and great ideas? The warrior and the judge are needed in civil society, yet this need is very sad for man. Progress of enlightenment should move the state away from bloodshed, and people, from strife and crimes” (p. 400).

**N. Podosokorsky**

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**С. ЛЕБЕДЕВ. Философия научного познания: основные концепции. М.: Изд-во Московского психолого-социального университета, 2014. 272 с.**

**S. LEBEDEV. *Philosophy of Scientific Cognition: Basic Concepts*. Moscow: Moscow Psychological-Social University Press, 2014, 272 pp.**

Despite the fairly long history of Russian studies of the philosophy of science and scientific cognition, which goes back many decades, so far there is no agreement on many problems, among them the problem of the subject and content of the philosophy of science, its beginning and evolution being one of the most debatable issues.

As distinct from his previous works [1; 2; 4] Sergey Lebedev in this book has avoided discussions with his colleagues, but the *Introduction* clearly shows that he has traced down the origins of the philosophy of science, as one of the “outgrowth” to the traditional sections of philosophy—to epistemology. It should be said that by the 17th—18th centuries epistemology had accumulated a wealth of mutually contradictory approaches; no wonder that in the 1830s there appeared the idea of a new (non-metaphysical) philosophy of science based not on purely gnosiological deliberations but on historical experience of “real science’s” development and the state it had achieved by that time. This means that in the reviewed monograph the author has presented the idea of two stages of development of the philosophy of science:

- (1) from philosophy to science, and
- (2) from real science to its philosophical comprehension.

It was the “first positivism” that ushered in the second stage of the philosophy of science; its concept of scientific cognition was called empirical inductivism. According to Sergey Lebedev, empirical inductivism and all other versions of the positive philosophy of science that appeared later—empiriocriticism, conventionalism and neopositivism—constituted the main content of the “classical” development stage of philosophy of scientific cognition. They were followed, writes the author, by nonclassical philosophy of science and postnonclassical philosophy of science represented by various concepts including dialectics

developed mainly by Soviet philosophers of the second half of the 20th century. Each of these concepts is discussed in corresponding chapters.

In full conformity with his logic the author opens an analysis of the concepts of classical philosophy of science with the chapter called “Empirical Inductivism” that deals mainly with “inductivist” methodology of John Stuart Mill and his follower John Herschel, as well as its criticism by their contemporaries—prominent historians, logicians and methodologists of science of that time—William Whewell, Stanley Jevons and Francis Bradley in England, Rudolf Lotze and Christoph von Sigwart in Germany, and Mikhail Karinsky and Leonid Rutkovsky in Russia. The well-justified doubts and the related arguments expounded by the above authors in respect to the empirical inductivist paradigm of scientific cognition, are usually treated superficially. With his detailed discussion, Sergey Lebedev has filled this gap.

In the next chapter “Empirio-criticism and Conventionalism” the author has justly pointed out that the second positivism followed the first one in succession (succeeded the first one) and that continuity between the two “was, first, confirmed by the rejection of the scholarly nature of classical philosophy (from Plato to Hegel, etc.) and, second, by empiricist interpretation of the nature of scientific cognition” (p. 52). On the other hand, as distinct from the first positivism, the representatives of the second positivism relied on anti-inductivist arguments when interpreting the means of formulation and substantiation of scientific laws. For them it was not a logical process but creative and psychological, based on the criterion of cognitive thriftiness and simplicity. This road led to the acceptance of social and communicative nature of scientific cognition. Henri Poincaré, the founder of conventionalist interpretation of the process of adoption by science of its laws and principles, followed the same road when developing and specifying his ideas. It was the first stage of the recognition not only of the social nature of scientific cognition and but also of cognitive will as its main factor.

Neopositivism as a new epistemological trend in the philosophy of science is discussed in the chapter predictably entitled “Neopositivism” in which the author has justly associated its simultaneous appearance in several European countries with progress in mathematical logic.

Against this background the psychological language of the philosophy and methodology of science used by the second positivism appeared to be too obscure and vague to suit the strict language of science. The author writes that neopositivism formulated a new project of the philosophy of science whose theoretical credo demanded that its language should be as strict as scientific knowledge itself, which is the subject of critical analysis of the philosophy of science and practical recommendations of how to improve the language of science. This is the only road leading to a significant and meaningful analysis of the methodological problems of science that uses the language of mathematical logic, an exemplary scientific discipline that relies on exact precision of its tongue.

The neopositivists offered a new understanding of the subject of the philosophy of science: “the subject of the scientific philosophy of science should

become the logical analysis of the language of real science, of the structure of scientific knowledge and the methods of real science carried out to verify their correspondence to the ideal standards of scientific knowledge and the methods of its construction which can be formulated in the language of mathematical logic. In this case the philosophy of science should critically assess the language of real science from the point of view our ideas about an ideal scientific tongue; it should retain its positive content only as logic and methodology of science, leaving all other philosophical problems of science, viz., the problems of scientific creativity, development regularities of science, etc outside the range of its competence” (p. 75).

The author begins his discussion of the intellectual environment in which the ideas of logical positivism received a strong development impetus with an overview of the ideas of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the founding fathers of logical positivism, and goes on with its history that began in the late 1920s at Vienna University. It was at that time that Moritz Schlick was gradually building up a circle of those who shared his ideas: logician Rudolf Carnap, mathematicians Hans Hahn and Kurt Gödel, physicists Philip Frank and Herbart Feigl, sociologist Otto Neurath and philosophers Victor Kraft, Fritz Kaufman and Friedrich Waismann. In 1929, they published their *Wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung. Der Wiener Kreis* (The Scientific Worldview. The Vienna Circle). In Berlin positivist scientists and philosophers Hans Reichenbach, Carl Hempel, Walter Dubislav and others created *Die Berliner Gruppe Gesellschaft für empirische Philosophie* (Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy). The Polish variant of neopositivism was represented by professors of the Lvov-Warsaw School Jan Łukasiewicz, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Alfred Tarski and others.

It goes without saying that a more detailed and consistent discussions of the ideas of these outstanding scientists would be preferable. But the author of the present book does not stick to a flat chronology in reconstructing the inner development logic of neopositivism, a logic objectively suggested by the real problems of the development of science (physics and mathematics in the first place) of that time. On the other hand, the development logic of neopositivism was determined by the key issues of the methodology of science inherited from the second positivism, viz., verification and demarcation of scientific knowledge, the logical structure of scientific theory, a possibility of achieving the truth in empirical science (the problem of justification of induction). The author has discussed all these points in detail.

The section “The Logical Structures of a Scientific Theory” is the most interesting: the author has analyzed in detail three programs of substantiation of mathematics—logistical (of or relating to symbolic logic) (Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead), formalist (David Hilbert) and intuitionist (Luitzen Brouwer, Arend Heyting, Hermann Weyl and others).

The author’s analysis of these three programs of mathematics’ substantiation has convincingly demonstrated that even when applied to mathematical knowledge the ideal of a scientific theory as a deductively constructed system of knowledge either cannot be fully realized (classical mathematics) or does not

correspond to reality (intuitionist mathematics). The ideal of a deductively constructed theory is even less suited for the description of real natural scientific or sociohumanitarian theories, the means and methods of which used to construct scientific concepts patently are not purely logical or formal. "It should be said that the hypothetical-deductive model of scientific cognition on which the logical positivists relied for their logical reconstruction of the process of scientific cognition looks farfetched when it comes to the entire body of real scientific knowledge, including mathematical (and, to certain extent, logical) knowledge. It seems that real scientific theories are built up by another and much more complicated method than that visualized by logical positivists. One can expect that in the process of their construction the following was taken into account: first, the specifics of the content of the objects cognized by science and, second, possible practical application of scientific knowledge. In any case, when building up scientific knowledge and when substantiating it we should go outside the limits of using empirical experience and logical arguments alone" (p. 101). We should agree with the above and with criticism of neoinductivism (Reichenbach, Carnap and their followers). The author has summed up: "Induction is unable not only to serve the demonstration method through which the true sense of scientific laws and theories is proved (all philosophers, including the positivists, realized this by the end of the 19th century). It cannot be used to identify the degree of their confirmation. This means that induction *per se* cannot serve as the method of substantiation of empirical hypotheses; in the same way it cannot serve the method through which one of the rivaling theories is found preferable. Hence it cannot be an important factor of the dynamics and evolution of scientific knowledge" (p. 114).

It was back in the 1950s that Karl Popper formulated this position in clear terms. Having highly assessed his contribution to the development of the philosophy and methodology of science Sergey Lebedev has justly pointed to the main flaw of Popper's neodeductivism: its assertion that the basic propositions are of a conventional nature introduces a considerable conventional element into Popper's falsifiability methodology. More than once Karl Popper tried to move away from radical conventionalism, but his criticism of conventionalism, writes S. Lebedev, looks more like "conventionalist tricks": "According to Popper, the empirical basis of science is totally conventional, which means that, whether Popper wants it or not, the fate of theoretical provisions depends on the conventionally accepted factors" (p. 130).

The conventionalist component of Popper's epistemology was intensified in the concept of science in the form of a multitude of mutually competing research programs elaborated by Imre Lakatos, one of Popper's pupils. The author of the book under review has demonstrated that practically all main elements of the process of scientific cognition in Lakatos' concept are of conventional nature. The author has identified the main fault of Lakatos' ideas (and all other representatives of positivist and postpositivist epistemology and the philosophy of science) as follows: "They all tried to explain the development of scientific knowledge without going outside the frame of this knowledge... They all were

convinced that objective determination of scientific knowledge, its determination by practice and all sorts of sociocultural factors belongs exclusively to its external history” (p. 136).

Paul Feyerabend, one of Popper’s pupils, disagreed with this position. He opposed the falsificationistic methodology of Popper with the concept of “epistemological anarchism”, based on the idea of a multidimensional and multifactorial determination of scientific cognition and cognitive behavior of scientists. Feyerabend came close to the conclusion that to formulate real alternatives to logical positivism and, in general, empiricism in the field of epistemology and the philosophy of knowledge we should go beyond the limits of the empirical/theoretical correlation as the main and even single contradiction in scientific cognition. “It was necessary to formulate and elaborate a wider platform of factors and contradictions” as the basis on which scientific knowledge functions and develops. Discussion of scientific cognition in the social, cultural and practical contexts was the leitmotif and the basic idea of this new approach to the epistemology and philosophy of science. The variants and specific programs of this movement were suggested and elaborated within the framework of a new—so-called postnonclassical—epistemology” (p. 140).

Sergey Lebedev has offered a detailed analysis of three main trends (paradigms) of postnonclassical epistemology:

- (1) the cognitive sociology of science (Michael Mulkay, Stephen Woolgar, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Bruno Latour);
- (2) a cultural-historical analysis of scientific cognition (Vyacheslav Stepin, Piama Gaydenko, Lyudmila Kosareva, Thomas Kuhn and others) and
- (3) the humanitarian paradigm embodied in hermeneutics, poststructuralism and postmodernism.

S. Lebedev has interpreted and highly assessed the results obtained within the cultural-historical approach as the trend within whose frames the emergence, content, specifics and dynamics of science depend not only on the type of the studied objects but also on the type of culture, of which this science is part. He remains convinced, however, that the claims of poststructuralism and postmodernism to universality are excessive. We can agree with his conclusion, even though his analysis of the “humanitarian paradigm” is not completely personified and is highly generalized.

The concluding chapter “The Dialectical Concept of Scientific Cognition (Science)” is the author’s “know-how” previously discussed in his other works (see [3]). Even though the concept is called “dialectical” it, according to the author, differs greatly from the Hegelian dialectical theory of cognition, first and foremost, in the methods of building up epistemological models. Hegel’s dialectical method was speculatively transcendental and was, in fact, imposed on science in the name of True Philosophy. The method used to build up modern dialectical epistemology according to the author, is fundamentally different. It is a product derived from an empirical analysis of real science and ascertainment of its dialectically contradictory nature. The dialectical concept of scientific cog-

dition, writes the author, relies in many respects on the fundamental ideas of Russian/Soviet philosophers (Boris Kedrov, Aleksey Losev, Mikhail Bakhtin, Merab Mamardashvili, Mikhail Petrov, Piama Gaydenko, Vladislav Lektorsky, Vyacheslav Stepin and others) as well as prominent scientists of the second half of the 20th century.

The author looks at the following seven fundamental provisions as basic for this concept, as the core of this special research program in the field of modern epistemology that dialectically sublates all biases and synthesizes the advantages of many other concepts dealing with the emergence and development of science.

- *The first provision* postulates the systemic complexity of the properties of scientific knowledge by which it differs from all other types of knowledge: its objectiveness (the content); its exactness, discursiveness, substantiation and practicality. In the absence of any of these properties any body of knowledge cannot be qualified as scientific.
- According to *the second provision* of the dialectical concept, scientific cognition is cognitive-social activity of obtaining (producing) scientific knowledge of varied contents (sensual, empirical, theoretical, metatheoretical, natural scientific, mathematical, logical, technical, technological, sociohumanitarian, disciplinary, interdisciplinary, descriptive, project, etc.). Science knows no single and universal method of acquiring and substantiating knowledge.
- *Third*, scientific knowledge is a highly complicated and pluralistic system of different types, areas, levels and units of scientific information. This system is integral, dynamic and reflexive; it is organized according to disciplines and levels.
- *Fourth*, when talking about the true subject of scientific cognition and a vehicle of scientific truth we should bear in mind that these are collectives of scientists and scientific communities, rather than individual scientists or a certain transcendental subject.
- *Fifth*, scientific cognition is determined not only by the studied object but also by the socium and culture as the necessary conditions of its realization.
- *Sixth*, on the other hand, scientific cognition and knowledge are independent, to a great extent, from social and cultural contexts due to of a great deal of inertia and resources of self-development.

The dynamics of scientific knowledge is regulated by factors and regularities of science itself and by sociocultural factors. Scientific knowledge can develop through evolution and revolutions while specific causes and mechanisms of scientific revolutions might be very different as the history of science has demonstrated. *Seventh*, all stages of the dynamics of scientific knowledge come to d by establishing certain sustainable situations: either justification or rejection (partial or total) of systemic changes by the scientific community. Both are achieved through a cognitive consensus on the debatable issues of science, the achievement of which takes time.

The author relies on these provisions to discuss the key problems of the philosophy of science: scientific rationality and its types, the main levels of scientific cognition, interaction between the empirical and the theoretical and the regularities of the development of scientific knowledge. Sergey Lebedev's analysis of the metatheoretical level of scientific knowledge attracts special attention. It is described as consisting of two sublevels: general scientific knowledge and the philosophical foundations of science.

The knowledge of the general scientific level, writes the author, includes a general scientific picture of the world and the general scientific methodological, logical and axiological principles. The metatheoretical level in the natural scientific and sociohumanitarian disciplines is present as corresponding pictures of the world and in the form of general scientific and philosophical principles. "It is necessary to point out, writes the author, that contemporary science has no common content nor uniform metatheoretical knowledge identical for all scientific disciplines. This knowledge is always highly specific and is tied, to a great extent, to the specifics of scientific theories" (p. 188).

The status of the philosophic foundations of science in the structure of scientific knowledge was one of the problems the philosophy of science widely discussed in the 19th and 20th centuries, the main point of disagreements being whether the philosophical foundations of science should be included in the structure of scientific knowledge. Having analyzed the arguments of his opponents, Sergey Lebedev concluded that "none of the positions offered a correct interpretation of the nature of the philosophical foundations of science, their special status and structure. We believe that the philosophical foundations of science are a special type of knowledge, a bridge between philosophy and science that is neither philosophy nor science *per se*. This is a special type of interdisciplinary knowledge, a Centaur, so to speak, of an obviously dialectical nature" (pp. 194-195).

This can probably invite objections, yet we should agree with the author: without its philosophical foundations the integrity of science and the integrity of culture crumbles: "Philosophy and science, for that matter, are particular aspects of culture. The integrity of culture consistently, sometimes harshly, reminds of itself. This happens not only during scientific revolutions when new fundamental theories are created but even when the scientific community accepts them as paradigms" (pp. 195-196).

I would like to conclude the review of this highly interesting work by saying that certain points have somewhat marred the general positive impression. I have in mind the principles of classification of the basic epistemological concepts used in the reviewed monograph. To my mind they have been classified according to two factors: chronological (the development stages of epistemology of science that correspond to the development stages of science: "classical," "nonclassical" and "postnonclassical") and substantiated. This principle, however, was violated, which leaves the reader at a loss: to which period of epistemological development belongs the "dialectical concept" successfully developed by P. Gaydenko and V. Stepin. The author refers these philosophers to the cultural-historical trend of contemporary "postnonclassical epistemology."

There are other debatable issues, yet we should point out that the monograph offers a wealth of interesting ideas, that the provisions are well substantiated and well argued; its structure is clear and logical. The book stirs up an interest in the most topical problems of the history and philosophy of science.

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**В. ПАНТИН, В. ЛАПКИН. Историческое прогнозирование в XXI веке: циклы Кондратьева, эволюционные циклы и перспективы мирового развития. Дубна: Феникс+, 2014, 456 с.**

**V. PANTIN, V. LAPKIN. *Historical Forecasting in the Twenty-first Century: the Kondratyev Cycles, Evolutionary Cycles and Prospects for World Development*. Dubna: Phoenix+, 2014, 456 pp.**

In the modern era, that is rich in political upheavals, violent conflicts, information wars and economic crises, there is a particularly acute need for the scientific forecasting of future developments and transformations. At the same time, the development of a methodology for predicting political changes is so far clearly falling short of both the pace of change and the request for reasonable scientific foresight for minimizing political risks and raising the threshold of security for man and society. Many of the concepts aspiring to a clearer vision of future changes, as, for example, the concepts of the “end of history” by Francis Fukuyama or of the West-centric democratic transition model of development have proved to be a partial or complete failure. Even the concepts of globalization, which describe correctly the key trends of global dynamics in general, pay insufficient attention to disparities, imbalances, contradictions and failures in the globalization processes. As a result, many researchers dedicated to the study of modern political transformations have been stunned by unexpected events and processes such as the “Arab Spring,” the 2014 Ukrainian crisis and its international escalation, the emergence of the so-called *Islamic state*, a political strengthening of China, etc.

This is why works on methodology of forecasting political change are becoming so much in demand in search for ground for possible development scenarios and specific forecasts for the coming years and decades. Development of models and tools for scientific foresight proves today to be in the spotlight of political scientists and professionals from related fields of sociohumanitarian

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This review was first published in Russian under the title “Evolutionary Cycles and Problems of Forecasting of Political Changes,” in the journal *Politicheskiye issledovaniya (POLIS)*, No. 1, 2015.

knowledge, who are seeking ways of comprehending the prospects for future development. However, there are few fundamental works to date that test and endorse forecasting tools for an integrated analysis of political transformations in the rapidly changing modern world.

Among such works there appears the new monograph by Vladimir Pantin and Vladimir Lapkin that carries on and further develops their ideas and theoretical approaches which were first set forth in their work *Philosophy of Historical Forecasting: the Rhythms of History and Prospects for World Development in the First Half of the 21st Century* (2006). At that time, may we remind the reader, the authors offered extensive forecasts that caused the scientific community's interested reaction (see [9; 5; 2; 10]). Today, bearing in mind the political and economic upheavals that have happened over the eight years since that time, there is every reason to check the extent to which those predictions have come true. It will thus provide an opportunity to assess the extent to which the methodology developed by V. Pantin and V. Lapkin is adequate and effective.

Indeed, in the early 2000s some researchers succeeded in pretty accurately predicting a number of important events and processes, in particular, the destabilization of the world order, and the intensification of upheavals in the economy and politics after 2005, the global crisis of 2008-2009 and the subsequent recession, the sharp increase within the 2013-2017 timeframe of political and military conflicts, including intercivilizational and inter-ethnic violence. This fact draws further attention to the methodology of forecasting based on an analysis of the medium-term cycles of global economic and political dynamics—first and foremost—of the evolutionary cycles, the study of which was started in the work of Nikolay Kondratyev. In the new work under review, V. Pantin and V. Lapkin rightly draw our attention to the fact that the interest in the Kondratyev cycles increases in times of crises in development, and the wavelike nature of discussions (their ups and downs) testifies to the reality and complex, multidimensional nature of the phenomenon (p. 236). Unveiling the prognostic potential of the Kondratyev cycles, they point to the need for correcting them taking into account the regular stepwise (after each cycle) reduction of their downgrading phases, bearing in mind that these cycles represent “only a fraction (or, to be exact, one half) of the full evolutionary cycle of the international (market) economic and political system, in the course of which there occurs a complete update of the dominant technological model of production, the most important social and political institutions” (p. 249).

The researchers seek to clearly identify the timeframes of the evolutionary cycles in this and other contexts, while repeatedly emphasizing the ultracomplex nature of society as a system which cannot be described in simple mathematical terms (however much the anxious supporters of “simple” solutions to complex problems may desire it). Indeed, in forecasting, according to the authors, there is no “universal master key,” applicable in all situations of life of the theory or a formalized model; building workable evolutionary cycles requires fine tuning and understanding of a multitude of facts and phenomena, as well as scientific intuition. In other words, although there is no universal prescription for

predicting political development, but there are approaches suggested by political philosophy, the philosophy of history, political and sociocultural analysis, a synthesis of which provides the opportunity to identify factors of change and anticipate trends of their dynamics.

While extending the lines of historical analysis and prognostication, charted in the 2006 book, the monograph under review shows that the researchers are moving to a new level to develop a methodology for forecasting and its approbation. Thus, the opening section of the book "*Philosophical and Scientific Foundations of Future Studies*" features an analysis of possibilities and evaluation of the effectiveness of the key approaches to forecasting, such as the philosophical-historical, civilizational, global-systemic, along with the approaches based on mathematical modeling, globalization concepts, the Kondratyev cycles and world dynamic waves. The authors do not confine themselves to an overview and assessment of the forecasts of world political and economic development in the 21st century that have been developed using these approaches by leading Russian and foreign scientists, as well as whole research institutions and even intelligence communities, but prove the necessity of synthesizing them on the basis of the concept of nonlinear dynamics and the further cyclical-wave complication of the global and country-level political systems. It should be noted that, moreover, there is no unambiguous solution to this problem, crucial for political science, of synthesizing various research approaches (it is precisely synthesis, rather than mechanical bonding), and the potential of such synthesis for historical prediction is still undervalued. This theoretical and methodological issue has been worked on for a number of years by the RAS Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (*IMEMO*), represented here by V. Pantin and V. Lapkin, in the context of an analysis of political and sociocultural transformations at different levels of political and institutional organization of modern societies, from supranational to local [7].

It's for a reason that V. Pantin and V. Lapkin have devoted considerable attention to methodological problems of forecasting political dynamics. The forecasting methodology used in their study is based on the ideas of multifactor and nonlinear political development, as well as the authors' concept of the evolution of cycles in the world political and economic system. The key value of the evolutionary cycles for understanding the inner workings of the world dynamics is that new evolutionary qualities of a political system (for example, new political institutions, forms of political organization, ideological trends, sociopolitical movements and communities) emerge, undergo selection, retain their vitality and develop as a result of the system's passage through several evolutionary cycles, including both the phases of rise and fall. In other words, it is exactly in such cyclical advances that a political system acquires and secures for itself its fundamentally new qualities and properties.

This happens because, in order to reach partial degradation of the old properties (which does not allow the new qualities to occupy their necessary place (a "creative destruction" process, in Joseph *Schumpeter's* terminology), i.e., a sys-

tem goes through a cycle of partial destruction and a subsequent (renewal). Examples of the evolutionary cycles in politics can be found in Arthur Meier Schlesinger's description of the US domestic policy cycles [8] and Frank Klingberg's reference to the US foreign policy cycles, [3] the reform—counterreform cycles in Russia, [6] the cycles of Russia's autochthonous political development, [4] Samuel Huntington's democratization waves, [1] the evolution cycles of the world political system, etc. Understanding such patterns of cyclic development, as shown in the monograph, is crucial for analyzing and forecasting political changes and shifts.

Chapter 5 "*The Value of the Kondratyev and Evolutionary Cycles to Predict World Development*" proves convincingly that the development of the methodology for the Kondratyev cycles makes possible its effective application to describe not only technological, economic and social dynamics, but also a political one. Because of this they are crucial for predicting political change and shifts in both individual countries and the world as a whole. In developing this approach, the authors demonstrate that most effective for historical analysis and forecasting are "the four-phase cycles of the world system evolution, consisting of two falling (lowering) and two rising waves of the Kondratyev cycles. Based on the model of the four-phase evolutionary cycles, the researchers present and substantiate their forecast of a change in the world political dynamics vector in the first half of the 21st century. The current part of the evolutionary cycle is a period of "great upheavals" with its duration of approximately 12 years (2005-2017) to be followed by another "world market revolution" phase.

Chapter 6 "*The Rhythms and Cycles of Russia's Autochthonous Development*" presents a large-scale and multifaceted analysis of Russia's political development over the last few centuries. This very chapter could serve as a foundation for an entire book (and, hopefully, it will grow in the future into a highly demanded monographic study). It analyzes in detail the dynamics of Russian political modernization with its peculiar alternation of "shoot-forward" and "relaxation" phases, describes the cycles of change of political elites in Russia, brings to light the 12-year cycles of Russia's foreign policy with alternating political vector changes (now to the West, now to the East), but also justifies the upcoming key turning point in the political development of Russia around the year 2025, which will mark the beginning of a fundamentally different path of its development and open for her the prospect of more organic existence in the world community. In general, the authors show convincingly that, "the documentable strict rhythm of development, magically conjugating the key turning points in Russian history, reveals to the researcher the opportunity to better understand the connection of her strongly different epochs that form, nevertheless, the integrity of the Russian culture, statehood, political and mental tradition" (p. 362). Thus, the dynamics of political change in Russia is much more complex and multifaceted than it is represented in some historical concepts that regard Russian political development as a motion in a cloistered space.

The final chapter "*A Forecast of the World Development in the Twenty-First Century: the Main Conclusions*" drawn on the basis of the Kondratyev cycles

and evolutionary cycles formulates specific forecasts of the world political dynamics system in the coming years and decades. It also outlines in the most general terms the prospects and possible options for political development in the first half of the 21st century and after the year 2050. Most interesting are predictions about the changing nature of world leadership in this century, the growing polycentrism in the world political development and prospects for world order reconfiguration, the bifurcation of the areas of global conflict in the context of destabilization of the Islamic world and attempts to split the post-Soviet space surrounding Russia. The authors argue that Russia, despite its many problems, will serve as a kind of counterweight to the United States and China in world politics up to the year 2025. Also projected are fundamental changes in the world development in the 2040s that will affect all countries and civilizations and will raise in real earnest the question of the future of man and human civilization as a whole. However, it is rightly pointed out in the book, that “there is no rigid predestination in human history and, as a result, a lot depends on the conduct of individuals, groups, strata and classes” (p. 287). This view gives hope for overcoming the future development stalemates that are being viewed today.

It can be stated in general that the monograph by V. Pantin and V. Lapkin throws a new light on the key issues for modern social sciences—the methodological problems of analysis and forecasting of political changes. The book draws the reader’s attention to a variety of critical predictions which must be taken into account not only by experts and researchers of modern politics, but also by the political parties and public movements, statesmen and civil activists. It is addressed to all of us, citizens of the 21st century, who are aware of the responsibility for our future, for the future of the country and the world.

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*Translated by Vadim Polyakov*

**В. ПЕТРЕНКО. Психосемантика искусства.  
М: МАКС Пресс, 2014, 320 с.**

**V. PETRENKO. *Psychosemantics of Art*. Moscow:  
MAKS Press, 2014, 320 pp.**

The new book by Viktor Petrenko examines the perception of art works by viewers and readers. The book's twelve chapters grouped into four sections present theoretical and empirical studies carried out by or supervised by the author at various periods of time using poetry, painting and cinema as material. It contains the works of K. Berdnikov, Ye. Korotchenko, V. Kucherenko, T. Menchuk, O. Sapsolve and A. Suprun. Separate chapters are devoted to some earlier articles authored and co-authored by V. Petrenko.

Considering art as one of the most important forms of cognition and self-consciousness, as a form of creative building of possible worlds, ideologems and models of "the desired future," V. Petrenko defines the psychosemantics of art as a form of its reflection that makes more conscious the perception of the content of the works of art by building semantic spaces. The author takes the view that scientific reflection on works of art is possible and necessary because art "is the reflection and construction of the world from symbolic imagery and low-reflexive idioms" (p. 7). Reflection may be supported by the use of sign systems attaining the "level of metalanguage that makes it possible to discuss the problems of the first-level language" (ibid.). The author assumes that "anything that has the level of expression and the level of content, i.e., does not merely present itself, but also carries information about something else" (p. 8). The methodology of psychosemantics fits that definition and therefore corresponds to the task of reflection on art.

The psychosemantics of art is based on the use of a special methodological apparatus that involves the building of subjective semantic spaces describing and modeling the fundamental structures of the consciousness of viewers, listeners and readers of art works. In a brief introduction to the book V. Petrenko highlights the essential role for psychosemantics of the technique of building semantic spaces (Charles Osgood's "semantic differential" and George Kelly's "personal constructs method") as well as the cluster analysis used in psychology by George Miller. The methodological basis of psychosemantics is the school of Lev Vygot-

sky, Aleksey Leontyev and Aleksandr Luriya. The technique of building subjective semantic spaces is determined by the meta-language of experimental psychosemantics which enables the researcher to “see” (to single out) the new in the products of artistic creativity. The cultural-historical and activity-based approaches invest the psychosemantics of art with the ideas of semantic structure of consciousness and the “sign character” of substantive reality, or human practice. The “American technological set of instruments” and the Russian cultural activity-based psychology share the principle of the activity of human consciousness that constructs pictures of the world. Let us stress that the metalanguage of semantic spaces is not just a technique of analysis and interpretation of art works (p. 10), but a general methodology of understanding them addressing the personality, goals, values and meanings of the individual. V. Petrenko does not merely know himself (one feels like saying “through technique”), but enables the reader to “become sensually aware” of the complex structure of human consciousness which is not one, however multidimensional, space, but a multitude of interpenetrating spaces. The method of experimental psychosemantics constructs in-depth structures (exposes sections/layers) of the consciousness of readers, viewers and listeners of a text, ultimately the Text of the World.

The book presents art as creativity and an object of experimental psychosemantic research as being indeterminately complex, hierarchic and vivid. Chapter one presents the psychosemantic approach to the psychology of art, to the definition of the object of art and artistic constructs as forming the meaning of the works of art. The specificity of art, according to the author, consists in that art is at once reality and a description of reality. The creative activity of someone who creates a work of art is a fundamental type of human activity, reality of man’s being marked by numerous features and traits. However, the perception of a product of art is also a fundamental type of activity that taxes the recipient’s intellectual effort, intuition and spirit. How the creative act is performed and how the act of perceiving creative works is performed is as much a mystery for the author as it is for the reader, listener and viewer. This is probably the main (ontological) problem of the book under review. Drawing on diverse empirical material presented in various chapters of the book, the author reveals important aspects of the perception of art works proceeding from the assumption that the process of perception of a work “is mediated by the personality of the viewer and his implicit theory of the world, of himself and others” (p. 16). “Not only the creator of art, but also the viewer is projective,” V. Petrenko maintains, stressing that if “the artist’s view of the world is already reflected in the actual work” the viewer’s perception and attitude to this work can be explicitly revealed using various forms (*ibid.*). Crucially, for the author of the book such explicitness is neither a formality nor utilitarian intellectual game. Reflecting with the help of the psychosemantic method on the products of art, V. Petrenko believes that “in the broad sense the task of art is to change, transform and lend a spiritual dimension to the subject’s picture of the world, to develop his consciousness, to integrate his perception of the world into the semiosphere of human culture and, finally, to create and develop culture itself, to construct possible worlds” (p. 12).

The author is convinced that a great work of art “stimulates the generation of meanings, the search for God, of the highest meanings of being, transcending the personality both of the art creator and the viewer who spiritually resonates with him” (p. 18). The book prompts the conclusion that psychosemantics of art also serves these purposes although the author does not say so explicitly: he writes that “psychosemantics (or the theory of personal constructs) as a science of the forms and processes of categorization, seeks to describe the semantics and syntax of the language of generalizations of the in-depth level of categorization, which is the universal language of art” (p. 15). The psychosemantic scholar who turns to the art work through a mediator, the recipient, “sets out to see, hear, understand and experience the work from the standpoint of the viewer, reader or listener, to describe the work as it is transformed into an event and spiritual experience of another person.” (p. 28).

Psychosemantics is treated in the book as a methodology of the study of forms of categorization and implicit models through whose prism the viewer perceives the works of art. This contributes to the development of culturological thinking. The psychosemantic method offers an instrument of reflecting on a work of art (a verse, poem, still life, landscape, film, etc.) as a specific type of reality and—what is also very important—introduces new substantive artistic abstractions (concepts, categories) that unfold and give an insight into the work’s artistic world. For this reason V. Petrenko’s book may be of interest to very diverse types of readers: psychologists, philosophers, students of culture, linguists, media specialists and art scholars.

The method of psychosemantics is aimed at analyzing the depths and highs of the perception of the reality of specific art works by the viewer. Viktor Petrenko believes that “the work of art is the mediator between its author and the viewer, who carries in a transmuted form the author’s spiritual quests” (p. 23). Psychosemantic spaces as the main language of describing the perception of a work by the reader, reveal many “mysteries” not only of the audience’s perception of a work of art, but of the work itself. The implementation of this methodological approach is the main achievement of V. Petrenko’s book. But there are also other merits not to be overlooked. The author defines the development of art as “humanity’s ascent up the spiritual vertical” (p. 18). The art of psychosemantics applied to the analysis of the perception of the reality of art, at the metalevel is also “an ascent up the spiritual vertical.” The reality of culture is here “cultivated” on the soil of the psychosemantic paradigm and is reflected in the results of numerous empirical studies that provide an ontological foundation for interpretations.

The range of themes and problems of empirical studies presented in the book is sure to interest readers and merits attention. These include: “the poetic metaphor” (in Section 1, *Verbal Psychosemantics*); “symbolism of color in the work of S. Yesenin, A. Blok and N. Gumilyov (in Section 2, *Psychosemantics of Color*); “the metaphor in visual art,” “landscape as the projection of the artist’s soul,” “still life as visual aphorism,” “energetics of the visual image” (in Section 3, *Psychosemantics of Painting*); “understanding a film and the attitude to it”

(with reference to the film *Stalker*), “viewer’s perception of the motivational structure of a film character” (based on the film *Cruel Romance*), “artistic constructs of a film,” “viewer’s attribution of the motives of characters’ acts” (based on the film *The Barber of Siberia* in section 4, *The Psychosemantics of Film Art*). The design and the results of empirical studies are described in separate chapters of the book to give the reader an exhaustive idea of each of them. It is impossible to enumerate all the empirical studies presented in the book. By way of an illustration, a study is devoted to the energetic and emotional state of the environment.

The high spiritual and ideological potential of the book is illustrated by one of its key questions: how can the viewer derive from a work of diverse meanings an idea or principle that is relevant both to the present day and to “eternal life”? This question is particularly important in the current sociocultural situation when high art is becoming mass-produced and mass-consumed and is often distorted and simplified. How to prevent art from losing its lofty mission of transmitting the multiplicity of visions in a single system of coordinates (civilization)? One way to solve this task is to try to build a matrix of a work’s perception with many coordinates. The author is looking for answers to the questions: how can a subject find (create) new coordinates of viewing the work of art and what can psychosemantics offer to facilitate the process.

The book is spiritually responsive and deserves high appraisal. But we missed generalizations linking individual chapters and sections; the abundance of empirical material sometimes overshadows the analysis *per se*; the book could do with an author’s conclusion without which there is a sense that the author has left something unsaid. True, there is room for varying interpretations.

V. Petrenko chose as an epigraph to his book the words of Hegel to the effect that any human creation, be it literature, music or painting, is always a self-portrait. It would be fair enough to see the book on psychosemantics as the author’s self-portrait. Reading the book we see an image of a thinker and poet, a romantic and a constructivist, a bold explorer and a painstaking worker. The important thing is that V. Petrenko’s book is a piece of research that prompts the reader to reflect on the being of culture based on enlightenment and doing and thinking. Both, in the author’s opinion, should be multidimensional, polyphonic and should be guided by schemes and benchmarks. If the humankind has learned to build and use the spatial coordinates of the world, for example in building a house, perhaps the time has come for using technology to build “an abode of the spirit”? What are its coordinate axes? We believe that the search of answers to these questions is the key task of the book under review which describes the heady perspectives of the psychosemantic method for a new constructivist (active, synthesizing and worldview-related) view of a piece of work. Above all the piece of work that is Man.

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**И. ЗАБАЕВ, Е. МЕЛКУМЯН, Д. ОРЕШИНА и др. (ред.).  
Невидимая церковь. Социальные эффекты  
приходской общины в российском православии.  
М.: ПСТГУ, 2015, 269, [2] с.**

**I. ZABAYEV, Ye. MELKUMYAN, D. ORESHINA et al.  
(Eds.). *The Invisible Church. Social Effects  
of the Parish Community in Russian Orthodoxy.*  
Moscow: St. Tikhon's Orthodox University,  
2015, 269, [2] pp.**

In 2015 the publishing house of St. Tikhon's Orthodox Humanities University (*PSTGU*) brought out a collection of articles entitled *The Invisible Church. Social Effects of the Parish Community in Russian Orthodoxy*. This review looks at the book from the standpoint of an engaged reader whose research interests are outside sociology of religion. It considers the articles in each section one by one and articulates the questions that arise when reading them.

Before discussing the articles in this collection (all of which, incidentally, have been earlier published in various Russian scholarly journals) it is important to note that it has been published by a religious university. A sociological work brought forth in such an institutional framework is hardly a routine event for Russia, a country which lived through forced secularization in the 20th century. In Europe, of course, the forerunners of universities sprang up in church communities and monastery schools. Many successful Western universities are faith-based [1]. However, what makes this collection special is not the fact that it emanates from a religious community, but the special organization of the *PSTGU* as such (see, for example, [5]).

The aim of this collection is to assess the social impact of the Russian Orthodox Church activities proceeding from a tacit assumption that the impact may be positive. The authors consistently elaborate this assumption in the three sections of the collection making skilful use of the categories of classical and modern European sociology and never departing from the intent of sorting out the mechanisms that could be instrumental in creative collaboration of the Russian Ortho-

dox Church (ROC) and Russian society in addressing the problems that are common to all.

The authors juxtapose their analytical position to the study of the church in terms of its liturgy as well as to the stigmatizing approach beginning from suspicious solidarity with the state and ending with the issue of the decency of the priests. Whatever context they discuss, the authors do not just record a religious factor, but trace it through the wide spectrum of ROC activities beginning with the feeding of the homeless and ending with ecclesiastical guidance of the parishioners and the nonchurching believes, who somehow connect with parish community. The authors articulate the goal of the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church as forming strong parish communities in Russia, with practically every article assessing the chances of such communities being formed.

In his article "*Sacral Individualism and the Community in Modern Russian Orthodoxy*" [9, pp. 31-48], Ivan Zabayev demonstrates that in addition to the macro-obstacles in the way of bringing society and the Church closer together (forced secularization, poor religious education, the difficulties of "involving the individual in religion," etc. ) there are considerable obstacles at the individual level because to a modern Russian the Church is an abode of things sacred that are out of reach of the community of people. Russians go to church to be closer to God and not in search of group therapy or to share interfamily transfers. That is why the practices of confession, Eucharist and so on are closer to the experience of a not quite churched person than other forms of church activities.

But the aim of the ROC is to sow the seeds of social communities. In general, the articles in the collection drive home the message that modern Russian society also needs such seeds and where people become involved in the affairs of a strong church parish, they draw spiritual fortitude from the Church.

Can active involvement with the Church be stimulated? The studies reported in the collection suggest an affirmative answer. The underlying formula for this conclusion is "we do not care for those we love, but we love those for whom we care." "One of the aims of the Church social work is to produce those who wish to help others," Ivan Zabayev, Darya Oreshina and Yelena Prutskova write in the article *Specificities of Social Work in the Russian Orthodox Church Parishes: the Problem of Conceptualization* [9, p. 128]. The article puts its finger on something very fundamental. After all, success in making more people want to help others described in the article *The Social Capital of Russian Orthodoxy in the Early 21st Century: Social Network Analysis* [9, pp. 49-76] can only be attributed to the "high mobilization potential" of social networks that are formed around strong parishes and are constantly expanding as new members join in. And the more people understand the tasks of the activities centered around the Church the more readily they join these activities.

Perhaps the healing organic solidarity is not so difficult to achieve. The above-mentioned article shows that social networks are broader among those community members who have contributed not money, but effort and time [9, p. 67]. Articulating the problem is an important facilitating practice widely used in psychosomatic medicine and it looks as if in a society where "solo living" is

becoming increasingly popular the importance of communication will soon have to be scientifically proved and promoted through Church.

What are the chances of finding a strong church parish close to one's home? As I. Zabayev and Ye. Prutskova show in their article *The Orthodox Church Community: Spatial Localization and Factors Contributing to its Formation (with Reference to the City of Moscow)* [9, p. 16-30], the boundaries of strong parish communities are not always territorial. Strong communities do arise in parishes, but members of these communities often come from all parts of Moscow. Although "the factor of spatial proximity still has some significance" [9, p. 28], the mechanisms of the emergence of strong communities are hardly connected with shared territory. An important factor in forming a strong parish is the personality of the superior, although we are not talking about charismatic leadership (which can hardly be an effective driver of community development in the longer term). As several articles in the collection stress, an important factor is the superior's ability to organize around the parish activities other than church services.

Another strand in the collection has to do with the search for positive influences of the parish community in specific areas of social life, i.e., in education and social work, family and birthrate. The general tone of that section is set by the article of Ivan Zabayev and Ivan Pavlyutkin *University and Two Meanings of Responsibility: Objectify the Social Effects of Education Institutions (Based on a Survey of Graduates of an Orthodox University)* [9, pp. 100-121]. Its key analytical category is the dichotomy of "form and substance," "instrument and value." Zabayev and Pavlyutkin use the dichotomy to explain the social orientation of, for example, the graduates of *PSTGU* which differ from those of the alumni of other universities which are more in line with the "audit society" principles. The same dichotomy is present in the article by I. Zabayev, D. Oreshina and Ye. Prutskova titled *Specificities of Social Work in the Parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church* which points out that members of the clergy are not equipped to formalize the social work in their parishes [9, p. 122-140].

The importance of this juxtaposition is highlighted in the article by Yelena Pavlyutkina *Joining up and Responsibility: Specificities of the Work of Nonprofit Organizations with the Homeless (with Reference to Religious Organizations)* [9, p. 141-160], who points out that state and nonprofit religious organizations pursue what are essentially opposite strategies with regard to homeless people.

The abovementioned results merely scratch the surface of the content of each of the texts in the collection which suggest questions that go far beyond the study of the ROC social activities. Thus, it is not only the graduates of the Orthodox University who prove that to be an Orthodox believer does not mean not being modern, but the abovementioned article by Zabayev and Pavlyutkina *University and Two Meanings of Responsibility: Objectify the Social Effects of Education Institutions* basically describe the transformations of the Russian higher education system as Russian universities enter the international academic market. It appears that a religious university is more successful in avoiding some negative effects of marketization of academic work. It would be interesting to

know, however, how representative the case of St. Tikhon Orthodox University is among the other religious universities in Russia. Likewise, it is hard to assess the fact that the students of a religious university do not decide to enter it by chance. Besides, there is nothing to prevent a religious university from trying to join the international market. Would it still be able to stick to the content of its activity and if yes, what would enable it to do so?

It has to be said that other articles in the collection also prompt the question of the place of the religious factor as an explaining variable. For example, the above-mentioned article by Ye. Pavlyutkina speaks of two logics of work with homeless people: one is aimed at protecting society against deviants without a fixed abode and the other is aimed at helping them. The former logic is allegedly guiding state organizations engaged in social work in this field, and the latter is guiding nongovernmental faith-based organizations. This generally coherent article uses a black-and-white approach that raises questions: thus the author has little to say about how NCOs choose their area of activity, and why these organizations have chosen to focus on the work with the homeless. Likewise, it is unclear to what extent the religious character of the organizations influences their objectives. In other words, what is the fertile soil on which the commitment to help the homeless grows? The fact that the article is included in the *Invisible Church* collection would seem to suggest that faith is the primary factor, however, if one looks at interviews with representatives of various Russian NCOs, it turns out that the category of help is the leitmotif of all volunteer activities (see, for example, [7]). One of the sensitive issues for these organizations is their relations with the state which are such that it is the volunteer projects and not their addressees that feel marginalized. The material presented in Ye. Pavlyutkina's article leaves it unclear what the integrating potential of religion-based NCOs in work with the homeless is that distinguishes them from the state players whose approach is very formal. Perhaps association with religion suggests that one should not merely look in the direction of a person, but see the person, and then it would serve a useful purpose to look at how NCO workers, for example, build their personal attitude to the homeless and what arguments they use to put such deviations right when they encounter them. On the other hand, to what extent is the position of civil servants determined by the fact that they are engaged in a state organization? Are the two logics of work with the homeless an alternative to choose between them from? Or is it rather the case of division of labor between different types of institutional actors in this field?

Unlike the topic of work with homeless people, which gets scant attention in Russian sociological studies, the problem of childbirth is widely discussed. One would have thought that nothing new can be said about an area where the argument has long produced competing hypotheses and where it is not the power of arguments, but the quality of statistical models for data analysis that decides who wins the argument. And yet the approach to this theme in the logic of a well-grounded theory that we find in the articles by I. Zabayev, Ye. Melkumyan, D. Oreshina, I. Pavlyutkina and Ye. Prutskova *The Impact of Religious Socialization and Affiliation with a Community on Birthrate* [4, p. 174-193] and by I. Zabayev *Rationality,*

*Responsibility, Medicine: the Problem of Childbirth Motivation in Russia in the Early 21st Century* [9, p. 216-267], attests convincingly that fertility behavior cannot be explained in a satisfactory way in terms of available concepts, no matter how many “sociological variables” Mincer’s equation can accommodate.

At the level of macro-data the choice in favor of child-bearing is explained through the category of responsibility. The decision to allow a baby into one’s own life, as the authors demonstrate from many angles, is difficult precisely because it involves assuming responsibility for the life of another human being. It is particularly difficult because in the modern child-centered society the value of children for parents is primarily emotional. Doctors (whose high responsibility so often evolves into cynicism) hate to treat their relatives because it is too taxing to treat someone to whom one is emotionally attached. Parents, however, have to assume such a responsibility by default. And this happens in a high-risk society whose most common cell is a nuclear family with few children. Therefore, as the authors demonstrate, people more readily have one or even many children if they can share the responsibility with someone, be it God or at least members of the same parish. Therefore some people’s parenthood helps other people to become parents, not only morally, but by sharing practical information on “what may happen and how it can be handled.”

In approaching the problem of fertility behavior via the category of responsibility the authors arguably are making a big step forward. Behind the façade of a routine category is hidden an array of the latest trends in modern Russian society which is successfully assimilating the Western mode of thought. The latter, having appeared in the era of the Enlightenment by declaring that a unique human life is absolutely priceless, four centuries later unfolds into social ideals of perfectionism, the priority of self-fulfillment over other vital values, the search for manageability and the illusion of controllability of biological and psychological processes in a person’s life. The problem of parenthood forms the apex of this evolution.

An alternative view of childbirth factors is but one of several illustrations in the book of the analytical advantages of soft methods marked by a careful, painstaking, “sifting” attitude to data and their potential for developing sociological theory. For example, one can argue about what part of their lives modern Russians are prepared to devote to the Church. But one wonders how accurately the dominant trend is identified when reading that the priests, driven by the idea of establishing a strong parish community, seek to consolidate the parishioners within the parish whereas in reality, owing to the fluidity of territorial configuration of parish communities in Russia, the parish community consists mainly of people from other localities, while most of those who declare themselves to be Orthodox believers go to church only occasionally.

One notes also the language spoken by the priests and believers which can be glimpsed through quotations: not “sick,” but “infirm,” not “old woman” but an affectionate “*babushka*.”

One would have liked to see the tendency to use affectionate terms as proof of the atmosphere prevailing among people who are members of a strong parish.

However, the beatific impression left by the works on the social effects of church parishes is somewhat marred, in the Russian context, by the fact that the articles have been written and approved by experts who are champions of the ROC. One feels like diluting the syrupy accounts of the positive effects of churching with data on how forced secularization of Russia influenced the Church itself, whether it contributed to its integration as being persecuted or resulted in the Church representatives themselves losing the habits of godly living. In the introduction to the book the authors seem to proceed in accordance with the old Confucian maxim that “it is difficult to look for a black cat in a dark room, especially if it is not there.” However, for some reason none of the authors would admit that the search is made difficult by the fact that the cat is darkish.

Even so, it would be wrong not to expect a significant result from research that looks at society through the prism of religion, that pillar of classical sociology. Just as religion asks existential questions, so the sociology of religion raises the same questions, only it does so from the viewpoint of sociological theory and for the purpose of developing it.

In the early 20th century sociology could claim the status of a science in its own right partly at least due to the achievements in the study of religion as the key source of social solidarity. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* by Émile Durkheim [3] or *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* by Max Weber [8], structural functionalism or understanding sociology, irrespective of the methodology—have the same roots. A century later we are observing with some surprise that new sociological approaches can emerge through borrowing of analytical categories from the sociology of religion, whether with regard to the transcendental value of market goods (see, for example, [2]) or the latest trends in the institutional analysis of organizations in the shape of institutional logics (cf. [6]).

In his article *God, Love and Other Good Reasons for Practice* Roger Friedland proposes to speak about God as an analytical category and about religion as a template not only for analyzing any social institutions, but for understanding the concept of institution as such [4, p. 28]. Behind the functioning of any social institution there is not only instrumental rationality, but also value-based rationality which is the real foundation of the logic of organizing daily practices. The actors engaged in this sphere build their practices in accordance with the value that is key to the particular sphere, thus helping to sustain it. Where possible, actors interpret their actions as serving the supreme value, as service to God. Talk about God leaves the confines of the church, loses its mystical character and is placed in the context of daily life (we say he is “a good doctor by the grace of God”) and turns out to be the key to discovering the underlying foundations of these notions.

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## ACADEMIC JOURNALS

Editorial note: We continue to inform you about the contents of the leading RAS journals specialized in Social Sciences and the humanities, which are published in Russian and confirm our readiness to help our readers order translations of any article mentioned below.

### VESTNIK ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK

*(Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences)*

**No. 2, 2015:** **O. Favorsky** et al. Why Should Begin Implementation of the Energy Strategy of Russia; **V. Ilyin**. Computational Mathematics and Computer Science: Global Challenges and Russian “Road Map”; **N Mazov, V. Gureyev**. Alternative Approaches to the Evaluation of Scientific Results; **O. Lavrik, I. Gusner**. The Academic Library as a Research Institute; **B. Porfiryev**. Economic Consequences of the Catastrophic Flood in the Far East in 2014; **S. Viktorov** et al. Effective Explosive Training during the Development of Stratified Deposits; **V. Levashov**. Socialization of the State versus Etatisation of the Society; **R. Galiulin** et al. Agrochemistry of the Persistent Pesticides; **N. Makhutov** et al. Creation of North Modification Appliances Is the Problem of Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Eastern Regions; **A. Zhuravlyov, A. Yurevich**. Metamorphosis of Liberal Psychotype; **G. Zaikina**. The Energy Sector as the Engine of Innovation Economics; **A. Finkelshteyn**. H-index and RAS.

**No. 3, 2015:** **T. Khabriyeva**. The Legal System of the Russian Federation in Terms of International Integration; **G. Sobolev**. The Methodology, Results and Problems of Earthquake Prediction; **I. Minervin** et al. The Zoning of the Okhotsk and the Japanese Seas Ice Cover; **L. Shchegoleva** et al. Generalized Portrait of the Academic Dissertation Council; **V. Kosolapov, Z. Shamsutdinov**. The Use of Genetic Resources for Breeding Innovative Varieties Forage Crops; **B. Belan**. The Transfer of Vehicles to Gas: Possible Problems; **E. Theres, I. Theres**. The Synthesis Reaction Is the Main Source of the Earth Internal Energy; **V. Parmon**. Possible Observation of Kinetic Isotope Effects in the Life Cycles of Living Organisms at Deuterium Very Low Concentrations; **I. Andreyev**. Philosophical Aspects of Neurophysiology.

**No. 4, 2015:** **A. Grigoryev** et al. Medical Maintenance of Extravehicular Astronauts Activity; **A. Potapov** et al. Modern Technology and Fundamental Research in Neurosurgery; Development of Medicine and of Big Science—Common, Achievements, Common Problems. Paper Discussion; **A. Kholodov**. About the Citation Index of Scientific Publications; **A. Andreyev**. Intellectual Environments: A Conceptual Perspective from the Sociologist’s Point of View; **I. Kuznetsov**. Technology and Risks of Genetic Engineering in Plant Breeding; **I. Dmitriyev**. “He’s a Chemist, a Botanist, a Mechanic, and a Sailor.” About “The Suitcase Maker” by O. Mikhaylov, or Once More about Dmitry Ivanovich Mendeleev; **G. Malinetsky**. Man-Made Resources in the Context of the New Russian Industrialization; **A. Volkov, A. Sidorov**. On the Development of Mineral Resource Complex of Russia; **Ye. Sayko, N. Trukhan**. At the Forefront of Scientific Thought. The 100th Birth Anniversary of Academician B. Raushen-

bakh; **R. Shcherbakov**. “The Happiest Thought of My Life...” The 100th Anniversary of Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity.

**No. 5-6, 2015: V. Zolotaryov**. The Great War, Patriotic War. 70 Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War; Scientific Session of the RAS General Meeting “Scientific-Technical Problems of the Arctic Developing”; Keynote Speech by Academician V. Fortov, RAS President; Speech by S. Donskoy, Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of Russia; International Cooperation in the Arctic: Risks and Opportunities. Report by Academician A. Dynkin; Arctic Ocean Geodynamic Evolution and Contemporary Issues of Arctic Geology; Report by Corresponding Member of RAS V. Venikovskiy and Academician N. Dobretsov; To the Development of Oil and Gas Resources of the Russian Sector of the Arctic; Report by Academician A. Kontorovich; Strategic Mineral Resources of Russian Arctic. Report by Academician N. Bortnikov; The Biological Resources of the Arctic Seas of Russia. Report by M. Flint, Doctor of Biological Sciences; The Contribution of Agricultural Scientists in the Development of Arctic and Sub-Arctic Territories. Report by Academician G. Romanenko, Vice-President of RAS; The Acoustics of the Deep Part of the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic Shelf of Russia. Report by Academician A. Litvak; The Past and the Present of the Arctic Cryosphere. Report by Academician V. Kotlyakov, A. Velichko, Doctor of Geographical Sciences, A. Glazovsky, Candidate of Geographical Sciences, V. Tumsky, Candidate of Geological-Mineralogical Sciences; On the Phenomenon of Arctic Law in the Context of the Legal Development of Russia. Report by Academician T. Khabriyeva, Vice-President of RAS, A. Kapustin, Doctor of Legal Sciences; Modern Climate Changes in the Arctic. Report by I. Mokhov, Corresponding Member of RAS; The Permafrost in the Arctic: Dynamics, Resources, Risks. Report by Academician V. Melnikov; Indigenous Peoples of Russian Arctic. Report by Academician V. Tishkov, N. Novikova, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Ye. Plineva, Candidate of Historical Sciences; Arctic Medicine in the Twenty-First Century. Report by Academician L. Afanas, M. Voyevoda, Corresponding Member of RAS, Academician V. Puzyryov, V. Melnikov, Doctor of Biological Sciences; Space Weather Today, and After-After Tomorrow. Report by Academician L. Zeleny, A. Petrukovich, Corresponding Member of RAS; Speech by the Participants of the Scientific Session of the RAS General Meeting: Academician L. Faddeyev, Corresponding Member of RAS A. Chilingarov, Doctor of Geological Sciences G. Ivanov, Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Pavlenko, Corresponding Members of RAS V. Rozhnov, L. Lobkovskiy, A. Maksimov, A. Khanchuk, Corresponding Members of RAS V. Kolomeychenko, R. Goldshteyn, Academicians Yu. Tsvetkov, G. Mesyats, V. Rubakov, R. Nigmatulin; Closing Remarks by Academician V. Fortov, the President of RAS; Resolution of the Scientific Session of the RAS General Meeting “Scientific-Technical Problems of Arctic Developing”; **S. Rogov**. The State and Prospects of Russian-American Relations; Is the Cold War Possible Today? Paper Discussion; **V. Dymnikov** et al. Scholar, Teacher, National. The 90th Birth Anniversary of Academician G. Marchuk; **A. Tishkov**. The Academic Geography during the Great Patriotic War; **Yu. Ilyin**. The Contribution of Russian Scientists in the Discovery and Investigation of Animal’s Information RNA.

## VOПРОSY ISTORII

*(Problems of History)*

**No. 3, 2015:** The Conference of the Prague Group of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. 1931; **K. Chernov**. The Political Program of Alexander I. 1801-1812; **A. Nestrenko**. Bishop Albert; **Yu. Pelevin**. The Special Case of Vera Zasulich; **L. Lyutov**. The Church and Resistance to the Liquidation of Russian Peasantry in the Early 1930s; **I. Obyedkov**. Russian Military Propaganda in the United States during World War I; **A. Kutishchev**. Cultural and Civilizational Aspects of the Wars of Late Feudalism; **Yu. Boyko, B. Kurbatsky**. The Place of Kosovo in the

Foreign Policy of Albania in the Late 19th Century to the Beginning of the 1990s; **S. Kulikov**, **F. Seleznyov**. The Nizhny Novgorod Stage of A. Khvostov's Career; **S. Zyablitseva**, **V. Tsukrov**. Kuzbass—Donbass: Chronicle of the War Years (1941-1945); **O. Goroshchenova**. Ye. Avdeyeva-Polevaya—a Siberian Writer; **Kh. Magomedsalikhov**. Ethnocultural Synergy in the History of Salatavia; **D. Kidirniyazov**, **Yu. Lysenko**. Ossetian Religious Commission in the North Caucasus in the 18th—First Half of 19th Centuries.

**No. 4, 2015:** The Conference of the Prague Group of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. 1931; **S. Rybakov**. On the Semantic Structure of the Concept "History"; **V. Vyatkin**. Ivan Ivanovich Melissino; **Yu. Pelevin**. The Special Case of Vera Zasulich; The World War through the Eyes of a Lieutenant. The Publication by **L. Stepanenko**; **I. Chemodanov**. Vyatka Peasantry in the First World War; **A. Chirkov**. Military Commissions in the State Duma of the 3rd and 4th Conventions; **A. Grinyov**. The Classification of Ships of the Russian-American Company (1799-1867); **T. Nadzhafli**. The Relationship of the Azerbaijan State of the Safavids with Russia in the 16th—17th Centuries; **G. Arsh**. To the Question about the Assessment of Lambros Catsonis in Historiography; **R. Pochekeyev**. A Butakov and the Aral Flotilla in the Late 1840s—Early 1850s; **P. Gordeyev**. Revolutionary Censorship at the State Theaters in 1917; **I. Kovtun**. The Discovery of Coal in Kuzbass in the 1720s; **F. Ozova**. The Role of the Institution of Amanats in Circassian-Russian Relations in 1552-1864.

#### NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA

*(Modern and Contemporary History)*

**No. 1, 2015:** **V. Sogrin**. Domestic Politics of USA from W. Clinton to B. Obama; **Ya. She-myakin**. BRICS in the Light of Civilization Approach; **M. Yusim**. About "Challenge of Bartetta," Great Historians and Patriotism; **M. Sidorenko (Novosibirsk)**. Jean-Baptiste Lully's Music and the Court of Louis XIV of France; **V. Smirnov**. To the Question of the Reasons of World War I; **B. Zhelitsky**. Ethnic Minorities in the System of International Legal Protection (Hungarian Experience of the Twentieth Century); **N. Korovitsyna**. The Slovak Society in the Way of Modernization after 1989; **P. Cherkasov**. Russian-French Relations and January Uprising 1863; **A. Koshkin**. Inglorious Battles on the Hills of Manchuria. To the 110th Anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War; **A. Loshalov**. V. N. Lamsdorf and Acute Issues of Russian-American Relations in the 1890s—1900s; **N. Kalmykov**. About the American History, and Not Only; **A. Makhov**. Everyday Knowledge of the Past in the Discussions on the Web Forum; **A. Vatlin**. The German anti-Hitlerite Resistance in the Historiography of the USSR and Russia; **L. Lapteva**. A. L. Pogodin—Researcher of the New History of the Western and Southern Slavs; **I. Selivanov**. The First Soviet Biographer Charles de Gaulle.

**No. 2, 2015:** To the 70th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War; **A. Borisov**. War and Victory. How the Post-War World Was Born; **V. Khristorov**. Behind the Scenes of the Soviet-Finnish Negotiations for a Truce. 1943-1944; Academician **A. Davidson**. History—the Field of Battles. And Armistices; **V. Sogrin**. Reconsidering the Way in the Profession; **V. Rusakovsky**. The French Clergy, the Royal Power and the Holy See in 1789; **I. Nokhrin**. Canada and the Anglo-American War of 1812; **O. Vlasova**. (Kursk). "Man in the Modern Age" by Karl Jaspers as a Reflection of the Crisis of the Weimar Republic; **S. Buranok**. (Samara). Hiroshima and the US Press: August 1945; **O. Skorokhodova**. "The Soviet Energetic Threat": A View from Washington and Brussels (the 1970s—Early 1980s); **O. Volosyuk**. Spain and Russia in the Second Half of the 19th Century: Confrontation, Dialogue or Alliance?; **A. Loshalov**. V. N. Lamsdorf and Acute Issues of Russian-American Relations in the 1890s—1900s; **Ye. Susloparova**. Arthur Henderson—the "Architect" of the British Labour Party; **D. Nikiforov**. Peter Karadorđević in Herzegovina Uprising of 1875-1878.

## ETNOGRAFICHESKOYE OBOZRENIYE

*(Ethnographic Review)*

**No. 1, 2015: Special Section of the Issue: Cannibalism: The Outcomes, Prospects, and Contexts for Study (Guest Editor—K. Bogdanov).** K. Bogdanov. Cannibalism: History, Contexts and Prospects for Study; L. Bugayeva. Showtime for Cannibals; A. Panchenko. “Thank You for the Kidney!”: Power and Consumption in Organ Theft Legends; V. Vyugin. Polite Cannibals and Rude Anthropophags: The USSR, Before and After (On the History of One Social Metaphor); I. Garri. Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan Community in the Religious Culture of the Buryat; I. Dryomov. Long Haired Kalmaks; A. Zakurdayev. Wen Hiu as a Concept of the Chinese Civilization; Ye. Kochukova. On the History of Classification of Peoples in the PRC; N. Khaldeyeva et al. The Bedouins of Southern Sinai: Ethnographic and Anthropological Data; S. Kryukova. The Language of Peasant Court Justice in the Second Half of the 19th Century: From Oral to Written; O. Savostyanova. The Traditional Culture of Nutrition among the Old Believers, Peasants of the Nagatinskaya District, Moscow Region (the Late 19th Century—1940s).

## VOPROSY FILOSOFII

*(Problems of Philosophy)*

**No. 2, 2015: K. Momdzhyan.** Universal Needs and a Generic Human Essence; V. Yemelin, A. Tkhostov. Chronotopos Deformation by Sociocultural Acceleration; L. Garay and V. Lektorsky. On Activity Theories: A Dialogue about What Is Their Richness and Their Deficiency; A. Ivanitsky. Consciousness and Brain: How “to Verify the Harmony with Algebra”; A. Antonovskiy. Understanding and Consensus in Scientific Communication; V. Shokin. The Series “Philosophical Theology: Contemporaneity and Backword Glance; Synopsis of The Existence Of God (2nd Edition) By Richard Swinburne; V. Shokhin. Theism or Deism? Reflections on Richard Swinburne’s Metaphysical Theology; R. Swinburne. Response to Vladimir Shokhin; Archpriest Pavel Khondzinsky. The Fragment “On the Trinity” in the General Context of the Theological Heritage by Aleksey Khomyakov; K. Barsht. The Name and Philosophy of Nicholas Malebranche in Draft Manuscripts and Works by Dostoevsky; V. Porus. Negative Ontology by Nikolay Berdyayev and Arseny Chanyshv: Socioepistemological Retrospective; D. Bosnak. The Concept of “Uniqueness of Event” in the Architectonic of the “Ancient Chapters” of Bulgakov’s *The Master and Margarita*; N. Kanaevya. Linguistic Foundations of Buddhist Epistemology and Logic; S. Pakhomov. The Soteriological Knowledge in Hindu Tantrism; D. Maslov. Nominal Negatiion of Parisian Franciscans in the 1320s; A. Zherebin. The Enigma of the “Great Detachment.” On the Anthropology of the Decadence in Nietzsche’s *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*; I. Kuzin. To a Question of Formation of the Concept “Look” in Sartre’s Philosophy; M. Kedrova. Herbert Read: A Culture in the Perspective of the Philosophy of Art.

**No. 3, 2015: V. Bychkov.** Artisticity as an Essential Principle of Art; T. Sidorina. “Homo faber” as Symbol of Labor Epoch: To the History of the Evolution of the Concept; V. Podolsky. Social Policy Justification in English Conservative Thought of the 19th Century; My Way in Philosophy World. An Interview with Aleksandr Myslivchenko; N. I. Gubanov, N. N. Gubanov. Subjective Reality and Space; R. Dozhdikova. The Evolution of Everyday Cognition and Some Problems Relating to Post-non-classical Education; D. Alekseyeva. Intellectual Property and Social Development: Problems of Efficiency and Justice; Ye. Trufanova, A. Yakovleva. Social Roles of the Scientist from “Escapist” to “Manager”; To the 90th Anniversary of Ye. Ilyenkov; G. Lobastov. Ye. Ilyenkov: Philosophy and Pedagogy; A. Maydanskyy. The “Russian European” Ye. Ilyenkov and Western Marxism; V. Kantor. “The Underground Man” against “New

People,” or About the Triumph of Evil in the World; **A. Antoshchenko**. George Fedotov’s Early Works. To the Publication of “On Genius”; **G. Fedotov**. On Genius; **A. Gacheva**. From Imi-slavie to Imiadejstvie: A. Gorsky, N. Setnitsky and V. Muravyov as Participants of the Dispute over Name; **V. Senderov**. From “All-Slavic Federation” to “Russian World”; **Kaibara Ekiken**. Precept in Happiness (Rakkun) translated into Russian by Aleksandr Mesheryakov; **D. Lungina**. Idea of Salvation in Søren Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Writings. Essay II. Anti-Climacus as a Thinker of Modernity (“Sickness Unto Death”); **A. Yampolskaya**. Praxis and Poesis of Truth: Derrida and Marion Interpreting St Augustine.; **N. Blokhina**. Paradox of Analysis and Paradoxicality of Analytical Philosophy.

### CHELOVEK

*(Human Being)*

**No. 1, 2015:** **Ye. Tetushkin**. Do the Human Races Actually Exist?; Human Nature: The History of Self-Building. The Roundtable; **A. Voronin**. The Time and the Eternity in RUSSIA—2045 Project; **L. Dragunskaya**. King Oedipus’ Oedipus complex: Incest Problem in the History and in the Culture; **A. Karabykov**. The Crisis of Confidence and Transformation of Speech Ethics in the Early Modern European Society; **Ye. Berkovich**. The Antipodes. A. Einstein and Ph. Lenard: The Physics and the History; **F. Maylenova**. Racing with the Time, or Tomorrow Will Never Come; **O. Savelyeva**. “Beauties” and “Cover Girls”: The Quest for Ideal of Beauty in Mass Imaging Industry; **A. Fatenkov**. Reducing a Human Being to “Naked Life”: G. Agamben’s Philosophical Anthropology; **V. Krasikov**. Fenomenology of the Drinking Session; **N. Dzhavrshyan**. Target-Setting Model of Culture and the Problems of Language; **Ye. Bogatyreva**. Bolshoy Karetny Lane in Cultural Space of Moscow; **G. Boyeva**. Leonid Andreyev’s Diaries: The Keys to Creative Activity.

**No. 2, 2015:** Humanities: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (Roundtable Discussion); **R. Apressyan**. Agape; **Gi. Agamben**. The Ethics of Security Technologies and Video Monitoring; **P. Matveyev**. Natural Moral Law; **N. Mitsyuk**. Refusal of Motherhood as a Life Project: On Russian Women’s Attitudes at the Turn of the 19th—20th Centuries; **A. Shipilov**. Dichotomy of “Male and Female” in Antiquity; **I. Andreyev**, **L. Nazarova**. The Heavy Burden of Diabetes; **Methodyi (Zinkovsky)**, Hieromonk. On the Concepts of the “Person” and “Hypostasis” in the Russian 19th Century Religious Philosophy; **I. Salmanova**. Tolstoy: The Line of Life and the Logic of Creative Work; **A. Vafin**. “Not Shaking Hands” Techniques; **S. Shults**. Gogol and Swift (Dead Souls and Gulliver’s Travels); **Ya. Chesnov**. Field Anthropologist’s Esoterics.

### PSYKHOLOGICHESKY ZHURNAL

*(Psychological Journal)*

**No. 2, 2015:** **A. Lebedev**. Psychological, Economic and Social Efficiency of Advertising in Modern Marketing Communications; **Ye. Volkova**, **A. Grishina**. Structure of Subjectivity of Younger Teenagers with Different Levels of Computer Addiction; **L. Golovey** et al. Parent-Child Relationships in Stable and Critical Periods of Childhood; **G. Nikiforov**, **S. Shingayev**. Occupational Health Psychology as an Actual Scientific Direction; **V. Khotinets**, **A. Kalinenko**. Value-meaning Factors of Life Intentions of Penitentiary Inmates; **V. Koltsova**, **A. Zhdan**. I. M. Sechenov’s Theory “Reflexes of the Brain”: Manifest of Russian Objective Psychology”; **Ye. Gorshkov**. Definition of Object Domain in Social Psychology at the Stage of Its Formation in the USA; **T. Lobanova**. Interrelation between Work Interests and Organizational Behavior of Employees; **T. Kornilova** et al. The Dark Triad Personality Traits Measure: Approbation of the Dirty Dozen Questionnaire; **A. Chernyshev** et al. On the Prospects of Russian Psychology for Russian Society Tasks’ Solving.

## OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI I SOVREMENNOST (ONS)

*(Social Sciences and Contemporary World)*

**No. 2, 2015:** **A. Yakovlev.** Incentives in the Public Administration and Economic Growth: Experience of Soviet Union, China and Russia; **S. Biryukov.** The Political Economy of Rent and Russia: Is There a Cure for the “Dutch Disease?”; **Zh. Latov, G. Klyucharev.** Non-formal “Rules of Game” in Education: Simulation Activities, Simulacra and Knowledge Brokers; **D. Melnik.** The Concept of Social Liberalism on the ‘Market of Ideas’ of Contemporary Russia in the World: Essay on Contemplating; **E. Pain.** Imperial Nationalism: Emergence, Evolution and Political Prospects in Russia; **V. Galyapina.** From Compatriot to “Stranger”: The Image of the Migrant in the Perception of the Residents of Moscow (on the Results of Focus-group Discussions); **I. Ionov.** Project of “Cognitive History”: Archeology and Ecology of Ideas (Reflections over the New Publication of Works of O. Medushevskaya); **A. Vishnevsky.** After the Demographic Transition: Divergence, Convergence or Diversity?; **Ye. Balatsky.** Three Ways of Knowledge; **M. Deryabina.** The Theory of the Firm in Optics of Socioeconomic Progress; **S. Dubovsky.** Mechanisms of Development and Conflicts in the 21st Century; **T. Koval.** Not to Lose in the “Bermuda Triangle”; **Yan Ke, G. Nikolaishvili.** Chinese and Russian Social Advertising.

## POLITICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (POLIS)

*(Political Studies)*

**No. 2, 2015:** Address of Political Scientists of INION RAS; **M. Gorshkov, V. Petukhov.** Foreign Policy Orientations of the Russians: A New Turn; **R. Turovsky.** Russia’s Local Self-government: The Agent of the Government in the Trap of Insufficient Funding and Civil Passivity; **L. Bronzino.** Specifics of Migration from Russia to Europe in the Course of Crisis: The Flight of the Creative Class; **K. Simonov.** Does Russia Need a Bipartisan System?; **V. Vasilyeva, A. Vorobyov.** Corruption Markets; **Ide Keiji.** Negotiations between the USSR/Russia and China on Border Settlement (Article Two); **A. Korotayev, L. Isayev.** Political Geography of Modern Egypt; **S. Khenkin, I. Kudryashova.** The Integration of Europe’s Muslims in Its Political Aspects; **S. Lutsenko.** Pluralism, Tolerance and Freedom in Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights; **P. Ivanov.** Clash of Civilizations *or* Sustainable Development?; **Kh. Tkhapsoyev.** Interpretation of Social Space—Time in the Context of Civilizational Process; **Yu. Korgunyuk.** Electoral Corruption: Medical Record; **M. Lebedeva.** Food as a Mirror of Global Political Development.

**No. 3, 2015:** **Yu. Oganisyan.** The Great Patriotic War—An Unfinished War?; **N. Simoniya, A. Torkunov.** New World Order: From Bipolarity to Multipolarity; Manuscripts Don’t Burn! (Introduction to the Rubric); **P. Panov.** Institutionalism(s): Explanatory Models and Casuality; **W. Patzelt.** Morphology and Casuality; **I. Fomin.** Integrating the Humanities: Semiotics or Memetics?; **B. Makarenko, I. Lokshin.** Modern Party System: Scenarios of Evolution and Trends of Development; **V. Fedotova.** Is There a Chance for Global Social Democracy?; **A. Solovyov.** Government Decisions: The Conceptual Space and Dead Ends of Theorization; **Ye. Gri-goryeva** et al. How Good Are the Journals in Which You Publish Your Articles?; **S. Chugrov.** Scientific Article: A Fruit of Creative Art, Craft, or Relevation?; Third “Berdyayev Readings” Forum—2015. Kaliningrad; **L. Timofeyeva.** Russian Government and Bureaucratic State by V. Makarenko; **V. Nemirovsky.** Traumatized Society and Its Phantoms.

## GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO

*(The State and Law)*

**No. 2, 2015:** **M. Krasnov.** The Head of State as an Element of the Authoritarian Potential of the President (The End); **Ye. Khazipova, A. Kerimov.** Executive Power in the State Mecha-

nism (Questions of the Theory); **D. Avdeyev**. Republican Form of Government in Light of the Constitutional Monokratizm (Russian Experience); **M. Lapina**. Theoretical and Legal Aspects of Risk Management; **Yu. Dmitriyev, S. Molchanov**. The Practice of Providing Legal Protection of the Results of Scientific Research in Education in the Conditions of Legal Uncertainty (For Researchers and Practitioners in Education); **O. Martyshin**. Two of the Law on Religious Associations; **Yu. Zavyalov, I. Galkin**. Phenomenology and Cognition Law; **G. Ruchkina, Ye. Matveyeva**. Energy Saving in the Sphere of State Public Interest; **Ye. Deryabina**. Lisbon Treaty in the System of Sources of Law of the European Union: Compared Analysis; **Yu. Skuratov**. Eurasian Paradigm of Russia and Some of the Problems (Challenges) of Integration in the Territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); **V. Zhukov**. Legal Science in Pre-revolutionary Russia: The Formation and the Ratio of the Dogmatic and the Fundamental Law; **V. Bodayevsky, O. Gutnik**. Special Subjects of Crimes against Military Service in the Criminal Law of the Russian Federation.

**No. 3, 2015:** **S. Channov**. Once Again the Question of Service Law; **S. Polenina**. Softening Law as the Main Trend of Its Modern Development and the Resulting Consequences in the Field of Human Rights; **V. Laptev**. Subject of the Modern Economic Law; **A. Chepurnov**. Concession as Organizational and Legal Forms and Methods of Economic Management; **G. Vetrova**. To the Question of Differentiation of the Criminal Procedural Form of Pre-trial Proceedings; **S. Solovyov**. Municipal Crime Elements: Problems of Theory and Practice; **I. Andreyeva**. Formation and Evolution of the Approach in France to the Juridical Power in the Separation of Powers System; **M. Galas**. The Institutional and Legal Instrument of Social Adaptation of the Russian Emigration in Western Europe 1920s—1940s and Integration with Opposition Organizations in the Soviet Union; **Ye. Krestyannikov**. P. Vologodsky: In the Service of Justice in the Epoch of the Historical Changes; **I. Alebastrova**. The Constitutional Principle of the Inalienability of Human Rights and Their Limits: Compatibility Issues; **S. Tikhomirov**. International Strategy for Disasters Reduction and International Law; **A. Ladeyshchikov**. Basic Principles of Regulation of Hazardous Waste Utilization in the European Union.

### VOPROSY EKONOMIKI

*(Problems of Economics)*

**No. 3, 2015:** **Ye. Vakulenko, Ye. Gurvich**. The Relationship of GDP, Unemployment Rate and Employment: In-depth Analysis of Okuns Law for Russia; **G. Yudin**. The Moral Nature of Debt and the Making of Responsible Debtor; **Ye. Fyodorova, Yu. Barikhina**. Assessing Horizontal and Vertical Spillover Effects from Foreign Direct Investment in Russia; **V. Buvaltseva, V. Chechin**. Development of the Investor Institution in Russia as a Basic Participant of Securities Market; **V. Zubov, V. Inozemtsev**. Surrogate Investment System; **A. Knobel**. Eurasian Economic Union: Prospects and Challenges for Development; **A. Dubyansky**. G. Knapp's State Theory of Money: History and Current Perspectives; **A. Maltsev**. History of Economic Thought, *Quo vadis?*

**No. 4, 2015:** **A. Ulyukayev, V. Mau**. From Economic Crisis to Economic Growth, or How to Prevent the Crisis from Turning into Stagnation; **S. Afontsev**. Crisis Management under Economic Sanctions: Mission Impossible?; **N. Zubarevich**. Regional Dimension of the New Russian Crisis; **Ye. Goryunov et al.** Monetary Policy of Bank of Russia: Strategy and Tactics; **S. Narkevich**. Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves: History, Definition, Composition and Modern Functions; **I. Gilboa et al.** Economic Models as Analogies.

### SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (SOTSIS)

*(Sociological Studies)*

**No. 2, 2015:** **O. Karmadonov** (Irkutsk). Solidarity, Integration, Conjunction; **V. Somov** (Nizhny Novgorod). Sociology of Sovietness: Historical and Cultural Aspects; **A. Viktorov**

(Moscow). Inequality Turn in the World as Challenge to Global Sociology; **S. Kravchenko** (Moscow). Bridges Connecting All Possible Cleavages in Sociology for a More Equal World; **P. Sztompka** (Cracow). A “Positivist” Manifesto; **A. Nemirovskaya** (Moscow). Prospective Modernization of the Far Eastern Federal District Regions; **M. Lastochkina, A. Shabunova**. (Moscow). Stable Multi-vectors of North-Western Federal District Modernization; **Choi Wooik** (Goyang, Gyeonggi, Republic of Korea). A History and Mainlines of Sociological Studies in the Republic of Korea; **Song Joonsoo, Kim Hyejin** (Goyang, Gyeonggi, Republic of Korea). Korean War and Changes of South-Korean Society in the 1950s; **Kim Minsoo, Kim Seunrae** (Goyang, Gyeonggi, Republic of Korea). Korean War and Non-standard Employment Issue after 1997 Crisis; **Jang Se Ho, Ra Seungdo** (Goyang, Gyeonggi, Republic of Korea). “Park Chung-hee syndrome”: History and Realities. A Reconsideration; **Hwang Sung-Woo, Kim Joon Seok** (Goyang, Gyeonggi, Republic of Korea). Kyrogy-family Phenomenon in Contemporary Korea; **O. Yanitsky** (Moscow). On the Evolution of International Comparative Studies in Ecosociology; **L. Titarenko** (Minsk). Ecological Aspect of Way of Life: Basic Values and Behavior Types; **V. Zasyplin** (Surgut) et al. School Teachers as Social Professional Community; **M. Kurbatova** et al. (Kemerovo). Behavior of University Employees during Higher Education Reformations: an Issue of Choice; **P. Shevchenko** (Moscow). Models of Administering Unified Education Organizations in Moscow; **V. Petrushin** (Moscow). Conflicting Cultures—What Creates and Shapes Them? **N. Vinogradova** (Yoshkar-Ola). Regional Aspects of Social Protection of Orphans; **N. Levchenko** (Moscow). Russian Animal Protectors Who Are They and How They Act?; **N. Romanovsky** (Moscow). New Conceptions and Ideas in Contemporary International and Russian Sociology (16th A. Kharchev Readings).

## VOSTOK

(Oriens)

**No. 6, 2014: Bayram Balci**. Jamaat al Tabligh and Restoration of Religious Ties between the Indian Subcontinent and Central Asia; **Ye. Lepekhova**. The Buddhist Sutras Text’s Perception in the Japanese Literary Tradition Setsuwa Bungaku (8th—13th Centuries); **Ye. Galkina**. A Note on the Interpretation of the Term Saqaliba in Ibn Fadlan’s Account; **A. Ikhsanov**. Interrelations of the Turkmen Tribes of Teke and Yomut in the 18th—19th Centuries; **Yu. Kupriyanova**. Shanghai Women in the First Half of the Twentieth Century: From the “Triple Obedience” to Equality in Marriage; **S. Ivanov**. The Fate of the Soviet Kurds; **Ye. Astafyeva**. Singapore in Malaysia (1963-1965); **N. Tsvetkova**. Industry Produced Accident in Bhopal and Risks of Globalization; **M. Shapovalov**. British Economic Interests in Palestine in the Late Nineteenth—Early Twentieth Centuries; **P. Grokhovsky, A. Kramskova**. Terminology of the Tibetan Theory of Writing; **N. Zherlitsyna**. Orthodox Greek Community in Tunisia under the Auspices of the Russian Empire (Based on the Materials from the Archives of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire); **A. Shustova**. George Roerich about the Role of Buddhism in Cultural Unity of Asia; **V. PogadayeV**. Literary Dialogue of Civilizations.

## VOPROSY LITERATURY

(Problems of Literature)

**No. 1 (January-February), 2015: M. Krongauz**. The Crash Course of Newspeak; **M. Yelify-orova**. The Formula of ‘Beast-Like Howling’: From Epic to Political Pamphlet; **O. Kiyanskaya, D. Feldman**. The Soviet Career of an Acmeist Poet: Documents and Facts Relating to Vladimir Narbut’s Biography; **V. Belova**. Igor Severyanin’s Early Publishing Strategy. *Poetic Brochures of 1904-1912*; **L. Katsis**. The Chronicle of Mandelstam’s Life and Creative Work: From Facts to Fantasies; **O. Minnullin**. Merciless Ethics of Varlam Shalamov in His Short Story *Unconverted*; **S. Burov**. Hoffmann’s Allusions in the Novel *Doctor Zhivago*; **S. Yakov-**

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